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Chapter One: Introduction
Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation
The ministerial activity of Wilhelm Frick in Thuringia, from 23
January 1930 to 1 April 1931, has suffered from an analytical imbalance. 
Both German and non-German scholars have largely considered Frick’s 
period in office from a deterministic standpoint, frequently drawing a 
straight line from the events in Thuringia between 1930-1931 to the Nazi 
seizure of power throughout Germany in 1933-1934.
“There can be little doubt that the Thuringian case represented a model for 
the Nazi seizure of power in 1933”1
“The Frick ministry illustrates Hitler’s tactics so clearly as to constitute a 
general model for the assumption of power”* 1 2 *
“What happened gives an indication of the way at this time the ‘seizure of 
power’ in the Reich itself was envisaged”?
1 M. Broszat, M., Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (Leamington Spa/'ilambungNew 
York, 1987), p.78
1 D.R. Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia, 1924-1930”, 
Cmitral European History (i-March), Volume 8,1975, p.48
1 I. Kershaw, Hitler, 18891936: Hubris, p.319. For similar comments, see also: H. Heiber, The 
Weimar Republic (Oxford, 19^3), p.l74; EJ. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler: Germany, 1918-4933
(Basingstoke, 1993), p.225; G. Schulz, Von Brtmingzu Hitler. DerWandeldespolitischen Systems in Deutschland
19301933. Band III. Zwischen Demokratic und Diktatur. Verfassungspolltik und Reichsreform in der ‘Weimarer 
Republik’ (Berlin/New York, 1992), p.140
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These interpretations have arisen from a retrospective analysis of 
German interwar history, which cannot provide a satisfactory analysis 
of Frick’s period in office. The aim of my research is to provide an 
alternative to this picture, by undertaking a complete analysis of Frick’s 
activity as Thuringia’s Minister of the Interior and of Education on its 
own terms. The main areas of investigation are: the origins, drafting, and 
implementation of Frick’s measures; his impact upon Thuringia’s civil 
service and administration; the nature of the relationship with his 
coalition partners; the perception of him by the opposition parties; and 
finally, his relationship with, and portrayal by, the NSDAP in Thuringia 
and the Reich. The interpretative framework focuses upon the 
significance of Frick’s measures and behaviour as a means of validating, 
modifying, or refuting the commonly held belief that his period in office 
represented a model for the ‘seizure of power’ carried out in Germany 
between 1933 and 1934 4
It would be something of a cliche to point out that all research 
projects encounter problems of one kind or another that demand, or 
force, changes in methodology. Yet, as far as this research has been
4 See E.A. Mower, Gemiany puts the Clock Back, Revised Edition (Harmondsworth, 1937), p.l58 
for one of the earliest views that Frick’s activity was the shape of things to come' after 1933.
2
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concerned, the cliche is much closer to a truism. Problems - or rather, 
limitations - with primary sources have meant that it has not always
been possible to accumulate enough data to satisfy the original aim of 
the thesis, i.e. a complete analysis. It is necessary, therefore, to define the 
nature and scope of these limitations since they have had an important 
influence upon the methodological, analytical, and interpretative
frameworks of the dissertation.
The Scope and Limitations of the Primary Sources
The Thuringian Ministry of the Interior (ThMdl)
Frick’s measures within this sphere of ministerial competence are 
very few and far between. Frick’s personnel measures, such as his anti­
communist decree, and its implementation have been reconstructed 
from ThMdl files, but other measures such as the Enabling Act, which 
were in the remit of the Thuringian Ministry of the Interior, have had to 
be reconstructed from files within the Education and Finance
Ministries?
Investigation into Frick’s handling of the Thuringian police has
J See ThVbMin A/6 and ThFiMin/6
3
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been severely hampered by the paucity of the documentation6 *This 
collection appears to have been ‘weeded’ given the fact that other 
collections for the periods before and after Frick appear to be reasonably
intact.
The Thuringian Education Ministry (ThVbMin)
This collection has proved to be a richer source of material. Yet 
the utility is restricted to certain areas, and again there are limitations. 
For example, there is much detail about the implementation of Frick’s 
anti-Semitic school prayers/ and his banning of Erich Maria Remarque’s 
All Quiet on the Western Front,8 but the files do not record how, why, and on 
whose initiative such measures were adopted.
Outside of Frick’s most controversial measures, the files in the 
ThVbMin reveal little. The vast majority of files have not recorded any 
‘impact’ that Frick may or may not have had. As with the ThMdl files, 
there does not appear to be any record of any policy overview of Frick’s 
actions - proposed or enacted - committed to paper by either him or
1 ThMdl P/14 deals with the administration of the Thuringian police from the late 1920s to 
the 1940s. It contains only two documents from the period of Frick’s Ministerzeit.
iThVbMin A/1010
® ThVbMin A/1011
4
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anyone else.
The Thuringian State Ministry (ThStMin)
It was hoped that this collection would prove to be a valuable 
source of material in regard to the governmental overview of Frick and 
his actions. This has not proven to be the case. The files of the 
Thuringian cabinet are merely a record of its conclusions (Bcschhissee9 * 11, 
with no record of any discussion or debate. The supplementary 
documentation given to the meetings (Beiaktcn) are also devoid of any 
data4° Similarly, files, which could have shed light on the three conflicts 
between the Reich and Thuringian governments, from, the perspective of 
the latter, have proved to be ‘dead-ends’ due to the absence of data 
within them?1
The Thuringian Landtag
Apart from files relating to Frick’s attempts to grant Hitler
9ThStMin/60,/61
’i:GhStMin/64,/65
11 ThStMin/101, /102, /103, /104, /107-1 on Thuringia’s plenipotentiary to the Reich 
government and the Reichsrat; ThStMin/220 Decisions of the State Supreme Court for the German 
Reich. The files of the Thuringisches Justizministerium (ThJuMin) contain no record of any inter­
5
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Thuringian citizenship in mid-1930,12 this collection, from a 
parliamentary perspective, fails to advance the understanding of Frick’s 
activity. There is no record on the negotiations leading to his entry to 
government,13 and nothing is revealed on how the NSDAP operated 
within the various Landtag committees, e.g. the Council of Elders 
(Altcstmrat) or the Permanent Committee (StdndigcrAuschufi).4
Other collections of documents from ThHStAW were consulted 
on the basis that they concerned areas of governmental or ministerial 
activity in which Frick was known to be active.15 These collections have 
not yielded any significant degree of material other than fragments
The Reich Chancellery (R 431)
This collection has been indispensable in charting the three 
conflicts that developed between the Reich and Thuringian 
governments whilst Frick was in office. The two files dealing with
departmental or ministerial discussion of the disputes.
12 Landtag von Thtiringen/52, /57, /196, /197
13 Landtag von Thuringen/24
14 Landtag von Thuringen/182
15 Thuri.ngksch.es Finanzministerium (ThFiMin); Landesamt ftir Denkmalpflege und 
Heimatschutz; Staatliche Hochschulen fur Baukunst, bildene Kunste, und Handwerk Weimar; 
Staatliche Hochschule fur Handwerk und Baukunst Weimar; Thuringische Oberverwaltungsgericht
6
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Thuringia16 17contain intra- and inter-Reich Chancellery and Reich 
Ministry of the Interior notes and memoranda, clippings from national 
German newspapers and the Wolffs’ Telegrafisches Buro (WTB), and 
other aspects of Frick’s activities. The two collections contain almost all 
of the correspondence between the Reich and Thuringian governments, 
which has proved to be essential given that the Thuringian archives 
contain only remnants of the entire correspondenc../
Other files of interest have been the records of the Reich cabme/,18 * * 21
the policc/9 and those on the NSDAP complied from mid-1930 
onwardd/e ese^aRy the Prussian Ministry of the Interior's manuscript 
on the Nazi Party and the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s similar 
documents of November 1930. Collections dealing with Frick’s coalition 
partners, i.e. the Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP), the Wirtschaftspartei 
(WP)/2 and the Landbund (LB)2/ contain no relevant material. The 
same can be said for those collections relating to the opposition parties
Jena
16 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfeld (BABL), R 43 1/2315, /2316
17 See ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413; ThFiMin/6
“ BABL, R 43 1/1442,/1447
iR43 12694
i°R43I/2682,/2683
21 R 43 1/2656; Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), R 45 II 
11 BABL, R 43 1/2685
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in Thuringia, i.e. the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP).4 the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD).. and the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) ®
The Reichskommissar fur Uberwachung dcr offentlichen Ordnung (R 134,
R1507f
The Reich government’s surveillance of Frick and the NSDAP in
Thuringia is not particularly well developed in these collections. The 
main benefit of the R 134 collection is its copy of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior document “Kann ein Nationalsozialistischer Polizeibeamter 
sein?”?8 This was written at a crucial point in the Reich-Thuringian 
dispute over police subsidies, and is an important summary of the Reich 
Ministry’s opinion. * 24 * 26 27
))R43 1/2687
24 R 43 1/2661; BAK, R 45 III
) BAK, R 45 IV
26 BAK, R
27 R 134 is the Reichskommissar collection that was held by the Bundesarchiv prior to 
German unification in 1990. R 1507 is the collection previously held by the Deutsches
Zentralsstaatsarchiv Potsdam.
)) R134/90 BH.56-66
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Reich Ministry of the Interior (R18, R1501)
Most of the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s material that was not 
destroyed during the Second World War appears to have found its way
into R 43 1/2315 and /2316. However, some interesting and very useful 
documentation on the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s contacts with 
Thuringians opposed to Frick was found in a collection sent to him in 
1934 by his former NSDAP associates in Thuringia2?
The Reichsgcricht (R 3002), and the Staatsgerichtshof jar das Deutsche 
Raich (R 300/9
The involvement of the Thuringian government in three disputes 
with the Reich Ministry of the Interior has already been remarked upon. 
These collections provide the full transcripts of the proceedings before 
the two courts, which have been essential in revealing details and 
viewpoints not available in either the Thuringian or Reich 
documentation, and supplies crucial insights into how the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior perceived the NSDAP in the year of its electoral
29 See R 18/5051 Bll.Z^O -22 Brill to Wirth, 17 June 1930; R 18/5051 BH.26-44 Hauff to Wirth, 6 
June 1930; R18/5051 Bl.46 Wirth to Brill, 6 June 1930; The complete four pages of R18/5051 Bll.54-56 
Brill to Menzel, 26 May 1930, may be found in ThHStAW, RStH/132 B11.13-16.
9
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breakthrough.
Nazi Party Documentation
It was hoped that sufficient material would exist within both the 
Reich and Thuringian NSDAP collections to assist in the execution of 
the research. This has not proved to be the case. Dietrich Orlow has 
pointed out that “[vjirtually no Gau ... archives survived intact”,30 31nnd 
with reference to Thuringia, this statement is fully justified. Almost all 
of the Thuringian Gau material either pre- or post-dates Frick’s period 
in office The Schumacher Sammlung of Gau documentation falls 
within the same category.32 In addition, the archive for the NSDAP’s 
Landtag faction in Thuringia, which could shed important light upon 
the party’s attitude towards Frick and his coalition partners, appears 
not to have survived. Enquiries have revealed that it is neither held by 
the present Thuringian Landtag in Erfurt, nor by the ThHStAW. 33 It has
1 D. Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: Volume II: 19334945 (Newton Abbot, 1973), p.x
31 National Archives (NA), RG 242, T-81, roll 11(5, fr. 136429-137002. This is the microfilm 
version of BABL, NS 20/123 and NS 20/124, both of which have now been relocated from BABL to 
ThHStAW as NSDAP-GL/1 and NSDAP-GL/1-1 respectively.
32 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, folder 209 “Gauleitung Thuringen”. This is the microfilm 
version of BABL, Schumacher Sammlung 209, Group VIII
33 My thanks to Herr Archivrat Marek (ThHStAW) for answering this question. It appears
10
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to be said that this want of material relating to the NSDAP in power 
prior to 1933 is not confined to Thuringia. Jeremy Noakes’ study of the 
NSDAP in Lower Saxony, which looked at its participation in the 
governments of Braunschweig and Oldenberg, found “no documentation 
whatsoever” on the policies of the Nazi ministers concerned.34 35 36 37
Documentation collected or compiled by the Reich NSDAP is also 
sadly deficient. The NSDAP’s own historical service concentrated upon 
the early years of the Thuringian Gau/ and other NSDAP organisations 
and affiliates have largely omitted this period in the Gau’s history 
altogether®
The NSDAPs Historiography of Frick as Minister.
As mentioned earlier the Nazi Party biographies of Frick, and the 
newspapers Volkischer Beohachter and Der Nationalsozialist, have been 
useful in revealing how the Nazi Party regarded Frick. There are another 
five NSDAP sources. The NSDAP history of itself reveals little/. yet the
that the archives for any of Thuringia’s Landtag factions have not survived.
34 J. Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 192M933 (Oxford, 1971), p.3
35 See NSDAP-HA microfilm, roll 7, folder 160
36 See BABL, NS 25/233 Hauptamt fur Kommunalpolitik collection on Thuringia, 1929-1932
37H. Fabricius, Gesd^hchcdernata^rxllse^zialisith^c^heB^cw^e^g^ung, 2. Auflage (Berlin, 1935).
11
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Thuringian NSDAP’s pamphlet on Frick’s activity is of more interest.38 
Although it does not go into detail, other than reciting the already 
known features of Frick’s rule, it does, however, engage in polemics 
against his coalition partners, revealing how the NSDAP saw itself and 
the other parties in the coalition. The Festschrift for Frick’s sixtieth 
birthday merely recites Frick’s ‘achievements’ with the typical Nazi 
phraseology,39 as do two articles by Frick. Both of these are of interest in 
that they were written by Frick,40 but their authorship for the 
Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch, has meant that they extol his activity in 
typical Nazi prose for the party faithful.
Private Papers, Diaries, and Memoirs
Collections of private papers (Nachlafte) have not been an 
extensive source of data. Of the eight-man government in Thuringia,
38 DcrKampfin Thuringen. Ein Bericht uber die Tcltigkeit des ersten nationalsozialistischen Staatsministers 
um derthliringischen nationalsozialistischen Landtagfraktion (Weimar, n.d.)
39 H. Fabricius, “Der Reichsleiter Dr. Frick”, in H. Pfundtner (ed.), Dr. Wilhelm Frick und sein 
Ministerium. Aus Anlafi des 60. Gcburtstages des Reichs' und Preufiischen Ministers des Innern Dr. Wilhelm Frick am 
12. MUrz 1937 (Munich, 1937). For a similar view see “Dr. Wilhelm Frick”, Nationalsozialistische 
Monatshefte, 1. Jahrgang, 1930
40 W. Frick, “6 Monate nationalsozialistischer Minister in Thuringen”, Nationalsozialistisches 
Jahrbuch, 5. Jahrgang, 1931; W. Frick, “Thuringische Bilanz”, Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch, 6. Jahrgang,
12
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Frick is the only member to possess a Nachlali, which reveals nothing 
about this stage of his political career 41 42 43 44 45 46 47iimilarly, the Nachlaft of Walter 
Ortlepp, one of Frick’s Nazi appointees, is also silent, save for 
biographical data accrued from a Nazi Party qurstionna^re.4?
Private papers relating to figures opposed to Frick, both in 
Thuringia/3 and the Reich,4? have not been of benefit. However, that 
belonging to Eduard Dingeldy,?? Reich leader of the DVP, contains two 
interesting letters from Thuringla,?4 which have been of assistance in 
helping to reconstruct the attitudes of Frick’s coalition partners.
Diaries, like private papers, are also rare. The diary of Hermann 
Punder,?? permanent secretary (Staatssekrctdr) in the Reich Chancellery,
1932
41 BAK, NL 1241 Wilhelm Frick contains eight volumes. BABL, R 18 contains also a Frick 
Nachkif), though this dates from his period of office as Reich Interior Minister. There are mentions to 
his Thuringian Ministerzeit, but these are in the form of career resumes, and do not contain anything 
which is not already known.
42 ThHStAW, ThMdl D/49,750. The questionnaire is found in D/49.
43 BAK, NL1086 Hermann Brill
44 Collections of private papers exist in BABL, R 43 1/2875 Heinrich BrUning (Reich 
Chancellor from late March 1930); R 43 1/3633 Joseph Wirth (Reich Interior Minister from late 
March 1930)
45 BAK, NL1002 Eduard Dingeldy
46 NL 1002/61 BUdR anon “Die DVPl und N.S. in Thuringen”, n.d.; NL 1002/61 Bll.Z-12 Baum 
and Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27 June 1930
47 H. Punder, Politik in der Rcichskanzki. Aufzeichtiungen aus den Jahren 1929A932, edited by T.
Vogelsang (Stuttgart, 1961)
13
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has yielded some interesting differences to the documentation and 
events in which he played a role. The diary kept by Otto Wagener/. a 
senior figure in the SA, sent to Thuringia by Hitler to assist in the 
negotiations, has been very useful in revealing the non-public aspects of 
the negotiations. Similarly, the diaries of Joseph Goebbek/r have also 
proved to be of value regarding the negotiations, but information 
relating to Frick’s ministerial activity and his perception by others, 
especially by the NSDAP, is not particularly extensive in the depth or 
range of topics recorded.
The memoirs of Carl Seveeing,48 49 50 51 52 53Albert Krebs/3 and Heinrich 
Bruning,44 are only of passing interest. The memoirs of Georg 
Witzmann/r faction leader of the DVP in Thuringia’s Landtag, are more 
detailed in the range of topics dealt with.
48 O. Wagener, Hitler aus nftchster Ndhe. Aufzeichnungen cities Vertraucns 19294932, edited by H.A. 
Turner Jr. (Frankfurt am Main, 1978)
49 E. Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels. Samtliche Fragmente. Aufzeichniingcn 1924 bis 
1941. Teil 1, Band I. 27.Juni 1924-30. Dezember 1930 (Munich, 1987); E. Frohlich (ed.), DieTagebticher von 
Joseph Goebbels. Samtliche Fragmente. Aufseiehtiu^ngen 1924 bis 1941. Teil 1, Band 11.1. Januar 1931-31. Dezember 
1936 (Munich, 1987)
) C. Severing, MdnLebensweg. Band. ll. Im cufundl (bde^tRe<^^^p^ublik (Cologne, .19150)
51 W.S. Allen (ed.), The Infancy of Nazism: The Memoirs of ex-Gauleiter Albert Krebs, 1923-1933 (New 
York, 1976). Krebs was a Nazi Gauleiter.
52 H. Bruning, Memoircn 1878-1934 (Stuttgart, 1970
53 G. Witzmann, Thrrmgcn von HiS-Udd. Erinnerungcn tinis Pe^lliii^^s (Mt^i.st^^inh^iim am Gian,
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Personal Files
In contrast to private papers and diaries, personal files have 
proved to be a much more readily available source. However, the 
availability of personal files has not been a guarantee of plentiful and/or 
useful material. Some files have revealed nothing at all,* 5 * * *? whilst others 
have only surrendered data (usually of a biographical nature), which is 
available from other sources5? The remainder has been of assistance, but 
is limited to specific contexts.56
Files relating to those appointed by Frick have helped to 
reconstruct the background to their appointment, but have not always 
supplied the reason why.?? Not all the files exist for those civil servants 
retired under Frick’s Enabling Act, but a sufficient number have 
survived in order to sustain conclutigns.55 It is a disappointment to
1958)
34 ThHStAW, ThStMin/262 Erwin Baum; ThStMin/307 Willy Kastner; ThVbMin Hans 
Severus Zieg^l^i'; ThStMin/358 Fritz Sauckel is a particularly bad example of a file containing almost 
no documentation.
53 ThStMin/331-T Willy Marschler; ThStMin/390 Fritz Wachtler; Landtag von 
Thuringen/46-T Paul Hennicke
56 ThStMin/281 Wilhelm Frick; ThStMin/341 Hermann MUnzel
5 ThVbMin Hans F.K. Gunther; ThVbMin Paul Schultze-Naumburg; Staatliche
Hochschulen fur Baukunst, bildene Kunste, und Handwerk Weimar/126 Paul Schultze-Naumburg;
ThMdl Georg Hellwig; ThMdl Personal File Helmuth Gommlich is an exception to the rule.
5 ThFiMin Personal Files Karl Dittmar; Konrad Huschke; Kurt Schack; Felix Schmid; Karl
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record that files relating to those civil servants directly under Frick in
his ministries appear not have survived.* 59 60
NSDAP Personal Files
A comparable situation exists with these sources also. Files exist 
for many of the Nazis known to be active in Thuringia-a. Yet the eclectic 
nature of the contents, e.g. press clippings, party questionnaires and 
correspondence, mean that the files are of use only in specific contexts, 
or merely supply background information, such as biographical and
career data.
The Scope and Limitations of other Sources
Io light of the above limitations other sources were examined to 
see what they could reveal. The purpose was not to fill in the empirical
Strohmeyer; Ernst Zaubitzer; ThMdl Personal Files 8529 Paul H.R. Goeths; 3405 Georg Hellwig; 
4583 Martin Krause; 8307 Kurt Schumann; 9218 Kurt Wagner; ThVbMin Personal Files Albert Bock; 
15038 Alfred. Jacobi; 14782 Ern.st Kluge; 17726 Gerhard Kummer; 33740 Richard Wicke; ThWiMin 
Personal Files Hans Grater; Karl Rauch; Karl Siedel; Richard Sommer
59 Conspicuous absences are Paul Guyet and Ruhle von Lilienstem who were Frick's 
Referenten for the police within the ThMdl.
60 See BABL, BDC NSDAP Personal Files, Wilhelm Frick (12.3.1877); Hans Ludwig 
(2.5.1894); Willy Marschler (12.8.1893); Walter Ortlepp (9.7.1900); Fritz Sauckel (27.10.1894); Fritz 
Wachtler (7.1.1891); Otto Wagener (20.4.1888)
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gaps with non-archival sources in an indiscriminate manner, but rather 
to deploy them constructively after a critical, but open minded, scrutiny. 
Analysis of secondary sources, for example, did not solely concentrate 
upon whether they revealed anything new or already known, but also 
upon the sources they cited, and whether these were known. As 
expected, the non-archival sources consulted have had their advantages,
and as well as their drawbacks.
Biographies
There are two Nazi biographies of Frick,61 62and one scholarly 
work. 44 The two Nazi works have been useful in accessing the party 
view - albeit with hindsight - on Frick’s activity, whilst the academic 
study, which did not consult any Thuringian archival material, has only 
provided an overview. The biographies of Herman Brid,63 64Frick’s most 
persistent critic in Thuringia, and Carl Severing,44 are also limited to the
61H. Fabricius, Rridbinn<uiminiit:cbDeAriieiderD\'(Ftitik/lanrStaoIsnl(elrl, 1. Auflage (Beflin, 1933); 
H. Fabricius, Dr. Wilhelm Frick. Fin Lebensbild desReicbsministnrs des Innem (Berlin, 1938)
62 G. Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Der Legalist des Uerecbtstaates. Fine Politische Biographie (Paderborn,
1992)
63 M. Overesch, Hermann Brill in Thtiriegen 1895-1946. Fin Kaalpfergsgnn Hitler und Ulbricht (Bonn,
1992)
64 T. Alexander, Carl Severing. Sozialdemokrat aus Westfalen mit prei/fiischen Tugenden (Bielefeld,
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‘overview’ approach associated with political biographies.
Nmsspapers
These have been helpful in recovering aspects not readily available 
from archival sources, e.g. the NSDAP Gau1eitong,65 the general view of 
Frick,66 and possible stimuli upon the Reich Ministry of the Interior.67
Thuringian Landtag Printed Material
In contrast to the ThHStAW collection ‘Landtag von Thurmgen’, 
the printed material has proved to be a valuable source. Given the fact 
that Frick was subject to not one, but four votes of no-confidence, this 
material has been crucial in tracing the changing attitudes of the 
opposition parties and Frick’s coalition partners. It has also provided 
examples of political opinion towards specific aspects of Frick’s 
measures, both in the Landtag and in its committee.
1992)
® Der Nationalsozialist and VdkischeBeobachter have been valuable in this respect.
ThHStAW, ThMdl P/126 for a series of press clippings about Frick from January 1930
onwards,
67 See BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl. 204 VossischeZeitung, “Severing bricht Beziehungen ab”, 19 March
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Thuringian Government Printed Material
The Gesetzsammlung fur Thuringen, the Amk- und Nachrichtenblatt, and 
the Amtsblhtt des Thuringischen Ministeriums fur Volksbildung have all helped 
identify which legislation or decrees Frick issued. Just as importantly, it 
has provided an ‘index’ for those decrees which Frick did not issue. The 
publications have also been helpful in providing a reference point by 
which the archival material could be more efficiently investigated 
through the concentration of measures enacted, or ignored. They have 
also been useful as a means of comparing draft and finished versions of 
decrees as a means of identifying any changes made and of input made 
by others.
Postwar Interrogations of Frick
One significant limitation has been the lack of ‘inside’ knowledge 
about how Frick conceptualised his Ministerzeit, either during 1930 to 
1931, or afterwards. Part of this is due to the lack of extensive or clear 
documentation in certain areas, e.g. the police files, or the Thuringian 
cabinet conclusions. It could also be argued that part of Frick’s silence is
1930; R 431/^^15 B1.269 VossischeZcitung, “Nationalsozialistischen Polizeidirektoren?”, 30 April 1930
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attributable to his career as a civil servant in the Wilhelmine Reich, i.e. 
he considered it ‘incorrect’ to talk about his activtty68 when a true career 
politician would have had no qualms about doing so. In addition, Frick 
neither left diaries to posterity, nor wrote any memoirs. He also refused 
to testify at the Nuremberg trials, though he did co-operate in pre-trial 
interrogations with the Americans. Unfortunately, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, the questions of his interrogators and Frick’s 
statements concentrate almost wholly upon his participation in the 
Munich Putsch, or his subsequent career as Reich Minister of the 
Interior69 Some questions were asked about his activities as Thuringia’s 
Minister and his relationship to Hitler at the time, but they were 
considered as incidental and are only fragments of limited use. 
Fortunately, interrogations of a more contemporary nature do exist. The 
Landtag stenographic reports, and those of its committee, have helped 
broaden the picture of Frick’s opinions, albeit with a degree of Nazi 
rhetoric. Information from the direct questioning of Frick also exists in 
the Thuringian Landtag’s special committee on his attempt to grant 
Hitler citizenship in 1930, and the State Supreme Court’s investigation
68 W.S. Allen, (ed.), The Infancy of Nazism: The Memoirs of ex-Gauleiter Albert Kr^ek^s, 1923-1933 (New
York, 197(6), p.261
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into the police subsidies dispute of 1*930.
Conclusions
The fragmented nature of the primary and secondary sources 
represents an obstacle for any exhaustive survey of Frick in office. To 
some extent it is possible to account for these limitations, e.g. the 
‘weeding’ or deliberate destruction of files by the Nazis prior to May 
1945, or accidental destruction due to the effects of war'. Perhaps, the 
explanation, which is the closest to the actual truth, is that these 
limitations are an accurate reflection of Frick’s day-to-day activity. In 
other words, the gaps in the files are a direct result of Frick refusing to 
concern himself with the daily minutiae of his ministerial duties simply 
because it was not within his political remit to do so. Any such 
undertaking would have diverted him from the specific policy objectives 
he had assumed office to pursue.
Nevertheless, these limitations have meant that the research 
could only progress ‘thus far, and no further’. The dissertation and its
constituent research chapters have been forced to concentrate upon
specific policies, events, and actions from particular perspectives, and
69 NA, RG 238, M1019, roll 18, and M1270, roll 4.
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then to base its conclusions from these ‘skewed’ perspectives. In some 
areas of the research, inference and deduction have had to take the place 
of solid, verifiable conclusions, though sufficient of the latter can be 
retrieved to provide an admirable balance between the two.
The Context of the Dissertation
Research on the Weimar Republic and its subsequent collapse 
has largely concentrated upon the political hostility that the Republic 
aroused from both the left and the right in the early 1920s, the era of 
government rule by presidential approval from March 1930, and the 
events leading to Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in January 1933.?° 
Frick’s period of rule in Thuringia began as the Weimar Republic was 
(retrospectively) entering the final phase of its existence when the right- 
in Germany began to reassert its hostility to the Republic when the 
financial crisis in Germany brought about the Wall Street Crash and the 
Great Depression began to affect German finances at all levels of 
German politics. Whilst this aspect of the Republic’s history has been
70 See, for example, K.D. Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum 
Problem des Machterverfalls in der Demokratie, 5. Auflage (Villingen, 1971); K.D. Bracher, The 
German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism (London, 1971)
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recited many times, the hostility of the right towards the ‘modern’ and 
novel aspects of Weimar culture throw the vehemence of the German 
right towards the Republic into sharper relief.
The Weimar Republic is commonly believed by many to have 
constituted a ‘Golden Age’ for German culture, but research has shown 
that for all the modern, progressive, and novel aspects of the period, 
many of the cultural manifestations were the culmination of trends, 
ideas, and movements that had originated in the Wilhelmine era. Yet 
recent research has illuminated another side to the cultural experience 
during the Weimar Republic, one that, although evident to 
contemporaries at the time, was obscured by the focus on the ‘modern’ 
aspects of the period, that is the cultural backlash of the right against 
the modern aspects of the Republic’s cultural life.71 It will be seen in 
Chapter Five how much of Frick’s actions within the areas of culture 
and education can readily be placed in this anti-Weimar framework
The reaction of Germany’s ‘serious’ musicians and composers was 
hostile to the new musical forms of atonality developed by Ernst Krenek,
23
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Paul Hindemith, et al. Journals and periodicals, such as Zeitschrift fir 
Musih under the editorship of Dr, Alfred Heuss, were responsible for 
hostile, xenophobic campaigns identifying the new musical forms with 
foreign racial elements hostile to the German nation/ Jazz music, in 
particular, became an “integral part of the Weimar Republic’s 
metropolitan culture” ,71 72 3 a manifestation of the ‘Americanisation’ and the 
modernisation of Germany, and of Europe as a whole, following the First 
World War. The German Right fearing a “cultural usurpation” ,74 
attacked Jazz since they could not divorce it from its ‘foreign’, i.e. black, 
origins, deeming as the apotheosis to Germany’s tradition as a land of 
Dichter und Denker, thinkers and poet..75 Jazz music became identified 
with Kul^t^i^rh^c^l^^^chewismus (cultural bolshevism), and, as one historian
71 p. Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Harmondsworth, 1968); D.J.K. Peukert, The 
Weimar Republic (Harmondsworth, 1991); W. Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History, 1918-1933 (London, 
1974)
72 See M.H. Kater, “The Revenge of the Fathers: The Demise of Modern Music at the End of 
the Weimar Republic”, German Studies Review, May, Volume 15, 1992; E. Levi, Music in the Third Reich 
(Basingstoke, 1992), chapter 1
73 C. Partsch, “HumM ante p^rtas: jazz in Weimar’\ in T.W. Kniesche and S, Brockinann 
(eds.). Dancing on the Volcano: Essays on the Culture of the Weimar Republic (Columbia, S.C., 1994), p.105
74 Partsch, “Hannibal ante portas: Jazz in Weimar”, p. 115
75 E. John, MusiJI^c^lschewMmi^s. Die PoHsisiemeg da MiO de Dcuti^chlaml ldt'1933 
(StuttgartAVeimar, 1994), pp.284-285; M.H. Kater, “The Jazz Experience in Weimar Germany”, 
German History (ii-July), Volume 6,1988, pp.153-154
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relates, the reaction of the ‘serious music’ fraternity can be seen as a cry 
for help as the feared invasion of black music and “American machine 
music”. The primitive rhythm of Jazz was believed to provoke a 
primitive sexuality in people, a form of hypnotic suggestion7? Blacks 
were portrayed with a sexual magnetism that reduced whites, 
particularly white women, to automatons,7? with the saxophone having 
a phallic aspect that produced castration anxieties amongst German 
males.76 * 8
Conservative concerns about the quality of ‘cultural’ works also
extended into the realm of literature. 1926 saw the introduction of the
GesetzzarBewahrung dcrjugend vor Schund- und Schmutzscriften, described as a 
“classic example of moral censorship”, which, as Margaret Stieg points 
out, “further politicised the already controversial issue of culture in 
Germany”79 This “sub literature” was held up as a convenient scapegoat, 
responsible for Germany’s ills. The fight against ‘trash’ literature had 
begun in the early 1890s when prices were low and could, therefore, be
76 John, Musikbolschewismus, pp.288-289
5 ParLsch, “Hannibal ante portas: Jazz in Weimar”, p. 113
78 John, Musikbolschewismus, p.286
79 M.F. Stieg, “The 1926 Law to protect Youth against Trash and Dirt: Moral Protectionism in 
a Democracy”, Central European History, March, Volume 23,1990, p.22
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afforded by the ‘lowest’ elements of German society, i.e. the working 
class. Many condemned ‘trash’ literature for the alleged effects that it 
had on its readers, often undermining respect for authority and 
appealing to “the lowest human instincts”,80 * 82 83and as a “corrupter of an 
implied German purity, the source of urban decadence in contrast to 
rural wholesomeness and a symbol, of soulless modern materialism”.®1 
Following Germany’s defeat in the First World War, the campaign 
against ‘trash’ literature intensified, with many groups engaged in the 
campaign believing, quite sincerely, that Germany was being flooded by 
such material. “The need for moral renewal, a concern that is frequently 
found in defeated nations, was emphasised”.®2 Like Jazz music, ‘trash’ 
literature was also seen as contrary to Germany’s cultural reputation. 
The campaign was conducted by “agitation and hysteria”, stimulating a 
debate on freedom, order, culture, and democracy. The effect of the law 
was minimal!; In 1928, 45 titles were banned. The following year only
™ Stieg, “The 11926 Law to protect Youth against Trash and Dirt, p.30
“ Stieg, “The 1926 Law to protect Youth against Trash and Dirt, p.37
82 Stieg, “The 1926 Law to protect Youth against Trash and Dirt, p.35
83 K. Petersen, “The Harmful Publications (Young Persons) Act of 1926: Literary Censorship 
and the Politics of Morality in the Weimar Republic”, German Studies Review, October, Volume 15,1992, 
p. 305
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32 titled were banned, with a further decline during 1930, to only 20®4
The new medium of radio had a similar experience during the
Weimar Republic. For although radio was not state controlled in 
Germany, there was the attempt to grant licences only to those 
companies that would nominally be ‘above politics’, with the Reichpost 
influencing such a degree of control, via the granting of licences to 
companies and the creation of a listener’s fee paying licence scheme, that 
one historian has recently argued that radio was “more clearly 
dominated and strictly controlled by public authorities than any other 
mass media in Weimar Germany”.® Broadcasting in Weimar Germany 
was designed to help Germany maintain its cultural heritage, and 
“nurture the Volksgnmsmsch(A^ by concentrating its output on cultural 
and educational broadcasts, and avoiding any move towards mass 
culture, modernisation, and the ‘lowest common denominator’* 85 86
8 M.F. Stieg, “The 1926 Law to protect Youth against Trash and Dirt: Moral Protectionism in 
a Democracy”, CentralEuropean History, March, Volume 23,1990, p53
85 K.C. Fulirer, “A Medium of Modernity? Broadcasting in Weimar Germany 1923-1932”, 
Journal of Modern History, December, Volume 69,1997, p.728
8 Fuhrer, “A Medium of Modernity?”, 746-747,753
27
Chapter One: Introduction
The Chapters
Chapter Two considers the development of the Nazi Party in 
Thuringia from 1922 to 1930 by examining its organisational 
development, the personalities involved, and its relation to other radical 
or extra-parliamentary groups. Second, it looks at how the Nazi Party 
joined the government of Thuringia in January 1930 by looking at the 
actual course of the negotiations, the factors brought into play, and 
Hitler’s personal involvement. Lastly, the chapter reveals why Hitler 
chose Frick as his ministerial candidate, and then reveals the reasons 
why Hitler had decided to embark upon the historic step of Nazi 
participation in government.
Chapter Three is the first of two chapters dealing with Frick’s 
activity as Thuringia’s Interior Minister. It investigates his impact upon 
the administration and government of Thuringia in terms of both 
structure and personnel policy. Attention will also be paid to particular 
measures, including Frick’s attempt to grant Hitler Thuringian 
citizenship by appointing him the Gendarme commissioner in the town 
of Hildburghausm. The subject of Frick’s administration of the police 
shall be dealt with in the following chapter. The historiography of 
Frick’s period in power has mentioned the Enabling Act in such a
28
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manner as to suggest that it led to an extensive reorganisation of 
Thuringia’s administration, with a distinctive Nazi slant. Certainly, 
Hitler’s comments that Frick was to carry out “a slow purge of the
administration and of the civil service from the manifestations of the red
revolution”, and that Frick was “to introduce ... with ruthless 
determination a nationalisation (Nationalisierungy'?7 have done much to 
foster this view. The reality, however, is different
In contrast to the Enabling Act dispute, the crux of the ‘police 
subsidies conflict’, examined in Chapter Four’, was not the retirement of 
officials, but rather their appointment. The Reich Ministry of the 
Interior feared that Frick was abusing his ministerial right to make 
appointments to the Thuringian police through a deliberate policy of 
recruiting and promoting Nazis in order to turn the police into an arm of 
the Nazi Party. This alleged practice was interpreted by the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior as a violation of Number 6 of the Principles,
which, stated:
“The Lander have to take appropriate measures that the non-political
87 F. Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen als Modell der Machtergreifung: ein 
Brief Hitlers aus dem Jahre 1930”, Vierteljahrshefte filr Zcitgctc9ic9tc (iv-October), 14. Jahrgang, 1966, 
pp.462-463
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character of the police [Schutzpolizei] as a whole, like the non-political behaviour 
88of the individual civil servant in office, is guaranteed unconditionally."
The chapter considers Frick’s plans for Thuringia’s police by 
studying the dispute between his government and the Reich Ministry of 
the Interior over payment of the Reich subsidy designed for police forces 
in the Lander. Payment of the subsidy was regulated by the “Principles 
for the Granting of a Reich Subsidy for Police Purposes” (1928) which 
determined the responsibilities of the Lander towards their police 
forces, the Reich’s obligation to assist the Lander with payment of a 
subsidy, and that the Lander would place their police forces at the 
Reich’s disposal should the need arise.88 9 There was also an additional 
Reich-Lander agreement governing the entry of candidates, as well as 
the employment, training, and retirement of police officers.90 The 
Thuringian government had agreed to these arrangements in March 
1928,91 and Reich Interior Minister Carl Severing made their acceptance
88 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.195 “Grundsatze fill' die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses fur 
polizeiliche Zwecke”, original emphasis
89 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bll.195-196 “Grundsatze fur die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses fur 
polizeiliche Zwecke"
90 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bll.197-198 “Vereinbarungen der Lander unter sich und mit dem Reich 
uber die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses fur polizeiliche Zwecke”
91 ThHStAW, Thuringische Oberverwaltungsgericht/A XI Nr.5 Bl.175 ThMdl to RIM, 17
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by the Lander a precondition for the receipt of the subsidy 92
The dissertation then focuses upon Frick’s activities as
Thuringia’s Education Minister in Chapter Five. Shortly after Frick 
came to power Hitler outlined his ideas on what Frick was to achieve in 
office. Hitler envisaged that Frick would carry out a nationalisation 
(Nationalisierung) of the Education Ministry through the appointment of 
“fanatical German nationalists”, the removal of Marxist and pro­
Republic teachers, and the re-orientation of school curricula along the 
lines of Nazi Party ideology93 The purpose of Chapter Five, then, is to 
examine the extent to which Frick turned Hitler’s ideas into coherent 
government policies. Three areas shall be looked at: Frick’s appointment 
policies; his interference in cultural affairs; and Thuringian school life 
and curricula, in particular Frick’s conflict with the Reich government 
over the ‘recommendation’ of anti-Semitic school prayers. It has recently 
been argued that Frick “acted [agierte] ... as a radical pace-maker 
[Schrittmacher] of future National Socialist cultural policy. Frick 
vigorously published orders which had decisive effects for Thuringia’s
March 1928
92 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.194 Severing to the Lander, 5 January 1929
93 See chapter 2, pp.
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art, culture and education”94
Chapter Six attempts to examine how the Nazi Party evaluated 
and portrayed Frick’s ministerial activities in Thuringia, and the nature 
of Frick’s relationship with his coalition partners is also analysed. This 
latter aspect occupies most of the chapter since Frick left office only
after his coalition allies - the DVP - defected to the SPD-KPD-DDP
opposition in support of the Spud’s fourth, and ultimately final, motion 
of no-confidence in Frick by the Landtag.
94 B. Stenzel, “ ‘Tradition, Volkstum, Heimat und Rasse’. GrundzUge der regionalen Kultur- 
und Kunstpolitik im nationalsozialistischen Thuringen (1932-1945), in A. Dornheim, B. Post and B. 
Stenzel (eds.), Thuringen 1933-1945. Aspekte nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft (Erfurt, 1997), p.60
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Chapter Two: The Nazi Party in Thuringia, 1922-1929
The Development of the NSDAP in Thuringia
Like many of branches of the NSDAP in Germany’s other Lander,
the origins and early history of the party in Thuringia are almost wholly 
obscure due to the paucity of documentation. The archives do reveal 
that in late January 1922 a group in Weida contemplated joining the 
NSDAP,1 and that an Ortsgruppe was founded in Gotha in July the same 
yean1 2 * 4The development and growth of these two groups was quickly 
ended when the Thuringian government, following the murder of 
Walther Rathenau by right-wing extremists, declared the NSDAP illegal 
in mid-July 1922? The membership of the Weida Ortsgruppe ‘transferred’ 
to the Munich branch for the duration of the prohibition? and 
Thuringia’s Nazis were allowed to join the Dcutsc9-Volkitc9c Freiheitspartei 
(DVFP) in order to continue their activities? The Thuringian
1 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/166 Bl.4 Amanm (Munich NSDAP) to Hans Gnath, 21 January 1922. It 
is not known when the Weida group joined the NSDAP.
1 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/160 B1.22 ThMdl to R. Schafer (Regierungskommissar Gotha), 1 July 
1922. See also NSDAP-HA, reel 14a, folder 1623 Kreisdirektion Gera
1 Ges&zsanimlungfiirThtiiringen, 11922, (Weimar, n.d.), nr.5,15July 1922, p.255
4 ThHStAW. ThMdl P/166 B11.22, 25 Amann (Munich NSDAP) to Hans Gnath, 6 December
1922 and 29 December 1922. The Weida Ortsgruppe was eventually transferred to that in Hof, Bavaria, 
see ThMdl P/166 B1.35 Fritsch (Hof NSDAP) to Gnath, 27 February 1923.
1 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/160 Bl.12 Ammann (Munich NSDAP) to Schutze (Erfurt), 12 March
1923
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government knew that the DVFP had offered sanctuary to Nazis,6 and
that it had been instrumental in helping to set-up ‘reading circles' 
(Lesegesellschaftcn) in which Nazis could read the banned Volkischc 
Beobachter7 As a result of this assistance to the NSDAP, and because of 
its connections to the military,8 *the DVFP was banned in Thuringia in 
March 1923? It soon became known, however, that both the DVFP and 
NSDAP were creating new organisations.10 *Many Nazis were arrested 
for illegal activities,11 and a Sturmahteilung (SA) contingent was founded 
in Weimar. The number of SA men in Thuringia, according to an ‘official 
history', was between 200 to 300 men.12
Circumstances dramatically improved for the NSDAP in early 
1924. The Landtag election led to the return of 7 representatives for the
® ThHStAW, ThMdl P/160 B1.<5 Muller-Brandenburg to Regierungsprasident (Erfurt;), 22 
March 1923; ThMdl P/166 Bl.75 ThMdl to Thuringische Kreisdirektoren und Polizeiamter, 21 March 
1923
7 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/166 BH .^33, 40 ThMdl notes, 15 February and 20 February 1923
8 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/166 B1.42RS ThMdl to Herr Reichskommissar fur Uberwachung der 
offentlichen Ordnung (Berlin), 21 March 1923
7 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/160 B1.10 ThMdl to Thuringische Kreis- und Stadtdirektoren, 26 
March 1923
10 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/160 B1.140 ThMdl to Thuringische Kreis- und Stadtdirektoren, 28
May 1923
U ThHStAW, ThMdl P/160 BU.151-H57, 190-197, 268-275,289-290
12 ThHStAW, RStH/205 Bll.lORS, 11RS SA-Gruppe Thuringen (ed.), ThUringens SA im Kampfe 
um Deutschland (Weimar, 1937). (Hereafter, RStH/205 ThtlringcnsSA)
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VolkiscFSozidc Block (V-SB), an alliance of ex-members of the DVFP and 
NSDAP, led by the anti-Semitic writer Artur Dinter.n Fortunately for 
the NSDAP and the DVFP, the right-wing Ordnnngsbund had only 
managed to win 35 of the 72 seats available, and therefore had to rely 
upon the V-SB to maintain its majority. The price exacted by the V-SB 
for its support was the legalisation of the NSDAP and DVFP in March 
1924.* 14 *Following this Dinter visited Hitler in Landesberg Prison and 
succeeded in becoming Landesleiter of the NSDAP in Thuringia,. 
although Dinter’s advancement to this post led to difficulties within the 
V-SB and NSDAP. Not only was Dinter’s personality said to be a 
problem,16 17but also Paul Hennicke, a fellow member of the V-SB Landtag 
faction and a previous NSDAP member, believed that he should be 
Landesle^lrr.14 Conflict quickly developed between the two when they 
both competed to be the Nationalsozicdistische Freiheitspartei 's (NSFP)
For biographical details on the seven V-SB members see ThHStAW, Landtag von 
Thuringen/39 Verzeichnis der Mitgliederdes III. Landtaiges von Thuringen 1924
14 GesettzsammlungftlrThtiringai, 1924, (Weimar, n.d.), nr. 15, 3 March 1924, p.l50
. NA, RG 242, T-81, roll L1<5, Weber to Fritz Sauckel, 1July 1924, fr.136947
16 D.R. Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia, 1924-19.30”, 
Central European History (i-March), Volume 8,1975, pp.28, 30
17 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thui^Tin^t;]^//^45-l Bhn3(5RS Personal File Paul Hennicke. Hennicke 
had first joined the NSDAP in April 1921. Hennicke’s file claimed that he had been a 
Landesverbandfuhrer, “a post which today corresponds to the rank of a Gauleiter”. No NSDAP
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candidate in the Reichstag elections of May 1924.18 19 20 21 22Dinter managed to 
secure Hitler’s support as the main, candidate, but Hennicke 
circumvented this by appealing to Rosenberg, who led the NSFP whilst 
Hitler was in prison. In the end, neither Dinter nor Hennicke secured 
nomination. Dinter was not satisfied with second place, so members of 
the DVFP dominated the list.? In July Dinter was deposed as the V-SB’s 
Landtag faction leader due to the “Bolshevist actions brought about by 
the agitation [Wuhlerei] of Herren Hennicke and Polkow”?® Some V-SB 
members had also felt uneasy about Dinter’s personal vendetta against 
the Jewish president of the Thuringian State Bank.2? Dinter tried to 
secure Ludendorff’s backing to reverse the V-SB’s decision, but failed.?? 
At the NSFP’s conference in Weimar23 Dinter and other Thuringian
Membership File exists for Hennicke. See also Werist’s? 10. Auflage (Berlin, 1935), p.463
18 See the short sketch on Dinter’s life and career in NA, RG 242, T-81, roll 116, Der Volkischer
Spiegel Die volkische Ftihrer in Bild und Wort (1924), fr.136436
19 Franz Stohr became the NSFP Reichstag member for Thuringia. See Reichsministerium
des Innern (ed.)HEndlbichftir dasDaU^^cheP^e^i^ch 1924 (Berlin, 1924), p.9
20 NA, RG 242, T-81, roll 116, Dinter to the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung 
(NSFB) Ortsgruppee of Altenberg, Arnstadt, Auma, Greussen, Ilmenau, Saaifeld, Sonderhausen, 
Weimar, and Jena, 6 August 1924, fr.136995. Polkow was a member of the DVFP.
21 Tracey, “Der Aufstieg der NSDAP bis 1930”, in D. Heiden and G. Mai (eds.), 
NationaPozielitrnut in Thtiringen (Weimar/Cologne/Vienna, 1^^.5), pp.56-57. Polkow replaced Dinter as 
leader of the Landtag faction.
22 Tracey, “The Development”, p.29
23 See NSDAP-HA, reel 50, folder 1517; ThHStAW, NSDA'P-GL/1-2 Erster Tagung der
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Nazis rejected the idea of the NSFP amalgamating with Julius 
Streicher’s Grofideutsche Volksgemeinschaft (GVGj and Dinter formally 
placed his Gau under the GVG’s Rs:chsleitu.ng.2^ Dinter’s support 
within Thuringia’s volkisch milieu continued to decline even further 
during the remainder of 1924 to the point where he was expelled from 
the V-SB Landtag faction in December.
Nevertheless, Dinter was still fortunate to enjoy Hitler’s 
continued support. After the re-founding of the NSDAP in February 
1925, Hitler re-confirmed Dinter as Gauleiter.^ Even so, Dinter still 
faced an uphill task in establishing and consolidating control over the 
Ortsgruppm, with the purpose of erecting a centralised Gau. The SA, 
which had been active as a “camouflaged organisation” (gctarnte 
Vercinigung)24 25 26 7 during the period of illegality, now came into the open. By 
March 1925 the SA was said to have 800 members in Thuringia, with 100
Nationak^o^alistischen Freiheitshewegwig Grojideutschlands in Weimar vom 15. bis 17. August 1924, pp.3-26 (This 
was previously BABL, NS D 38 Th/1)
24 Tracey, “Der Aufstieg”, p.57
25 R. Hambrecht, DarAufstieg der NSDAP in Mittel- und Oberfranken (1925-1933), (Munich, 1976), 
p.81; NSDAP-HA, reel 7, folder 160 Dinter to Ortsgruppenvorstande Gossnitz and SchmOlln, 12 
December 1924
26 NA, RG 242, T-81, roll 116, Allganeine Thuringische Landeszeitung Deutschland, 
“Nationalsozialistische Fuhrerdemonstrationen in Weimar”, 23 March 1925, fr.136967
27 ThHStAW, RStH/205 B1.31RS ThUringaisSA
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SA men in the Weimar area alone.® At the beginning of March the 
Landesausschuft was reorganised into a Gau,® and Dinter managed to 
score a coup by bringing Fritz Sauckel, a Nazi activist from Ilmenau into 
the Gau organisation.3i Dinter also added the volkisch writer Hans 
Severus Ziegler to his Ziegler’s newspaper Dcr Volkische was
renamed as Der Naiiodalsozidlisi and established as the official Gau
newspaper. But problems still remained. Hennicke’s Ortsgruppe in Gotha 
still refused to accept Dinter as the leader in Thuringia. Nazi disaffection 
in Gotha was such that its Ortsgruppe ceased to exist because its 
members “no longer wish to submit to Dinter’s leadership.”® Instead, 
the Volkische Wehrhund was set up and the organisation quickly spread to
other towns. PoLneck was a centre of anti-Dinter dissent with 100
® ThHStAW, RStH/205 B11.36RS, 37 Thliringcns SA
90
F. Sauckee (cdjdKamfuudSicg iii Thtiriiigc/i (Weemsi; 1934), p.39
30 See NA, RG 242, T-81, roll 11(5, fr.136948-136949, 136954-136958 on Sauckel’s activity in 
the Bezirkgruppe Ilmenau. For general biographical details see BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File 
Fritz Sauckel. (27.^^.1^^^^'4), SA and PK folders; Das Deutsche Ftthrerlexkon 1934/1935 (Berlin, 1934), 
pp.402-403; P. Rees, Biographical Dictionary of the Extreme Right (London, 1990), p. 345; C. Zentner and F.
Bedurftig, DasgrosseLexikon des dritten Reiches (Munich, 1985), p.513
31 Das Deutsche Ftthrcrle^kon, p.546
32 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/176 B1.24RS Stadtdirektor (Gotha) report, 16 May 1925; ThMdl 
P/208 B1.8 Thuringische Kreisdirektor (Gotha) to ThMdl, 17 October 1925. On the Gotha NSDAP see 
H. Matthiesen, “Das Gothaer Burgertum und der Nationalsozialismus 1918-1930”, in Heiden and Mai 
(eds.), Nationalsozialismus, pp.97-1.18
38
chapter Two: The Nazi Party in Thuringia, 1922-1929
members in the Volkische Wehrbimd^ The towns of Erfurt, Jena, and
Eisenach also had branches of the Volkitc9c Wehrbund* 34 The NSDAP’s
Reichsleitung formally dissolved Gotha’s Ortsgruppe, and founded an 
official one, but this met with indifference. By mid-May Dinter could 
claim to rely upon the support of 82 Ortsgruppen. This was something of a 
dramatic turn around, given that in January Dinter enjoyed the backing 
of just 30 Ortsgruppen.35 Dinter tried to threaten the expulsion of those 
Ortsgruppen, which did not attend a Gau meeting in August 1925, but 
despite the low turn-out, Dinter appears not to have carried out his 
threat.36 37Most of the Ortsgruppen slowly drifted back to the Gau 
throughout 1925, and by the end of the year a Bezirksgruppe was 
established in northern Thuringia. Dinter also managed to end his 
isolation in the Landtag when Willy Marsd-der? and Karl Spiller38
ThHStAW, ThMdl P/208 Bill Thuringische Kreisdirektor (Saalfeld) to ThMdl, 2 
February 1926; ThMdl P/459 B1.54 ThMdl note 31 May 1926
34 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/208 Bl.13 Rausch (Kriminalsekretar Weimar) note, 31 May 1926. On 
the NSDAP in Jena see R. Stutz, “Im Schatten vor Zeiss. Die NSDAP in Jena”, in Heiden and Mai 
(eds.), NationaPozialPmus, pp.119442
35 Tracey, “The Development”, pp.31, 32
1 Tracey, “Der Aufstieg”, p.60
37 BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Willy Marschler (12.8.1^^93), SA folder. Marschler 
had first joined the NSDAP in November 1922, and then rejoined in December 1925, membership 
number 24,216. See also Das Deutsche Flihrerlexikon, p.299; W.S. Allen (ed.). The Infancy of The
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defected from the V-SB to the NSDAP, so forming a three-man faction.38 9 
Hennicke remained with the DVFP.
The DVFP was the only serious challenge to the expansion of the 
NSDAP in Thuringia at this time. Shortly after Hitler’s re-founding of 
the NSDAP, the Thuringian NSFP decided to dissolve its organisation 
and join the DVFP almost ert'masse. For a time it looked as if the DVFP 
would prove to be a serious competitor with the NSDAP for the radical- 
volkisch vote in Thuringia, but as events turned out, the DVFP was to 
experience a slow and irreversible decline.
Within the NSDAP’s first year of legality the number of 
Ortsgruppen had risen to 48 after Fritz Sauckel had managed to bring over 
12 from Ilmenau40 The NSDAP’s Weimar Ortsgruppe had 260 members,41 
and 100 SA men42 at the beginning of 1925. No comparable figures exist 
for the DVFP in 1925, but by February 1926 its Weimar Ortsgruppe had
Memoirs of ex-Gauleiter Albert Krebs, 1923-1933 (New York, 1976), pp.277-279
38 BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Karl Spiller (9.8.1892), PI< file. Spiller’s membership 
number was 20,652.
39 For a selective overview of the faction’s activity see ThHStAW, NSDAP-GL/1-3 W. 
Marschler (ed.), Dcnkschrifi uber die Tatigkeit der National-Sozjalistischcn Deutschen Arbeiter-Partei im 
ThliringerLandtage 1924/1927. (This was previously BABL, NS D 38 Th/2)
40 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/266 B1.145 Lagebericht for February 1925
41 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/161 Bl.217 Stadtdirektor (Weimar) to ThMdl, 25 January 1925
42 ThHStAW, RStH/205 BI.37 ThUringens SA
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only 30 members,® though this was balanced somewhat by the DVFP’s 
360 members in Gera43 4 45 46 47 48Problems within the DVFP leadership*® led to 
defections to the NSDAP. Dinter was successful in winning back 
Hennicke,4. which undoubtedly exacerbated the DVFP’s slide towards 
political extinction.*7 Hennicke’s defection to the NSDAP also led to a 
sharp decline in the support and activity for the Volkische Wehrhund4* 
However, as Donald Tracey has correctly pointed out, the true measure 
of the NSDAP’s and the DVFP’s political vitality lies not in the 
membership of the respective parties, but in their political activtty.*® 
From April 1925 the NSDAP’s Weimar Ortsgruppe held one meeting a 
week, and from the autumn, began to accelerate its activity. The 
possession of Der Nationalsozidlist as the Gau newspaper also played an 
important role in the dissemination of the party message. In addition, 
from October 1925 onwards Hitler began a series of public appearances
43 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/176 Bl.57 atudtpolizelumt (Weimar) to ThMdl, 2 February 1926
44 .
ThHStAW, ThMdl P/176 B1.54 Stadtdirektor (Gera) to ThMdl, 2 February 1926
45 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/161 B1.6 Stadtdirektor (Gera) to ThMdl, 2 March 1925
46 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/46-l B].1E^8)RS Personal File Paul Hennicke. Hennicke 
rejoined the NSDAP on 20 May 1926.
47 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/176 B1.87 Lagebericht, 15 May 1926; ThMdl P/176 B1.105 
Stadtvorstu/d (Gotha) to ThMdl, 4 October 1926
48 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/208 B11.15, 19 ThMdl to Herr Reichskommissar fur Uberwachung 
der offentlichen Ordnung (Berlin), 23 October 1926, and 18 November 1926
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in Thurmgaa.® The DVFP could only respond by producing their 
Reichstag representatives who were no match for Hitler in terms of a 
high profile amongst the public or the far-right in Germany In simple 
terms, the NSDAP was steadily out-performing the DVFP in the public 
arenaa1 A further blow to the DVFP was the location of Weimar in July 
1926 for the first NSDAP Reich conference since re-foundhig?? Even 
though there was still some degree of tension within the NSDAP despite 
Hitler’s reconciliation of the north and south German factions earlier 
that year, the image portrayed to the public was one of a movement 
united under Hitler.
1926 brought a further opportunity for the NSDAP to expand its 
influence. The scheduling of the next Landtag elections for January 1927 
meant the party would have the first chance of testing its organisation, 
and of relegating the DVFP to the sidelines of Thuringian politics. The 
NSDAP’s chance to achieve this lay in concluding an electoral pact with 
the ex-servicemen’s organisations, principally the Stahlhelm and the * * * *
49 Tracey, “Der Aufstieg”, p.61
50 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/167 passim
51 J. Noakes, “Conflict and Development in the NSDAP, 1924-1927% Journal of Contemporary 
History (iv-October), Volume 1, 1966, p.8 argues that the DVFP’s leadership “lacked the strength to 
assert themselves with the brutal ruthlessness which was often required”.
52 NSDAP-HA, reel 21, folder 389, and reel 70, folder 1517
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Wchrbiinde, both of which had their national offices in Thuringia, 
Although the Stahlhelm only sought alliances with conservative and 
nationalist groupings, the Wehrbiinde was much, more disposed to
consider working with the NSDAP. The Volkische Fuhrerring 'Thuringen. 
(VFTh) was set up to co-ordinate this, yet the VFTh erroneously 
believed that this could be achieved with both the DVFP and the 
NSDAP. Hitler recognised that working with the VFTh would 
significantly increase the number of voters for the NSDAP, and that his 
party would also secure access to both the Stahlhelm’s and the 
Wehrbnnde’s organisational framework to assist spreading the Nazi 
message. Hitler, however, had no intention of being a mere committee 
man and he sought to have the VFTh accept his claim to undisputed 
leadership. Dinter simply had no desire to work with the DVFP, 
especially as it displayed an “uncertain attitude”53 towards collaboration 
with the VFTh and the NSDAP, Dinter was reported to have said that 
the DVFP ought to ally itself with the mainstream right-wing parties, 
whilst the NSDAP would remain alone.54 The political leverage of the 
NSDAP vis-d-vis the VFTh was strengthened when Bernard Schauen, one
53 Tracey, “Der Aufstieg”, p.65
54 NSDAP-HA, reel 7, folder 160 Muller-Brandenberg (VFTh) to Hitler, 6 October 1926
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of the DVFP’s Landtag representatives, was ready to join the NSDAP 
due to his party’s stance. Dinter, sensing an opportunity to further 
weaken his rivals, offered Schauen first place on the candidate list for 
the Weimar constituency and second place on the Land list. Dinter 
offered Graf von Gortz of the VFTh second place on the Weimar list 
also. However, von Gortz changed his mind. He offered his place back to 
the NSDAP without consulting the VFTh, and attempted to bring back 
the DVFP into the negotiations. Dinter refused outright to accept this. 
He re-arranged the list of candidates so that priority was given to 
Marschler and Hennicke. Schauen was relegated to fourth place on the 
list, a move interpreted by the VFTh as nothing other than a promise 
broken by Dinter5, This ability of the NSDAP to dominate the 
negotiations, which it had been invited to join, can be taken as a clear 
sign of the increasing strength and self-confidence of the party, which 
stemmed from the consolidation and development of the Gau in 18 
months following legalisation.
In the Landtag election, only Dinter and Marschler were elected. 
The poor showing of 3.4% for the NSDAP arose from the failure of the 
party to secure the votes of the Stahlhelm and the Wehrbunde. As a direct 55
55 NSDAP-HA, reel 7, folder 160 Muller-Brandenburg (VFTh) to Dinter, 28 December 1926,
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result of this, Dinter demanded that all NSDAP members had to 
renounce membership in all of the Wehrhiindcs constituent 
orgaii^sat^ons?6 Although the VFTh complained, Hitler gave his critics 
in the VFTh short shrift in view of the electoral snub it had given to his 
party. Hitler realised that the decline of the DVFP, which had only 
received 9115 votes (1.1%) in the election, together with his party’s 
increasing organisational soiDhistication, meant that the Wehrhunde - or in 
fact any other non- or extra-parliamentary right wing organisation 
within Thuringia - had little choice but to work with the NSDAP, and
on the NSDAP’s own terms.
Within 3 years Dinter, with the assistance of Sauckel and Ziegler, 
had managed to make the NSDAP the premier organisation on 
Thuringia’s far-right.37 At this point Dinter increasingly began to turn 
his back upon the party to concentrate upon his volkitc9 religious 
activities. Sauckel, who had been Gau business manager 
(Geugetchdftsfuhrer) since 1926,® was made deputy Gauleiter in March 56 57
and 30 December 1926
56 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/162 B1.264 Lagebericht, 15 March 1927
57 By this time the Gau possessed 19 Bezirke throughout Thuringia. See ThHStAW, ThMdl 
P/268 B1.77 Appendix to the for April-May 1927
5® BABL, NS 26/1364 Personal File Fritz Sauckel
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1927®. and he began to take on more and more duties as a consequence 
of Dinter’s absences. Dinter eventually resigned his post within the 
party due to “professional [herufliche] reasons”,® and in October Sauckel 
succeeded him as Gauleiter 4 Dinter still retained his seat in the Landtag 
and membership within the party. His attacks upon organised religion, 
together with his attempts to form a Nazi senate to advise Hitler and to 
orientate the party towards a more voIl/isth-Christian direction enraged 
Hitler. Even though Dinter had no power base in Thuringia other than 
Hitler’s personal support, Hitler moved cautiously against Dinter. Hitler 
solicited the support of other Gauleiter,65 and Gregor Strasser sent out a 
letter to all Gauleiter asking them to sign a declaration renouncing 
Dinter’s views and confirming their loyalty in Hitkr® Only once these 
had been received was Dinter expelled from the party.
Hitler’s replacement of Dinter with Sauckel as Gauleiter proved to 
be a shrewd move. Sauckel, seen as “a dull organiser [ein trockmer
59 ThHStAW, ThMdl P/162 B1.258 Lagebericht, 19 March 1927 
® ThHStAW, ThMdl P/268 Bl.131 Lagebericht for September 1927 
5* BABL, NS 26/1364 Personal File Fritz Sauckel;
62 P. Huttenberger, Die Gauleiter. Eine Studic z}tm Wandel des Machtgefilges in der NSDAP (Stuttgart, 
1969), pp. 45-46
55 NSDAP-HA, reel 23, folder 487 Gregor Strasser letter, 8 October 1928
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Organise tor]” by some® immediately brought his experience as 
Gaugeschafisfuhrer to his new post. Until the end of 1929 this period was 
one of continued growth for the NSDAP at all levels.
Sauckel’s first quarterly report of 1929 to the Reichsleitung 
provides a valuable insight into the Gau at this time. Membership 
figures alone reveal a significant increase.
Growth in NSDAP Membership
October 1927 - April 1929
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(Source: NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sacceel to Orga/isatio/sableilc/g der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.l)
Sauckel identified the Bczirke of Gotha, Weimar-Nord, Sonneberg, Suhl,
The phrase is Peter Huttenberger’s. See Die Gauleiter, p.4664
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Apolda, Altenberg and Nordhausen as the main catchment areas.65 Most 
of the Wikinggruppen in Thuringia had gone over to the NSDAP by late 
1928.66 This growth in the NSDAP’s numerical strength appears to have 
originated in its public activity, which had been “an extremely active 
one feme ftussert rege]”. Sauckel recorded that despite the atrocious winter 
weather, most of the Ortsgruppen had held their weekly meetings, and 
that 150 large public meetings had held in towns and villages of all sizes, 
with speakers from within the Gau and without. Attendance was said to 
have been “surprisingly distinguished”, with many local newspapers 
giving “very thorough” accounts.67
Sauckel’s appointment, however, had not led to any immediate 
cessation of difficulties and conflicts within the Gau. During 1928 there 
appears to have been a conflict of personalities within the SA 
leadership,68 which came to a head in early 1929 and threatened to put 
collaboration between the Gauleitung and the SA leadership “seriously
65 National Archives (NA), RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to
Organisationsabteilung der Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.l
66 See NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 January [1929], p.l. Sauckel mistakenly dated this letter as 1928, but 
internal evidence shows that it does date from 1929.
67 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.l
68 NA, RG 242, T-81, roll 116, Sauckel to Donnerhack, 9 June 1928, fr!36970-136971
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in question” . ® Sauckel resolved this by relieving Arno Donnerhack of the 
SA leadership and appointing Gustav Zunkel, leader of the NSDAP’s 
Weimar Stadtrat faction.® The growth of the SA in this period appears 
to have reflected the dispute.
Growth in SA Membership
August 1927 - April 1929
(Source: ThHStAW7, RStH/205 B11.60RS, 64RS, 69,76 Vuringcns SA)
Leadership problems also existed within four Ortsgruppen. The 
Gauleitung had remained aloof as far as possible, though it had been * *
NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.3
70 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, pp.4-5; ThHStAW, RStH/205 Bl.74 ThUringens SA
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necessary to impose Paul Papenbroock (from. Gotha) upon the Eisenach
Ortsgruppe,71 since the conflict there had led to a haemorrhaging of voters 
and new membrrs.72 73Fortunately for the Gau, Dinter’s exclusion had not 
affected the party “in any way”, but Sauckel foresaw that his predecessor 
may well continue to peddle “his scandalous assertions ... with tenacity”. 
To Sauckel’s consternation Dinter still remained in the Landtag and was 
using his vote to prop up the governmen2® Nonetheless, Sauckel was 
confident enough to report that his Gau constituted “a unified and 
complete whole, and furnishes a useful instrument for the approaching 
electoral campaign.”74 He believed that the Landtag election would 
return a minimum of three NSDAP representatives, and his view of the 
political situation gave him good cause to be optimistic. The government 
was in “an incessant political crisis” and had to rely upon the single vote 
of Dinter to maintain its majority. Sauckel noted, however, that the SPD 
and the KPD, the main opposition parties, were no longer interested in
71 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.3
72 See NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 January [1929], p.l
73 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen", Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, pp.3,5
74 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.4
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calling for an early dissolution of the Landtag, a view that the other 
parties were beginning to share. “[T]here can be no doubt”, wrote 
Sauckel, “that with a premature dissolution of the Landtag the National 
Socialists would register the strongest gain”. The NSDAP’s 
breakthrough in the Kreis- and Ganeindcrat elections of December 1928 
was seen by Sauckel and others as a sign of the NSDAP’s increasing 
electoral powe*.® Fears that these newly elected representatives would 
prove to be a disaster for the party were unfounded since their activity 
had resulted in a “significant strengthening of our [NSDAP] public 
influence and appearance. In a great number of towns this advantage has 
become evident towards the local police and administration 
authorities.” Ties to other political parties or economic groups were not 
tolerated by the NSDAP in order to allow it the greatest room for
manoeuvre®
Financial problems had given Sauckel cause for concern, 
particularly since the Gau had still not cleared the 4000 RM debt 
accrued from the Landtag election of 1927 and the Reichstag election of * *
75 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April "1929, p.5
75 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, p.6
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1928, though the Gauleiter was confident that the debt could be 
completely paid off. In addition, the Gau’s financing of the Kreis- and 
Gemeinderat elections, together with the purchase of a car and a printing 
press had led to “commitments” of an additional 3000 RM, but Sauckel 
was confident that this could be settled by the end of the year.77
Concluding his report, Sauckel stated that the Gau was to 
continue with its high profile activity. The towns of Weimar, Erfurt, 
Gotha, Suhl, Sonneberg, Gera and Altenberg were to be Schwerpunkte of 
the party’s campaigns. The last four towns were “particular strongholds 
of Marxism”, but party would put “the greatest emphasis” upon 
recruiting members and voters from the rural population and the 
professional middle class. The party, Sauckel reassured the 
Reichsleitung, would not be caught unawares by any surprise Landtag 
election,78
Sauckel’s confidence in the ‘war footing’ of his Gau was such that 
he believed it was not presumptuous to tell Hitler that “in the very near
NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, pp.6-7
78 NA, RG 242, T-580, roll 26, “Gau Thuringen”, Sauckel to Organisationsabteilung der 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, 3 April 1929, pp.8-9
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future in Thuringia an excellent progress of the movement shall be 
recorded.”7* The Gau was staffed by “valuable men”, and Zunkel was 
continuing to guarantee “the fortunate and harmonious co-operation” 
between the SA and the Gau.® Certainly Sauckel took pride in his claim 
that the Thuringian Gau was “not exclusively restricted to definite and 
social classes, rather that valuable people from all social classes come to 
us.” By this Sauckel meant a “strong increase” of those from the left of 
the political spectrum in the previous recruiting grounds of Gotha, Suhl, 
Apolda, Altenberg, and the new areas of Steinbach-Hallenberg and the 
Thuringian Wald. There had also been a “very strong increase” amongst 
the rural population. In addition, the NSDAP in Weimar could point to 
“the best circles of society amongst our members and followers.” 
Dinter’s expulsion had still not produced any noticeable side effects for 
the party*. On the contrary, Sauckel believed that the NSDAP was all the 
more stronger for it as many, who would have not joined the party under 
Dinter, had now done so.81 * 8
79 BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Fritz Sauckel (27.10.1894), PK folder, Sauckel to 
Hitler, 20 August 1929, pp.1-2
80 BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Fritz Sauckel (2Z.BC.l1^^^x)^, pk folder, Sauckel to 
Hitler, 20 August 1929, p.2
87 BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Fritz Sauckel (27.10.1894), PK folder, Sauckel to 
Hitler, 20 August 1929, p.2. Unfortunately Sauckel did not supply any data to substantiate his claims.
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Sauckel pointed out, however, that news about the Gau was not 
always good. “[O]ur struggle is, and must become, more and more 
serious and difficult”; the expansion of the NSDAP would make the 
work of party officials more difficult. Nevertheless, Sauckel sought to 
assure Hitler that the Thuringian Gau had developed “naturally and 
organically. Inflationary gains, like earlier, need not be feared”82 These 
remarks suggest that the rapid expansion of the NSDAP in the first 
quarter of 1929, when membership rose by 25%, had caused internal 
problems for the Gau, with Sauckel hinting that there were always 
difficulties and trivial matters threatening the Gau’s efficiency.83 This 
concern was prompted by the approach of three crucial election 
campaigns. The NSDAP wanted to establish itself in the Gcmeindcrat 
elections in the Prussian government areas, and lead the campaign 
against the Young Plan “with emphasis”. The most important, however, 
was the Landtag election: “It must and shall assure us a strong position
in Thuringia.”84
qn
BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Fritz Sauckel (27.10.1894), PI< folder, Sauckel to 
Hitler, 20 August 1929, p.2
83 BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Fritz Sauckel (27.10.1894), PK folder, Sauckel to 
Hitler, 20 August 1929, p.3
BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Fritz Sauckel (27.10.1894), PI< folder, Sauckel to 
Hitler, 20 August 1929, pp.3'4
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The Landtag Election and the NSDAP’s Breakthrough
Thuringian Landtag Election
8 December 1929
(Source: G. Dressel (ed.), Quellen Ti Oesdudhc Thllringens. Band IV. Wahlen und Ahstimmungsergchnisse 1920- 
1995 (Erfurt, 1995), pp.88-89)
The Landtag’s 53 seats were distributed:
SPD I8 Landbund 9
KPD 6 Wiatschaftspaatei (WP) 6
NSDAP 6 DVP6
DNVP 2 DDP 1
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The NSDAP had tripled its vote from 27,946 in 1927 to 90,159, and 
had tripled its representation in the Landtag from 2 to 6. Sauckel, 
Marschler, Hennicke and Fritz Wachdeg85 were elected from 
constituencies (Kreiswahlvorschltige),86 whilst Kurt Ludv-dg87 and Paul 
Papenbroock were elected from the Land list (Laddcswahl\'crs^(;}^]c^^)S8
The DNVP, DVP, LB and the Centre Party had polled only 243,168 
votes - a drop of 27,400 - compared to their joint performance in 1927 as 
the Eidhciislistc. These votes had not transferred to the other bourgeois 
parties. The DDP had lost 3,439 votes, and the Volksrcchtspartei (VRP) 
had undergone a serious decline with the loss 12,446 votes. Only the WP 
had increased its vote, albeit by 45. All in all, the bourgeois parties had 
lost some 43,285 votes.
The left’s electoral fortunes had been mixed. The KPD had 
experienced a significant slump in support from 113,295 votes in 1927 to
85,209 - its loss of 28,086 votes was more than equal to the combined
losses of the DNVP, DVP, LB and the Centre Party. The KPD’s
85 Wachtler had joined the NSDAP on 26 April 1926, see BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership 
File Fritz Wachtler (7.1.1891), PK folder. See also Das Deutsche Fuhrerlexikon, p.510; Wer ist’sl, pp.1665•- 
1666
Vorlagen, Anf-cige, GrofieAnfragen desFilnJten Landtags 1930-1932 (Weimar, n.d.), nr.2, p.4
87 No NSDAP Membership File exists for Ludwig, but see Wcrist’s?, p.1003
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opponents, the Kommunistische Partc-Opposition (KPO) had won 12,222 
votes, and the SPD had increased its vote by 4,000 to 258,042.
Altogether, the left had polled 11,864 votes less than in 1927.
Since the NSDAP’s increase in votes - 62,21388 9 90- was roughly equal 
to the total number of votes lost by the bourgeois parties and the KPD, it 
would be easy to argue that the NSDAP’s breakthrough had come about 
because every voter, who had abandoned the bourgeois parties and the 
KPD, had automatically defected to the NSDAP. The near parity of turn­
out between the 1927 and 1929 elections (810,935 and 806,986 
respectively)^ would appear to substantiate the idea of voters re­
shuffling themselves along ideological lines m masse.
This monocausal view, however, is too simplistic to be an 
accurate explanation of the swing to the NSDAP. Between 1927 and 1929 
the electorate in Thuringia had grown from 1,035,859 to 1,078,129 - a rise
88 Vorlagen, Antrdge, GrofieAnfragen, nr.2, p.4
89 This assumes that the DVFP voters in the 1927 election had transferred their allegiance ai
masse to the NSDAP following the DVFP’s demise.
90 See J. Falter, T. Lindenberger, and S, Schumann (eds.), Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der 
Weimarer Republik. Materialien und Wahlverhalten 1919-1933 (Munich, 1986), p.lll. Dressel’s work does not 
contain data on size of electorate, spoilt papers, etc.
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of 42,270f and the vast majority were undoubtedly first time voters. It 
is quite possible that the NSDAP’s breakthrough was not just due to the 
defection of voters away from the bourgeois parties and the KPD, but 
also to the fact that many of these parties’ voters had stayed away from 
the election, thus allowing the first time voters to have an influence far 
beyond their actual numbers.
Nevertheless, the NSDAP’s success in attracting voters from other' 
parties should not be underrated. An indication that the NSDAP would 
perform well against the bourgeois parties in the Landtag election had 
been illustrated in Apolda’s town council election of 20 October 1929. In 
the previous election of 2 December 1928 the NSDAP had polled only 
601 votes and gained just 1 seat on the council. Ten months later, in the 
election of 20 October 1929, the NSDAP’s vote more than quadrupled to 
2715, and its representation on the council increased from 1 to 692
01 .
Falter et al, p.Ill
92 Dressel, IhtettenzurGeschiehteTetlringens. Band IV, pp.79,83
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Town Council Elections in Apolda,
December 1928 and October 1929
(Source: Dressel, ^^^llen cut Geschichte Thtiringens. Band IV, pp.T^T^, 83)
The NSDAP’s breakthrough was derived the defection of voters 
from the Vereinigte burgerliche Parteien und Wirtschaftsgnuppen, and the 
Burgerlicher Wahherein/Haus- und Grundbesitzer, the two main bourgeois 
groups in Apolda. These two groups’ losses provided the NSDAP with
almost all of its extra votes and all of its extra 5 seats.
Certainly, the NSDAP’s ability to tempt voters away from its 
opponents owes something to the development of the Gau under 
Sauckel. The extent of the NSDAP’s organisational framework in
59
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Thuringia has been seen as second only to the SPD in terms of its 
presence in all centres of population93 94Without an extensive 
organisation throughout Thuringia the NSDAP would not have been 
able to disseminate its message comprehensively to the electorate in 
Apolda, let alone throughout Thuringia. The NSDAP’s success in the 
Landtag election must also take account of its participation in the anti­
Young Plan campaign, which ended a fortnight after the Landtag 
election. The prestige and respectability which the NSDAP derived from 
collaboration with the bourgeois parties in 1929 helped deliver what the 
VFTh had not in 1927 - votes away from the NSDAP’s confederates.
The Negotiations for Entry into Government
The NSDAP’s breakthrough had caused a change on the balance of 
power in the Landtag. The NSDAP’s 6 seats meant that neither the left, 
nor the right could form majority governments by excluding the NSDAP. 
There was little chance of a ‘Great Coalition’ being formed in Thuringia 
since the bourgeois parties had mistrusted the SPD5* ever since it had let 
the KPD join its government in mid October 1923, a move that led to the
93 Tracey, “The Development”, pp.4D42
94 .G. Witzmann, Hriringcn wo 1918'1933. Erinncte^^^^i Pees Politiiters (Meisenneim am Gian,
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Reichswehr intervening in Thuringia to disband the SPD-KPD 
paramilitary ‘Proletarian Hundreds’,95 *
However, the bourgeois parties, led by the LB, were much more
inclined to consider an alliance with the NSDAP® Hitler quickly 
recognised the opportunity, which had been presented to him, and he 
began to ruthlessly exploit it.
It is difficult to say when the negotiations concerning the 
NSDAP’s entry into any coalition government began exactly97 Goebbels’ 
diary entry of Wednesday 8 January 1930 is the first definite date
known. He recorded that the NSDAP was to receive the Interior and
Education Ministries, and that Frick had been selected as Hitler’s 
candidetp98 The negotiations, however, appear to have been in progress 
a little earlier than this. Sometime earlier that week Hitler had
empowered Otto Wagener, a senior SA leader, to travel to Weimar as a
1958), p.l53
See B. Haupel, Die Griindung des Landes Thuringen. Staatsbildung und Reformpolitile 1918-1923 
(Weimar/CologneWienna, 1995), pp. L56-170; E. Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London, 1988), p.48
® H. Patze and W. Schlesinger, Geschichte Thttringens. Teil 5(ii) (Cologne and Vienna, 1978),
p.507
97 Tracey, “Der Aufstieg”, p.71 claims that the negotiations began on 17 December 1929, but
cites no source for this.
98 E. Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagehtlcher von Joseph Goebhels: Samtliche Fragmente. AuJzrichnungen 1924 his 
1941 Teil 1, Band 127.Juni 1924-30. Dezemher 1930 (Munich, 1987), p.480, entry of 8 January 1930 This is 
the earliest known mention of Frick as the ministerial candidate.
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goodwill ambassador. His brief was to accelerate the negotiations then 
being conducted by Sauckel. Only when a settlement was in view would 
Hitler to travel to Weimar and conclude the negotiations in person.^
Wagener traveled to Weimar. Sauckel had already made 
appointments for him to speak with the chairmen of the DVP, DNVP, 
LB, and the DDP^ Wagener also conferred with the chairmen of the 
Thuringian Industrial Association, the President of the Reich Railway 
Board of Directors (Erfurt), the Director of the Reich Bank (Weimar), 
and the government ministers. * 100 101 2The meetings progressed well enough 
for Wagener to telephone Hitler that everything was ready for him to 
travel to Weimar and make the appearances necessary to sway opinion 
in favour of admitting the NSDAP into governmen7 ®7
Hitler’s first appearance in Weimar was at a private tea party 
organised by Sauckel. Accompanied by Rudolf Hess, Frick, Wagener 
and feuded, Hitler met twenty tafluenfid figures from Thmingia’ 
business, industry, bureaucracy, and the right-wing political parties.
O. Wagener, Hitler aus nachster Ndhe. Aufzdddumccd eines Vertrauens 1929A932, edited by H.A. 
Turner Jr., (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), p.309
100 Patze and Schlesinger, Geschichte T^ltlringeds, p.507, claim that the DDP was not considered 
possible coalition partners because of its hostility to the NSDAP.
101 Wagener, Hitler aus nttchsterNche, pp.310-311
102 Wagener, Hitler aus nachster Ndhe, p.309
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Hitler soon became the centre of attention and made all the right noises 
concerning the introduction of strong government in Germany, with the 
need to ensure that it rested upon the sound foundation of the German 
people.103 At the end of the meeting Wagener relates that Sauckel, after 
he had escorted some guests out, returned and “reported that the choice 
of minister, and hence our entry into the government has been
secured.”104 105 106
That evening Hitler continued to press his case before 300 private 
guests from the elite of Thuringia’s public life, politics, business,
administration, art, and science. According to one historian, Hitler 
“carried off something of a tour de force”103 In the two hour speech 
Hitler skillfully avoided mentioning any concept, e.g., ‘National 
Socialism’ or ‘National Socialist’, which would offend the sensibilities of 
his listeners and jeopardise the NSDAP’s chances of joining the 
government.lai Hitler stuck to the traditional themes of Germany’s 
decline in the world market, and her slide toward civil war through the
103 Wagener, Hitter aus nadisterNahe, p.313
104 “berichete, daft die Ministerwahl und damit unser Eintritt in die Regierung gesichert sei”,
Wagener, Hitler aus ndchster Nahc , p.313
105
H. A. Turner Jr., Gentian Big Business and the Rise ofHitler (N ew York, 1985), p.l93
106 Thliringische Landeszeitung Deutschlands, “Eine politische Rede Adolf Hitlers in 
Weimar", 12 January 1930
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corrosive effects of pacifism, democracy, and internationalism. Recovery, 
Hitler argued, lay in the concept and personality of the ‘Fuhrer’, and in
the Volk’s urgent priority to recover confidence in itself and its abilities. 
Only at the close of the speech did Hitler touch upon the situation in 
Thuringia. He argued that if the NSDAP had decided to enter 
government, it did not mean that the party had renounced its 
programme. Rather, Hitler argued, it was the NSDAP’s “iron will to 
introduce our fundamental ideas” into Thuringia, and in the process 
“surrender not one centimetre of our creed.” The NSDAP’s struggle 
placed priority upon the people and Germany, and whoever, Hitler 
continued, was opposed to the people, became the NSDAP’s “deadly 
enemy.” The speech ended dramatically when Hitler said: 
“Reconciliation is not for us! There is only one thing: The salvation of 
our Volk, and, if it has to be, through the annihilation of our enemies.”107 108
According to observers, the audience responded enthusiastically 
to Hitler and his statements0 Doubtless they had been expecting a 
tirade of criticism over the slow progress of the negotiations. Instead
107 Allgemeine Thuringische Landeszeitung Deutschlands, “Eine politische Rede Adolf Hitlers in
Weimar”, 12 January 1930
108 Wagener, Hitler aus nftchster Nclhe, p.313; Frohlich, Die Tagehtichcr von Joseph Goehhcls, p.481, 
entry of 11 January 1930; Turner, German Big Business, p.l93
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they were treated to a speech in which Hitler cleverly and subtly 
identified himself and his party (albeit not actually by name) with a
non-partisan, non-political effort for the renewal of Germany, and 
surreptitiously avoided any reference to the real reason why he was in
Weimar.
What happened over the weekend of 11-12 January until Monday 
13 January, the day scheduled for the expiry of Hitler’s ultimatum, is not 
known. Hitler certainly appears to have won over Thuringia’s influential 
figures with his two appearances on the Friday, and the newspaper 
accounts published over the weekend and beyond1^ no doubt helped 
influence opinion. The DVP, however, remained opposed to the NSDAP 
joining the government.
Frick’s nomination was the stumbling block. Although Frick had 
not served his prison sentence for participating in Hitler’s 1923 Putsch, 
his reputation was sufficient to alarm the DVP, whose 5 seats in the 
Landtag were also needed to make any right-wing coalition government 
fully feasible. The DVP in Thuringia came under great pressure from 
Thuringian business interests alarmed at the idea of co-operation with a * III.
109 See C. Hartmann, Adolf Hitler. Redca, Schriftcn, Anor^^^nu^ngen. Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933. Band
III. Zwischen dcnRdchslag$s■vahkdJuli 1928 - September 1930 (Munich, 1995) p.8, n.3
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‘socialist’ party,110 111as well as from the DVP throughout Germany, not just 
because of Frick’s past, but also because of the NSDAP’s attitude 
towards the DVP itself.1" Hitler was particularly angry that he was going 
to be cheated of entry into government because of the DVP’s reluctance. 
It appears that the other parties expected the NSDAP to nominate 
minor party figures to occupy some administrative backwaters in the 
Thuringian government.112 113So, on Friday 10 January, Hitler issued an 
ultimatum stating that if Frick was not accepted by Monday 13 January, 
the Thuringian NSDAP would call for a dissolution of the Landtag on 
the Tuesday, and the party would then begin campaigning for the new 
elections on the Wednesday"3
Hitler’s threat of calling for new elections was a clear attempt to 
bully Frick’s prospective coalition partners into submission by playing 
on their fears that any new election would confirm even more strongly
110 Turner, German Big Business, p.l93
111 Witzmann, Thuringen von 1918-1933, pp.153-154
112 F. Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen als Modell der Machtergreifung: ein 
Br^^f Hitlers aus dem Jahre 1930,” Vicrteljahrshcfte far Zcitgeschkhte (iv-October), 14. Jahrgang, 1966, 
p.461. This may have been a reference to position of the Staatsrate in the Thuringian cabinet. Under 
article 71 of Thuringia’s Constitution (1921) any of the former states which made up Thuringia were 
entitled to be represented by a Staatsrat, who was essentially a mmi^ster wwi'^t^ut- portfolio, i. e. real 
power.
113 Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung”, pp.461-462: FrC5!n]^K;ii, Die Pagebtichcr vonjoseph 
Goebbek, p. 481, entry of 11 January 1930
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that voters were defecting from their parties to the NSDAP. This tactic,
however, was possibly part of a two pronged strategy.
There is evidence to suggest that Hitler worked behind the 
scenes. As the DVP was managing to resist frontal attacks. Hitler chose 
the indirect method: he went straight to the financial backers of the 
DVP. Not only were Wagener’s pre-arranged meetings with 
representatives of industry, finance and transport to this end"M but 
those of Hitler were also. Hitler bragged that at one of his first meetings 
in Weimar, he had presented the NSDAP’s ideas so well “that all at once 
... a very sharp pressure was brought to bear on the deutsche [sic] 
Volkspartei”. The result, claimed Hitler, was that Frick’s candidacy and 
the demand of the interior and education ministries received “prompt 
agreement” on the Monday evening.114 15
In a 1963 account of the German cement industry, an East German 
Marxist historian reproduced part of a letter written in late March 1930 
by Heinrich Bichmann, manager of the Thuringian Business Association 
and NSDAP member. Bichmann claimed Thuringia’s financial and
114 Wagener, Hitler aus nachster Ndhe, pp.310-V1 H. Perhaps this is what Wagener meant in 1931 
when he claimed that he had been “quietly working” (stille Arheit) for the NSDAP since 1926. See 
BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Otto Wagener (20.4.1888), SA folder.
115 Dicltmann, “Die Regierungsbildung”, p.462; Orlow, The History oftheNaz Party, p.181
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parliamentary situation caused him to intervene “in a discreet manner”
to create “a suitable cabinet”.116
Ludloff believes that if Bichmann “considered it fitting” to inform 
others that he had helped to create the new government, it gives 
credence to the view that other industrialists would not by offended by 
Nazi participation in a government for the first time"7The promises of a 
sharp curtailment in government expenditure, of tax cuts, and of the 
‘irrelevance’ of the NSDAP’s official programme helped expedite 
matters.118 This appears to have been successful since Rudolf Hess, who 
had been present during the negotiations, later corroborated the claims 
of Hitler and Bichmann. In May 1930, Hess wrote: “Industry in 
Thuringia had threatened to cut off contributions to the DVP if they did 
not do business with us”119
R. Ludloff, Kasemen statt Wohnungen. Zur Geschichte der deutschen Zemantindustrie im 
imperialismus bis 1945 ([East] Berlin, 1963), p.l82; Turner, German Big Business, p.l93. Bichmann joined the 
NSDAP on 1 January 1930 shortly after resigning from a masonic lodge; see BABL, BDC NSDAP 
Membership File Heinrich Bichmann (6.1.11^8^-4), NSDAP Personalamt to Reichsleitung NSDAP, 5
April 1934, OPG File. Weristts?, p.l20
117 Ludloff, Kasemen statt Wohnungen, p.I83. It is interesting that Bichmann became one of the 
NSDAP’s twenty-six representatives returned to the Landtag in July 1932 and remainded there until 
its dissolution in 1934. See ThHStAW, Landtag von Thtiringen/39 Verzcichnis der Mitglieder des VI. 
Landtags von Thtiringen 1932.
Turner, German Big Business, pp.193-194
119 W.R. Hess (ed.), Rudolf Hefi.Briefe 1908A 933, D. ^a^endamm Introduction and Commentary
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No independent, i.e. non-Nazi, verification has been found 
revealing whether Hitler had exerted such covert pressure. However, it 
is noteworthy that the DVP did quickly capitulate to Hitler’s demands. 
On 14 January, Goebbels wrote: “Dr. Frick is Thuringia’s Interior 
Minister. It has worked out”.o°
This was somewhat premature since the Landtag needed to 
approve the coalition government. On Thursday 23 January, the Landtag 
voted 28 in favour, 22 against, with three abstentions. The government 
comprised of: Erwin Baum (LB) as Minister-President and Finance 
Minister; Frick as Interior and Education Minister; and Dr. Willy 
Kastner (WP) as the Justice and Economics Minister. Willy Marschler 
became the NSDAP’s Staatsrat for WeimaT.r1 In addition to becoming 
Thuringia’s Interior and Education minister, Frick became deputy 
Minister-President and was also one of the Thuringian government’s 
two chief plenipotentiaries (Hauptbrvollmtichtigtr) to the Reichrtat.oo *
(Munich, 1987), nr.396, p.403. See also M. Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany
(Leamington Spa/Hamburg/ New York, 1987), p.77 
120 “Dr. Frick ist Innenministsr von Thuringen. Es hat also geklappt”, Frohlich, Die Tageblicher
von Joseph Goebbels, p.484, entry of 14 January 1930: Wagener, Hitler aus ndchster Nahe, p.313 
121 Beschlussc des Funficn Landtags von Thhringen 193(^0-1932 (Weimar, n.d.), nrll, p.3. Karl Kien 
(DNVP), Theodor Bauer (DVP), Erich Port (LB), and Franz Furth (WP) were appointed the 
Staaosaate for Meiningen, Sondeashausen, Reuli, and Rudolstadt respectively.
122 ThStAW, ThSlMin/60 Bl.125 1st cabinet sitting, 23 January 1930; Thuringiechee
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In view of the coalition’s notional three vote majority, Frick’s 
accession to office was mere a formality. Nevertheless, Goebbels 
undoubtedly expressed Hitler’s relief when he wrote: “Frick is now 
Minister in Weimar. That took some doing”.* 123 124 125Frick now had the 
honour of being the first National Socialist to reach ministerial rank in 
Germany before 1933. But why was Frick, above all others, chosen as 
Hitler’s candidate? And what was Frick to achieve in office?
Frick’s Life and Career until 1930
Even though Frick was the first Nazi minister in a state 
government (Thuringia), and the only Nazi in Hitler’s Reich cabinet of 
30 January 1933 to enjoy full ministerial rank,324 no scholarly biography 
of Frick existed until 19927 The reason for Frick languishing in this 
‘obscurity’ is that after he had helped Hitler accomplish the so-called 
‘legal revolution’ of 1933-1934, whereby the NSDAP established its
Staatsministerium (ed.), Amts- und Nachrichl:enhl^t:t ftir Thuringen, I. Teil. Regierungshlatt, 10. Jahrgang,
(Weimar, n.d.), nr.8,25 January 1930, p.l7
123 “Frick ist nun Minister in Weimar. Das war eine schwere Geburt”, Frohlich, Die 
Tagehucher von Joseph Goehhels, p.489, entry of 24 January 1930
124 Hermann Goring was minister-without-portfolio.
125 See G. Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Dcr Legalist des Unrechtstaatcs. Eine Politische Biographie 
(Paderborn, 1992)
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control over Germany, Frick’s power in both party and state soon 
suffered an irreversible decline. To all extents and purposes, Frick was 
outmanoeuvred by the more radical and aggressive competing factions 
with the Nazi polycracy, in particular by Himmler and the SS. Frick also 
had to suffer the disappointment that many of his plans for the reform of 
the civil service and the constitutional framework between party and 
state met with Hitler’s express disapproval because they would have 
curtailed his personal power?2. But, as Neliba has pointed out, in the 
period from the re-founding of the NSDAP to Hitler becoming Reich 
Chancellor, Frick was often seen close to the centre of activity and 
power within the party. What was it that made Frick such an invaluable 
ally during the NSDAP’s rise to power and made him the candidate for 
ministerial power in Thuringia? The answer to these questions can only 
lie in Frick’s extensive experience of government and administration 
prior to 1930.
Frick was born on 12 March 1877, in the town of Alsenz in the 
Palatinate. Following attendance at Volksschule and Gymnasium in 
Kaiserslautern, Frick studied law at the universities of Munich, 
Gottingen and Berlin, before eventually taking his doctorate in law from *
126 See M. Broszat, The Hitler State (Harlow, 1981)
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the University of Heidelberg.127 128 * 130 131
From 1900 to 1903 Frick was a lawyer in Munich, and then a 
Regicrungsassistant to the Upper Bavarian government and also an 
Amtsanwalt to the Munich police between 1904 and 1907. For the next 
ten years (until 1917) Frick was employed as a Bezirksamt^ssessor in the 
Pirmasens district^8 where again he served with the police, this time to 
prevent and punish infringements of the wartime rationing regulations. 
Frick was also a member of Bavaria’s war profiteering office 
(Kriegswueheram:). By this stage of his career; Frick appears to have 
earned “a reputation for stern conduct”1^ He did not serve in the First 
World War due to chest problmmsPi
In 1917 Frick was re-employed by the Munich police as a 
Regierungsasscssor and an Oheramtmnnn.u1 Frick witnessed the November
127 For general biographical details see Das Deutsche Ftlhrcrlcxikon, pp.lZ-18; Neue Deutsche 
Biographic, Band V (Berlin, 1961), pp.432-433; L.L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich (New York, 
1976), p.lOO; Zentner and Bedtirftig, Das grosse Lcxikon des dritten Reiches, p.l94; W. Benz and FI. Graml 
(eds.), BiographischceLeakonzurWeimarerRepuhlik (Munich, 1988), p.95
128 Werist'l, p.444 
120 NA, RG 165 Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick by the Shuster Historical Mission, 20 July
1945.1 would like to thank Robert Wolfe of the National Archives for sending me a gratis copy.
130 P.D. Stachura, Political Leaders in Weimar Germany: A Biographical Study (Hemel Hempstead, 
1993), p.50; E. Davidson, The Trial of the Germans (New York, 1967), p.262
131 Das Deutsche Ftiiircrl^<^:xiiion, p.l7
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Revolution, and the ‘republic of soviets’ (Rtiterrcpublik) in Munich had “a 
profound influence” on him. He blamed the presence of the Jewish 
revolutionaries Kurt Eisner and Paul Levine in the Rtitcrrepublik as the 
reason why he was “strongly anti-Semitic”.oo Frick was said to have 
been placed on a black list by communists during this time.m
In May 1919 Frick also became departmental leader of Munich’s 
political poiieo®. Frick’s duty of dispensing police permission for 
political meetings and posters led to his first encounter with Hitler 
when he sought approval for the NSDAP’s public me^€tting;o.o^o Frick 
would later recall that he had been won over by Hitler’s “energetic and 
active appearance”,13® and his anti-Communist standpoint: “I agreed 
with the mission of the party, because it was the only means to act 
against communism”?^ in addition to contact with Hitler, Frick was 
said to have been in “close contact” with other far-right ‘patriotic * * * * * *
132 NA, RG 165 Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick by the Shuster Historical Mission, 20 July-
1945
133 BABL, R 18/5051 B1.81 Notes on Frick’s life and career by Hans Fabricius, 11 November
1941
134 BABL, NS 26/1221 Personal File Wilhelm Frick
135 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4, Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 25 September 1945, Iu.547, 
659
136 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4, Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 1 October 1945, fr.684,659
137 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4, Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 2 October 1945, Iu.710
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organisations’ active in Bavaria at that time such as the Organisation 
Escherisch.138 It has also been claimed that Frick allowed the murderers
of Matthias Erzberger and the perpetrators of the Feme Murders to escape 
justice by issuing them with false passes and identity cards whilst 
employed by the Munich Police.139 The gratitude Hitler felt towards 
Frick for his ‘fifth column’ activity inside Munich’s police was revealed
on 29 March 1942:
“As adjutant to the Chief of Police, he was able to supply us with all kinds of 
information, which enabled the Party to expand its activity. He never missed 
an opportunity to help us and protect us. I can even add that without him I’d 
never have got out of prison”.140
In his post-war testimony to the Americans, Frick tried to 
claim that at this stage of his career he was not “a direct associate of
138 NA, RG 165 Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick by the Shuster Historical Mission, 20 July
1945
139 See R. Wistrich, Mio’s who in Nazi Germany (London, 1982), p.81; E.N. Peterson, The Limits of 
Hitler’s Power (Princeton, N.J., 1969), p.79, n.6; O. Dutch, Hitler’s Twelve Apostles (London, 1939), p.207
140 A. Hitler, Table-Talk, 1941-1944, H.R. Trevor-Roper Introduction (Oxford, 1953), p.377. 
Although Hitler’s claim seems somewhat exaggerated it must be remembered that by this time Frick 
was considered far out of step with the directions the Nazi State and its ideology had taken during 
the War. Only seventeen days earlier Hitler had presented Frick with a cheque for 250,000 RM for 
his 65th birthday, see BABL, R 43 II/985a Bll.37-41 “Reichsinnenminister Dr. Frick”
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Hitler”,141 142 143 144 145even though he had been designated Munich’s new police 
president by the Putschists04o Frick claimed to have been in complete 
ignorance of the Putsch until it actually began, and his nomination as 
police president was the first he had known about itO43 This was wholly 
untrue. “Frick played his role to perfection” by exploiting his presence as 
the only senior official available to prevent counter-measures by those 
police officers remaining loyal to the adm^mttrar^on044 Quickly arrested 
before he could really act, Frick nevertheless earned Hitler’s praise. In 
the first volume of Mein Kampf, Hitler said of Frick and his superior,
Ernst Pohner:
“They were the only higher state officials who even then had the courage to 
be Germans first and then officials ... he [Pohoer] and his collaborator, Dr. 
Frick, are in my eyes the only men io a state position who possess the right 
to be called co-creators of a National Bavaria”?4®
Frick was found guilty as ao accessory to high treason and was
141 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4, Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 25 September 11945, fr.659
142 H.J. Gordon Jr., Hitler and the Beer HallPutsch (Princeton, N.J., 1972), pp.214, 261
143 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4, Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 1 October 1945, fr.690-703
144 Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, pp.303, 315
145 A. Hitler, MIeinKampf D.C. Watt Introduction (London, 1969), pp.333, 334. Frick was one 
of the few Nazis to be mentioned in Mein Kampf
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sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, which was later commuted to 
probation and a 1000 RM fine.’P In addition, he was subject to 
disciplinary action by the Bavarian Civil Service over his participation in 
the Putsch. Frick appealed, and was acquitted by the Disciplinary Board 
of the Supreme Bavarian Court because it deliberately ignored the 
evidence incriminating him... Consequently, Frick remained in 
Munich’s police department.^ In April 1924, Frick was elected as a 
Reichstag representative for the NSFP,.® and in February 1925 he helped 
refound the NSDAP.pp From 1926 to his appointment as Thuringia’s 
Interior and Education Minister, Frick was employed by Munich’s 
Higher Insurance Office (Oberversicherungsamt)146 147 148 149 * 51
Frick was ideally suited, therefore, to be Hitler’s candidate for the
146 BABL, NS 26/1221 Personal File Wilhelm Frick
147 BABL, NS 26/1221 Personal File Wilhelm Frick. See R. Weber, “ ‘Fin ttlchtiger Beamter 
von makelloser Vergangenheit’. Das Disziplinverfahren gegen den Hochverrater Wilhelm Frick 1924”, 
Viertelj^^^^I^^ej^^fii  ^Zeitgesd^ichte, Volume 42,1994; Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, p.526, n.526
148 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4, Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 6 September 1945, fr.6l8; Wer
ist'?, p.444; Wistrich, Who’s who, p.81
149 M. Schumacher (ed.), MI.d.R. Die Reidisaigsahgeordneten der Weimarer Repuhhk in der Zeit der 
Nat^onolsozialismiis (Dtisseldorf, 1994), p.224
I®0 Benz and Graml, Biographischce Lcxikon, p.95
I® BABL, NS 26/1221 Personal File Wilhelm Frick; Wer ist'?, p.444; Neue Deutsche Biographie, 
p.432; Rees, Biographical Dictionary ofthe Extreme Right, p.l38
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post of Thuringian Interior and Education Minister. He was one of the
few senior Nazis to hold a PhD, and his thirty years experience within 
the legal system and Bavaria’s government and administration, including 
the police, were distinct advantages, which no other Nazi then
possessed.
After Frick became Minister, Hitler rationalised his choice by 
claiming that “the important prerequisite is the correct personality.” His 
dismissive remark that “small time parliamentarians” were not equal to 
the task can be interpreted as a refusal to consider any of the NSDAP’s 6 
Landtag representatives as suitable candidates. Hitler maintained that 
he needed a “thorough going [durchgekochter] National Socialist of just as 
great technical expertise [Fachfcenntnis] as of unconditional national 
socialist conviction”. Frick, Hitler insisted, would “do justice to the 
situation” since he was “[a]n energetic, bold and responsible civil 
servant of the highest ability, and a fanatical National Socialist!”152
Frick faced only one rival as Hitler’s candidate - Gregor Strasser. 
In May 1929, Strasser had tried to put himself forward as the Saxon 
NSDAP’s candidate when, for a short time, it looked as if Saxony would
Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung”, p. 461
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be the first Land to have a Nazi government aumrte]r?33 When the 
opportunity for participation arose in Thuringia Strasser again tried to 
secure nomination. Hitler rejected Strasser on the grounds that he was 
“too strong a personality for Thuringia” and far too invaluable in the 
party bur'canai'acy^ No doubt Hitler feared that Strasser would prove 
to be too independent and would seek to create an independent power 
base from which he could implement his ‘left wing’ Nazi ideas. There 
was, however, no question of Frick’s loyalty to Hitler’. Frick could be 
relied upon to do as he was told without close supervision from the 
party whilst in office.
Hitler's Decision and Justification for Nazi Participation in
Government
Otto Wagener claims that Hitler legitimised participation in any 
government since it would enhance the NSDAP’s legal image, and so
See C.C.-W. Szejnmann, “The Rise of the Nazi Party in Saxony between 1921 and 1933”, 
Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1994, pp.99, 119, 120. Szejnmann also points out the Saxon NSDAP 
considered Frick, instead of Stresser, as their candidate, as did Hitler. See Szejnmann, op.cit., pp.120­
121, and p.l21, n.453
154 iWagener, Hitler aus nftchster Ndhe, p.310; P.D. Stachura, Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism 
(London, 1983), p. 145, n.67
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make any attempt to outlaw the party more difficult.155 This is an 
interesting explanation, but not the true reason. On 2 February 1930, 
less than a fortnight after Frick joined the Thuringian government, 
Hitler wrote to a South American industrialist and NSDAP supporter 
called Eichhorn.156 Hitler’s letter is of immense significance since he 
clearly revealed how he ruthlessly exploited the opportunity presented 
by NSDAP’s breakthrough in the election, and how Frick (by then in 
government) was to take advantage of his position.
As will be remembered the result of the Landtag election was 
such that neither the left nor the right held a sufficient number of seats 
to form a coalition government without having to take into account the 
6 held by the NSDAP. Hitler was quite aware of the fact that his party 
now enjoyed sufficient power in the Landtag to force the other parties to 
accept his demands for “active participation [active Beteiligung]” in 
government as and when negotiations began. Should the other parties, 
however, have attempted to ignore the NSDAP, Hitler revealed that he 
had been quite prepared to withdraw from the negotiations and then 
demand a dissolution of the Landtag to force a new election. Hitler
155 Wagener, Hitler aus tuichster Ndhe, p.309
156 See Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung”, pp.460'464. A copy from 1943 can be found in 
BABL, NS 19/233 “Fotokopie eines Briefes des Fuhrers an einen GroLindustriellen in Sudamerika”
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hoped that such a move would have brought the NSDAP more votes,
and therefore increased its bargaining power further. The conditions 
Hitler laid down for “active participation” were the interior and 
education ministries. They were, in Hitler’s words, “the most important 
ministries for us.” The interior ministry controlled Thuringia’s 
administration, including the appointment and dismissal of its civil 
servants, and the police. The education ministry controlled the entire 
system of education from the primary schools to the University of Jena. 
“Whoever ruthlessly and tenaciously controls the power of these two ministries”, 
wrote Hitler, “will have an extraordinary effect on theirfortunes”. w
What Hitler meant by this rather dramatic statement was 
elaborated upon when he outlined his initial plans. He expected Frick to 
effect “a gradual purge of the administration and the civil service from 
the manifestations of the red revolution”, and introduce “with ruthless 
determination, a nationalisation [Nationdhserumg] which shall show to 
the other bourgeois governments what we National Socialists 
understand by this word.” On the subject of Frick’s policy towards the 
police, Hitler cryptically remarked: “there is much to do.” As Education 
Minister, Frick was to carry out another nationalisation
157 iDiclmiann, “Die Regierungsbildung”, p.461, emphasis added
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[^^'at^onalii^lLer^ung3 by appointing “fanatical German nationalists” within 
Thuringia’s schools and the Ministry. He was to purge the teaching 
body of “Marxist-democratic manifestations”, and adapt the curriculum 
in tune with “National Socialist ways and thinking.”13®
Hitler’s Concept of “active participation”
Hitler’s statements, though initially revealing, are vague in terms 
of actual policy details, and they do not divulge why Hitler felt he could 
speak with such authority These points are particularly significant 
since any evaluation of Frick’s ministerial activities must, to some 
degree, take into account how Hitler conceptualised what Frick was to 
do in office. Is there any evidence to suggest that the concept of “active 
participation” was a coherent strategy, i.e. more than the sum of Hitler’s
statements?
On 8 January, in his first diary entry on the negotiations for 
admittance into government, Goebbels wrote: “There we shall put it to 
the first test.”5® Excluding the possibility that Goebbels may have been 
over exuberant, his remark could suggest that some form of plan or
444 Dickmann, op.cit., pp.462-463
159 “Da wir werden die eaets Probe aufs Exempel liefem”, Frohlich, Die Tagcbtichcr von Joseph
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Strategy was already in existence, merely waiting Frick’s assumption of 
office to be put into effect. If Goebbels’ statement is accurate, then 
Hitler’s ideas on “active participation” were not just some post-facto 
rationalisations devised after Frick became minister. No documentation, 
however, has come to light revealing how Hitler developed his ideas, or 
from which sources - if any - he drew upon for information or 
inspiration. Certainly, the time available to Hitler was limited. During 
the month between the NSDAP’s breakthrough and Goebbels’ 
suggestion of a plan. Hitler was busy with the anti-Young Plan 
campaign until the referendum of 22 December 1929, and by his own 
admission, he was occupied over the Christmas and New Year perioPP 
It is not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that when Goebbels 
indicates the plan’s existence on 8 January 1930, it may have been little 
more than a framework of ideas requiring or awaiting further 
refinement. This is perhaps where Frick played an interactive role in the 
formulation of “active participation”, not just by advising Hitler on the 
bureaucratic realities of government, but also by taking Hitler’s ideas 
and turning them into a coherent policy. This, of course, does not omit 
the possibility that there was a continual development of Hitler’s ideas
Goehhels, p.480, entry of 8 January 1930
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up to Frick’s accession to office on 23 January, and it cannot be ruled out 
that “active participation” was still evolving as a concept when Hitler 
wrote to Herr Eichhorn on 2 February 1930. This would mean that 
Hitler’s statements were not a precis or an abstract of a more detailed or
sophisticated theory, but actually constituted “active participation” 
itself In the final analysis, Hitler’s statements are all that exists, and
however inadequate they seem, they constitute the minimum criteria
against which Frick’s activities must be assessed.
Two days before Frick became Minister, Goebbels wrote: 
“Hopefully he [Frick] shall keep that which he has promised”.161 
Although Goebbels did not specify the nature of Frick’s promises, it is 
perhaps a reference to Frick vowing to do everything possible within his 
power for the advancement of the NSDAP, and avoid anything that 
would be a public relations disaster. The following four research 
chapters will now attempt to examine whether Frick and “active 
participation” justified the confidence Hitler that had placed in both.
160 See Hitler's comments to Eichhorn, in Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung”, p.460 
161 “Hoffentlich, halt er das, was er versprochen hat”, Frohlich, Die Tagebticher von Joseph
Goebbeh, p.486, entry of 21 January 1930
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the Nazi Party in Thuringia grew 
from its initial beginnings io Thuringia in 1922 to become a well- 
organised machine by late 1929, enabling it to successfully compete with 
Thuringia’s longer established political parties in the Landtag election of 
December 1929. Attention then focused on how Hitler, by exploiting the 
Thuriogian NSDAP’s organisational strength and its electoral success, 
overcame the reluctance of the other parties in admitting the NSDAP 
into a coalition government, and how Hitler surpassed the opposition 
towards his candidate for office, Wilhelm Frick, by exerting pressure 
upon the DVP. Finally, the chapter considered Frick’s suitability for 
office io Thuringia, and what was Frick expected to achieve in office.
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The Thuringian Enabling Act, March 1930
This chapter is the first of two dealing with Frick’s activity as 
Thuringia’s Interior Minister. It investigates his impact upon the 
administration and government of Thuringia in terms of both structure 
and personnel policy. Attention will also be paid to particular measures, 
including Frick’s attempt to grant Hitler Thuringian citizenship by 
appointing him the Gendarme commissioner in the town of 
Hildburghausen. The subject of Frick’s administration of the police shall 
be dealt with in the following chapter. The historiography of Frick’s 
period in power has mentioned the Enabling Act in such a manner as to 
suggest that it led to an extensive reorganisation of Thuringia’s 
administration, with a distinctive Nazi slant. Certainly, Hitler’s 
comments that Frick was to carry out “a slow purge of the 
administration and of the civil service from the manifestations of the red
revolution”, and that Frick was “to introduce ... with ruthless 
determination a nationalisation (Nationalisierung)”,1 have done much to 
foster this view. The reality, however, is different.
® F. Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen als Modell der Machtergreifung: ein 
Bri^<^.f Hitlers aus dem Jahre 1930”, Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschkhte (iv-October), 14. Jahrgang, 1966, 
pp.462-463
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Prior to Germany’s military collapse of 1918, Thuringia comprised
7 different territories ruled by various German royal houses. The 
abdication of these rulers and the founding of the Weimar Republic 
allowed these territories to be unified into a single, self -governing Land.2 
In contrast to Germany’s other Lander there had not been any tradition 
of a single, established apparatus of government and administration in 
Thuringia, it had to construct a uniform system. Article 63 of Thuringia’s 
constitution (1921) recognised this administrative diversity. During a 
“transitional period” (Ubergangszeit) of unspecified duration each of the 
former 7 territories became a “communal association of higher order” 
(Kommunalvcrband hoherer Ordnung) with the right of self"administration. 
In exchange for this status, however, these Kommunalverbtinde were 
expected to fulfill administrative duties laid down by the government or 
the relevant ministries, and prepare for the transition of other 
administrative duties to central government. Laws and decrees of these 
former areas were to remain in force only so long as central government
2
On the early years of Thuringia see: B. Haupel, Die Grtindung des Landes Thuringen. Staatsbildung 
und Reformpolitik 19184923 (Weimar/Cologne/Vienna, 1995), and D.R. Tracey, “Reform in the Early 
Weimar Republic: The Thuringian Example”, Journal of Modern History (ii-june), Volume 44, 1972, 
pp.195496
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had not issued new regulations? In the early 1920s many measures were 
enacted to create a unified admini^ttratzic^i^,3 4 but by the close of the 
decade Thuringia was unable to balance its budget as expenditure upon 
administration began to exceed revenue. It was feared that failure to 
remedy the situation threatened bankruptcy and possible territorial 
incorporation into Prussia. Neither the population of Thuringia, nor had 
politicians accepted this as a viable option5 6Thus, the only possible 
means of securing Thuringia’s continued existence was a policy of 
retrenchment. This was the remedy prescribed by Reichssparkommissar 
Dr. Saemisch who examined Thuringia’s ‘accounts’. He identified four 
areas, which needed financial overhaul: government and administration, 
finance, education, and justice® The need to reform was cited as the 
motivation for the publication of a draft Enabling Act on 12 March 15930.
3
Landeszentrale fur politische Bildung und Thuringische Hauptsstaatsarchiv (ed.), Quelkm
zurGeschichte. Band 5. Verfassungen und Gesetze 1920-1995 (Erfurt, 1995), p.41
4 iTracey, “Early Reform”, esp. pp.205-208
1 D. R. Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia, 1924-1930”, 
CentralEuropean History (i-March), Volume 8,1975, pp.40, 43
6 Gutachten liber die Landesverwaltungs Thuringcn. Erstattet am 4. Oktober 1929 vom 
Reichssparkommissar Staatsminister a.D. Dr. Saemisch (n.p., n.d.); See also Schieck, “Das Gutachten 
des Reichssparkommissars uber die Landesverwaltung Thuringen”, Reich und Lander, 4. Jahrgang, 1930, 
pp.25-30; W. Sommer, “Das Gutachten des Reichssparkommissars uber die thuringischen 
Verwaltung von 1929 und die thuringischen Verwaltungreform 1930”, Reich und Lander, 4. Jahrgang, 
1930, pp.23-4-240
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The purpose of the Enabling Act was to simplify and reduce the 
costs of government and administration in Thuringia. Until the act’s 
expiry on 30 September 1930, the government could alter existing laws 
by decree (Verordnung), abolish existing authorities, construct new ones, 
transfer their responsibilities to the Reich, and simplify administrative 
procedure and the administration courts. The government could also 
revoke existing legislation in a whole range of areas and establish new 
uniform regulations. The individual ministries would enact
Ausfuhrungsvcrordnunghn to complement the decrees, and all decrees 
issued were to be submitted for the Landtag’s approval. The Landtag
was entitled to annul or alter any decree.
The Enabling Act’s most contentious aspect was the planned
retirement of civil servants under article 3, paragraph 1. This determined 
that until the act’s expiry, the regulation of article 29, paragraph 1, 
number 1 of Thuringia’s state civil servants’ law was deemed to be valid 
for all nichtrichterlichcn civil servants, i.e. that any civil servant could 
provisionally retire (in Ruhestand versetzcn) if the office administered by 
him was reorganised.7
y
Vorlagen, Antragc, Grofie Anfragcn des Ftinften Landtags von Thuringen, 1930-1932 (Weimar, n.d.), 
nr.41, pp.31-32. See BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.lI^O W.T.B. “SparmaLnahmen in Thuringen”, 15 March 1930;
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The Controversy in Thuringia concerning the Enabling Act
Opening the Landtag debate, Frick contrasted the Weimar 
Republic with Thuringia by arguing that the Republic’s repeated
recourse to extra- and anti-parliamentary measures to see it through 
critical times was “not exactly a good sign” of its “excellence”. Whilst 
the proposed Enabling Act was in much the same vein, this was merely 
“up to a certain point”, Frick claimed, since the Thuringian government 
intended to stray from the legislative norm only “for weighty reasons”.8 
The Enabling Act’s chief aim was the reorganisation of the 
administration. Under normal circumstances, this would be effected 
through due process and consideration of legislation by the Landtag, 
but, as Frick stressed, this was “technically impossible ... according to 
the completely clumsy apparatus with which parliament works”. It was 
“urgently necessary” to bring about the “significant economies” needed 
to maintain Thuringia’s sovereignty. He recognised that these measures 
would hit government employees (Angestcllten) and civil servants 
particularly hard, but believed the reorganisation “must not be 
determined by personal considerations”, and he argued that Thuringia’s
R 43 1/2315 Bl.191 “ThUringens Ermachtigungsgesetzes”, HannoverscherKuricr, 16 March 1930
g
Stenographische Berichte uber die Sitzjmgen des Ftinften Landtags von Thuringen. Band I. 1. bis 35.
89
Chapter T'hrcc: Frick as Interior Minister I 
Straightened circumstances dictated that the government had to have 
carte blanche to accomplish the reorganisation - article 3, paragraph 1 was 
the means to achieve this. Any civil servant and any office could be
affected by the reorganisation, stated Frick. With this in mind, he drew 
attention to the remaining provisions of article 3 which further 
regulated the retirement of civil servants. He viewed the voluntary early 
retirement of older civil servants as “very desirable” if it led to the 
reduction of civil service numbers as a whole.9
Second, article 2, paragraph 1 was designed to bring about a shift 
of executive power from the individual ministries of central government 
to field agencies (“external authorities”). The government, said Frick, 
valued strengthening the competencies of the field agencies as this 
would permit ministries to cut back on expenditure, merge sections, and 
make civil servants “superfluous”. This shift in power would be achieved 
through the alteration of the Landesvcrwaltungsordnung, and the Gemeinde- 
and Kreisordnung, as well as other lesser regulations. Frick accepted a 
communist objection that alteration of these regulations necessitated 
legislation, but he again reminded the Landtag that this traditional
Sitztmg(7.Jannarhis23.Mai l930), (Weimar, n.d.), Ht;h sitting, 18 March 1930, p.219, col.I 
StenographischeBerichte, Band I, p.219, col.II - p.221, col.I
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method was “too protracted”. Decrees published under the aegis of 
article 2 were to accomplish this.10 11 12
Thuringia’s Social Democrats, lead by Hermann Brill, immediately 
rejected the act, and on behalf of his party, he declared the “hardest 
fight” against it. Brill believed the act was an attack against the entire 
system of parliamentary government, and warned hat no means would 
“remain untried” to check the “ominous beginnings becoming evident” 
in Thuringia’s political development. Brill characterised Frick’s attempts 
to justify the Enabling Act from constitutional and legal perspectives 
were either “politically askew” or “legally incorrect”.11 Article 33 of 
Thuringia’s constitution permitted an empowerment (cine Ermdchtigung) 
of a government,. but Brill pointed out that this was restricted to the 
legal sphere and allowed little more than provisional measures. Every 
measure of the Enabling Act, Brill maintained, was a “clear violation” of 
article 28, paragraph 2 of the Thuringian Constitution which stipulated 
that laws were to be decided by either the Landtag, or by plebisclte.13 
Furthermore, Brill pointed out that the Landesverwaltungsordnung, as well
10 StenographischeBerichte, Band I, p.221, col^.II - p.222, col.l
11 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.222, col. 1-11
12 See Landeszentrale QltellerlzurGecchichte, p.33
13 See Landeszentrale, Gu1^e.llenzj^lr^C^(s^chihhte, p.33
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as the Gcmcinde- and Kreisverwaltungsordnung also provided established
means for the alteration of legislation. Brill asked why the government 
needed an Enabling Act, or needed to submit proposed decrees to the 
Landtag, when the government’s majority was enough to secure the 
successful passage of legislation. He believed the Landtag was “cowardly 
shunning a very serious obligation and ... its responsibility toward the 
population” if it surrendered its legislative powers to the government. 
He further wondered why the Landesverwaltungsordnung, which had been 
created by the Enabling Act of 1926, had to be scrapped. He asked the 
government why it had not said clearly what the Enabling Act “actually 
intended” and demanded that the full facts be placed before the Landtag.
Brill then tackled the matter of the personnel policy as envisaged 
under article 3. The Enabling Act was “thoroughly unsatisfactory” with 
regard to the rights of civil servants and Angestellten, particularly as Frick 
had earlier said that even if some government offices and authorities 
were not affected by the re-organisation, they would still experience a 
BeamttfMbbau.14 Brill doubted very much that such an application of 
article 29, paragraph 1, number 1 of Thuringia’s civil service law was 
permissible. He claimed that judges could only decide this, and whether *
14 See Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.220, col.II
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there was an “organic”, i.e. an actual reorganisation of the authority 
concerned. Assertions made by legislators, he argued, were not sufficient
crieeria.15
As a constitutional lrwyer, Brill considered the most important 
issue to be the Enabling Act’s constitutional significance. He did not 
accept Frick’s assertion that the act was not a law altering the 
constitution (verfassungstindemde Gesctz)16 17 18Brill pointed to article 5 of the 
Reich Constitution, which stipulated that state authority in the Lander 
was exercised, on the basis of their constitutions, by the Lrndraga.19 Any 
law, which affected, or did away with, “this organic position of the 
Landtag” was a violation of both the Thuringian and Reich 
Constitutions. Brill identified articles 13,15,19 of the Reich Constitution 
as providing some of the “constitutionally valid means” he threatened to 
employ against the aca®
The discussions in the Landtag’s legislation committee on 25 
March followed much the same course. The SPD continued to doubt the
15 StenographischeBerichte, Band I, p.223, col.Pp.224, cc^l.II
1 See StenographischeBerichte, Band I, p.219, col.l, p.222, col.II
17 See E. M. Hucko (ed.). The Democratic Tradition: Four German Constitutions (Oxford, 1987),
p.149
18 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.225, col.I; Hucko, The Democratic Tradition, pp.152, 154. The 
SPD attempted to have the State Supreme Court for the German Reich rule articles 2 and 4
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government’s claim of the act’s legality, as well as the legality of the
measures to be carried out under it.19 Reference was made to the
apparent contradiction between article 3, paragraph 1 and Frick’s
statement in the Landtag that any civil servant could be retired even if 
their office was not affected by the reorganisation. The SPD pointed out 
that civil servants could well be in a position to sue the government for 
violation of their rights, as set out under article 129 of the Reich 
Constitution. A government representative replied that both article 1 
and article 3, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Act stood in “close connection” 
to each other. Thuringia’s entire administration was to be reorganised, 
therefore, article 29, paragraph 1, number 1 of the state civil servants’ law 
was valid for all of Thuringia’s authorities. The government’s 
representative stated, in response to a question from the SPD, that only 
state authorities were affected by the planned reduction in authorities 
and civil servants (Behordai- und Bcamtenabhau), but self-administrating 
authorities (Sclbstverwcikungsbehordcn) were excluded. The government 
had not yet decided how many of its Angestellten and civil servants would
unconstitutional, but the attempt failed; see Landtag von ThUringen/30
19 Ausschufiberichte des Ftlnften Landtags von Thuringen 1930-1932 (Weimar, n.d.), nr.5, p.l2, col.L
p.l3, col.II
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be subject to ‘retirement’.20 The SPD asked if a regulation could 
introduced so that provisionally retired civil servants could be re­
employed since the SPD feared that re-employment would be used
“improperly” to re-instate “suitable” (geeignete) civil servants only. The 
WP, DVP, and NSDAP all said that such a regulation was not 
necessary.21
The committee voted in favour of the act. The SPD alone 
protested that the vote was not legally valid since the assent did not 
possess the two-thirds majority necessayy22
Opposition to the act also manifested itself outside the Landtag, 
and was again chiefly concerned with the rights of civil servants. Before 
the publication of the draft act, the Thuringer Beamtenbund expressed 
its concern saying a general Personalahhau was “misplaced” and would 
cause “grave shocks” if brought about by extra-ordinary measu^®3 
Likewise, senior civil servants’ councils within the government were 
concerned about the preservation of their ‘duly acquired rights’ 
(wohler^worhene Rechte), with particular reference to retirement. They
20 Ibid., p.14, col.I-II, p.l6, coLl
21 Ibid., p.16, col.II
22 Ibid., p. 17, col. I
21 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/6 Bll. 11-12 Thuringer Beamtenbund to ThStMin und die Herren
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believed that the linking of article 3, paragraph 1 to article 29, paragraph 
1, number 1 of the state civil servants’ law would establish a “legal 
pretence”, since under the latter act civil servants could only be retired if
the office administered by them ceased to exist as a result of a 
reorganisaiion 29 Similarly, the Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund, led 
by Brill in Thuringia, repeated detailed concerns about various 
personnel aspects resulting from the Enabling Act®
The battle over the Enabling Act returned to the Landtag on 29 
March 1930. Georg Witzmann, leader of the DVP, was the only member 
of a government coalition party to make any statement. He said that the 
original doubts which he had expressed about the act,® had now been 
resolved “through our co-operation and influence”. Witzmann hoped 
that, through “intelligent and sober use”, the government would achieve 
its aims27
Hermann Brill again denounced the act warning that it would not * 24 25 *
Mitglieder, 11 March 1930
24 ThHStAW, ThFiMin/B B1.9 Die Hauptbeamtenrate to ThStMin, 18 March 1930
25 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/6 1311.18 19 Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund 
(LandesauRschuR GroRthUringen) to the Thuringian Landtag, 20 March 1930; ibid., Bll.21-22 25 
March 1930; ThFiMin/B Bll.24-25 AGDB (LaGTh) to ThStMin, 31 March 1930
® See Stenographische Berichte, Band 111th sitting, 18 March 1930, p.229, col.II
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deliver the planned reform, but instead lead to “increased 
bureaucratisation” and “the reduction of state activity to a purely 
bourgeois-capitalist system.” He repeated that the law altered the
constitution, and that a simple majority (einfache Mehrhdt) was not 
sufficient for constitutional and legal validity. The act, he believed, was 
conceived out of “hate towards social democracy”2® The KPD viewed the 
Enabling Act as “a further step towards the elimination of today’s ... 
democracy, a step towards the by-passing of parliament, and the 
introduction of fascist, dictatorial government methods ”22
Despite this outright opposition, the Landtag assented to the 
Enabling Act, 28 votes to 25. Brill again argued that a 3 vote majority 
meant the law had not been legally passed since it did not constitute the 
two-thirds necessary (as demanded by the constitution27 28 29 30), and argued 
that the government could not claim otherwise. Nevertheless, despite 
Brill’s strenuous objections the Landtag president declared that the
27 Stenographische Berichte, Band 117th sitting, 29 March 1930, p.379, col.I-II
28 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.379, col.II-p.380, col.I; See M. Overesch, Hermann Brill in 
Thuringen 1^595-1946. Ein KUmpfer gegen Hitler und Ulbricht (Bonn, 1992), p.202; J. John, “GrundzUge der 
Thuringen 1918 bis 1952”, Schrifien zifr Gechhich:e des Parlarnentarismus in
Thuringen, Heft 3,1993, Thuringi^<^C^eV<^i'fa:c!^lun^sge^^}^ici^t^e iml9. und20.]ahrhunderte, pp.64-65
29 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.380, col.I
30 Landeszentrale, Quellenzur Geschichte, p.30
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Enabling Act had indeed become law.®
Frick’s opponents now feared that he would use the Enabling Act
to sweep Thuringia’s administration clean and realise those “ominous 
beginnings” believed to be developing within the Land. But to what 
extent were his critics justified in believing? Did Frick hijack the 
reforms for his own ends, or was the true picture more mun^an^?
Frick’s Use of the Enabling Act
A memorandum of 14 February reveals that it was Frick’s wish
that “the Enabling Act gives the opportunity to subject the entire Land 
legislation to an inspection and to improve [it], where it is necessary. ”* 32
Study of the ministerial files and government publications confirms this 
picture. Measures were enacted, such as new versions of the 
Landesverwaltungsordnung and the Gemeinde- und Kreisverwaltungsordnung,  ^
but there was no great flurry of activity. One contemporary view of the 
Enabling Act believed that despite claims made about it leading to a
I® Stenographisclic Berichte, Band I, p.380, col. II; See BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.192 W.T.B. “Annahme 
des Ermachtigungsgesetzes in ThUringens Landtag”, 29 March 1930; Overesch, Hermann Brill, p.202
32 ThHStAW, ThMdl D/60 ThMdl note to Oberregierungsrat Ebeling, 14 February 1930, 
emphasis added
I® GesetzsanimlungfiirThtiringen, nr.26, 22July 1930, pp.123-170
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reduction (Verringcrung) in state activity, “the draft of the Enabling Act 
restricts itself to a mere reshuffle of the existing duties, [as] proposed by 
article 2, paragraph 2”®
Very early on into his term of office Frick issued two memoranda, 
which can be interpreted as an attempt to stamp his authority upon his 
ministries. On 28 January he announced his intention that in all matters 
of “fundamental and political significance” he reserved his right to 
personal decision and asked that they were put before him. The request 
also extended to applicants to the civil service and the polica.® Frick 
also reserved his right to personal decision “in every individual case” 
regarding the dismissal of civil servants, Angestellten and Arbeitem 
resulting from economy me^^isue’ea.® Although article 3, paragraph 1 is 
not found in the earlier drafts of the Enabling Ac®7 it could be argued 
that its inclusion stemmed from not only Frick’s desire to strengthen 
further his control over civil servants not only in the formal ‘hire and fire’ * 6
16 ThHStAW, ThFiMin/B Bl.9 Die Hauptbeamtenrate to ThStMin, 18 March 1930, original
emphasis
11 ThHStAW, ThMdl A/28 B1.25 Frick to Geschaftsabteilungen und den Leiter der
Landespolizei, 28 January 1930
16 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/72 Bl.137 Frick to Ministerialdirektoren und Abteilungsleiter der 
Mdl und VbMin, 21 February 1930
6 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/B BU.2,3
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sense, but also in the sense of instilling fear into them by emphasising 
that now, more than ever, their future career development lay in his 
hands. In the first reading of the Enabling Act in the Landtag, Frick 
himself had said that every civil servant fell under the jurisdiction of 
article 3, paragraph 1 even if their office was not affected by the re­
organisation.38 39This statement can only have heightened suspicion about 
Frick’s motives for the act’s provision clearly offered the opportunity to 
remove officials under the guise of a financially induced reorganisation. 
Although opponents of article 3, paragraph 1 had not expressly stated 
such concerns, it is difficult to see what else they could have mistaken 
the provision as signifying. So how exactly did Frick wield the power 
now vested within his office, and who were the targets of his
Beamtcnabbau?
With effect from I April, 1 Ministerialdirektor, 5 Minis terialrate, 6 
Oberregierungsrate, 3 Regierungsrate were to retire on half-pay 
(gesetzlichc Wartestand'). In addition, 2 Ministerialdirektor, 6 
Minis terialrate, 8 Oberregierungsrate, and 1 Regierungsrat were to 
commence provisional retirement (Wartestand vcrsetzcri)?9 One further
38 See Stenographische Berichte, Band 1,11th sitting, 18 March 1930, p.220, col.II
39 ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bll.165-16915 sitting of the State Ministry, 29 March 1930
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Oberregierungsrat and a further 2 Regierungsrate were to be retired 
from 1 Jufy o In sum, 35 civil servants were to retire from the ministries 
of education, interior, finance, and economics. Of these 35 civil servants,
personal files exist for 20. Analysis reveals that just 1 official claimed to 
belong to any party (the DVP) before 1933,* 41 *whilst only 1 official joined 
the NSDAP on 1 April, the same day as his retirement was to take 
effect®- The remainder of the files record no party affiliation at the time 
of their retirement, though 4 civil servants did eventually join the 
NSDAP, albeit between 1933 and 1937.43 On the basis of these findings, 
yet taking into account the absence of personnel files for the other 15 
retired officials, it is difficult to see any explicit evidence suggesting that 
these retirements were initiated due to the political machinations of 
Frick. In all but one caee,4® the documentation reveals no divergence
21 ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bl.212 24 sitting of the State Ministry, 23-24 June 1930
41 .ThVbMin Personal File 14728 Ernst Kluge BI.115^’RS “Military Government of Germany - 
Personnel Questionnaire”, 3 October 1945
'1 ThMdl Personal File 3405 Georg Hellwig, Akten des Landesfinanzamts Thuringen folder 
Bl.81 “Military Government of Germany - Personnel Questionnaire”, 20 September 1945
"I® See ThVbMin Personal File 17726 Dr. K.A.G. Kummer, “Personalbogen”; ThVbMin 
Personal File 33740 Richard Wicke “Military Government of Germany - Personnel Questionnaire”, 18 
July 1945; ThFiMin Personal File Karl Dittmar Bl.128 NSDAP (Kreis Weimar) to RStH Buro, 26 
September 1933; ThMdl Personal File 4853 Martin Krause Bl.103 NSDAP (Kreis Weimar) to ThMdl, 
28 April 1938
'1 ThVbMin Personal File A. Bock contains no retirement documentation
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from the reasons advanced by the Enabling Act, viz the retirements had 
taken effect because the offices administered by the civil servants had 
ceased to exist; there is certainly no suggestion that any of the officials 
were retired because they may have held anti-nazi opinions. The 
candidates’ age also appears to have been a factor. The average age of the 
candidates was 54 years, though this ranged from a 21 year old/® to two 
63 year olds .* 4® It could be argued that these retirements were not so 
important in themselves, but rather that their importance lay in which 
civil servants were left in employment. In other words, those who 
remained were much more in favour of Frick and his policies, rather 
than those retired were against him.
Conflict with the Reich Government
The day before the Enabling Act became law, Reich Interior 
Minister Carl Severing wrote to the Thuringian government saying he
did not believe that article 3, paragraph 1 was compatible with article
129 of the Reich Constitution, which protected civil servants’ rights. He
6 ThVbMin Personal File 1772B Dr. K.A.G. Kummer, born 10 August 1908
46 ThFiMin Personal File E. Zaubitzer, born 2 April 18BB; ThVbMin Personal File A. Bock,
born 1 October 18B7
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argued that article 3, paragraph 1 allowed article 29, paragraph 1, 
number 1 of Thuringia’s civil servants’ law to- become “a fiction ... 
without reference to the actual conditions”. In other words, the
protection, which civil servants enjoyed against arbitrary dismissal and 
the right to be left alone in office, had been done away with in “a 
trenchant manner”. As support for his view, Severing quoted several 
judgments of the Reichsgericht, which supported the view that the 
Reich Constitution protected a civil servant’s security of tenure in 
offcceO7
Severing’s letter received no answer as both the Reich and the 
Thuringian government’s were both involved in a dispute concerning 
the payment of a Reich subsidy for the upkeep of Thuringia’s polico n 
Reconciliation of the Enabling Act with the Reich Constitution only 
began with Severing’s successor in office, Reich Interior Minister Joseph 
Wirth.
Wirth met Hermann Munzel, the Thuringian government’s 
representative with the Reich govei’nment, on 2 April. Wirth said that 
the constitutional validity of article 3, paragraph 1 was a “very important
47 ThHStAW, ThFiMin/6 B1.30-30R.S Severing to ThStMin, 28 March 1930. Severing had 
been contacted by the Berlin branch of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund. See ThHStAW, 
ThFiMin/6 Bll.01-02 AGDB (Berlin) to Severing, 26 March 1930
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question”, and asked for further talks to resolve this since civil service 
interest groups had objected to the act’s provision 42 After Munzel had 
reported back to the Thuringian government, he told Wirth that a 
discussion of the matter was “thoroughly desirable” and that a member 
of the Thuringian cabinet might attend.3®
On 10 April, Wirth met with Erwin Baum, Thuringia’s Minister- 
President, to repeat the Reich’s government's concern. State Secretary 
Plunder (Reich Chancellery), State Secretary Zweigert and 
Ministerialrat Kniep (both Reich Ministry of the Interior) all agreed 
that the compatibility of article 3, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Act with 
article 129, paragraph 1 of the Reich Constitution was “a pretence” (eine 
Fiktion). Suspicion about this “pretence” was heightened further when 
Baum said that article 3 was “not necessary at all” (gamiicht erford.erlich) 
since tdiose civil servants who had taken provisional retirement had 
done so because their offices had been reorganised. When Wirth asked 
why, in view of this, article 3 had been considered necessary in the first 
place, could not supply a satisfactory answer.3’
1 See chapter 4 of the dissertation.
49 BABL, R 431/2315 Bll.255-256 Reich Ministry of the Interior note, 2 April 1930
I® ThHStAW, ThFiMin/6 B1.34 Munzel to Wirth, 4 April 1930
1’ BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl^..^<52-263 Reich Chancellery note, 12 April 19.30 emphasis added. See
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The Thuringian government insisted that article 3, paragraph 1 
was “entirely compatible” with Reich law, but the government was 
willing to invoke the Reichsgericht to secure a settlement, and do so in 
co-operation with the Reich government. Collaboration over this step 
was to be discussed during a visit by Zweigert to Weima®52 The 
Thuringian government further pledged to suspend all provisional 
retirements under article 3, paragraph 1 until the Reichsgericht had 
reached a derism®.® In a “searching conference” with the Thuringian 
government on 29 April, Zweigert discussed the constitutional 
problems. No agreement was produced, but both sides agreed to initiate 
the planned appeal to the Reichscericha.® Wirth invoked the 
Reichsgericht the following day ®
On 20 June, the Third Civil Senate of the Reichsgericht met to 
deliver its verdk® ® The Reichsgericht confirmed Severing’s view that 
civil servants who were in office when the Enabling Act became law,
TheTimes, “The Dispute with Thuringia”, 19 April 1930
H BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.264 W.T.B, “Die Antwort Thuringens an das Reich”, 17 April 1930 
® BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.265 W.T.B. “Die Beilegung der Meinungsverschiedenheit mit
Thuringen”, 17 April 1930. This promise was not kept, see p. 19 above
® BABL, R 43 12.315 B1.2^(59 W’.tB. “Der Besuch des StaatssekretUr Zweigert in Weimar”, 30
April 1930
66 ThHStAW, ThF'iMin/B B1.72 Wirth to President of the Reichsgericht, 30 April 1930 
66 ThHStAW, ThFiMin/B Bll.i^<5-90 Decision of the Reichsgericht, 20 June 1930
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had the right to be retired only if the office administered by them was 
abolished as a result of a governmental re-organisation. This right could 
only be restricted by a change in the Reich Constitution, not by “a
simple Land law”; any such provision by a Land would be void due to its 
incompatibility with the Reich Constitutim.57
The wording of the act, according to the Reichsgericht, had 
simply not given the Thuringian government: the right to retire civil 
servants since article 29, paragraph 1, number 1 of Thuringia’s civil 
servants’ law was valid for all civil servants. Severing was again deemed 
correct in identifying a “legal pretence” in article 3, paragraph 1. The 
Reichsgericht pointed out that the Thuringian government had denied 
this and had claimed that the clause “signified nothing other than what 
was already pronounced in article 29, paragraph 1, number 1”. However, 
the Thuringian government had claimed that under article 1 of the 
Enabling Act there would be a complete re-organisation of the Land’s 
administration and authorities, and that article 2 granted the powers 
and the mandate necessary to achieve this. But “these conditions do not 
justify the conclusion which the Thuringian government makes”, 
because, said the Reichsgericht, in any re-organisation - for one reason
57 ThHStAW, ThFiMin/6 B188 Decision of the Reichsgericht, 20 June 1930
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or another - there would be offices unaffected.. Therefore, any alteration 
would not involve the necessary re-organisation of all offices, but only 
provide the opportunity to do so. Therefore, it did not follow that civil 
servants would retire because their offices would automatically cease to 
exist. In other words, “[abstractly as well as practically”, article 3, 
paragraph 1 did not coincide with article 29, paragraph 1, number 1 of 
Thuringia’s civil servants’ law, but went “beyond it”.5®
In addition, the Reichsgericht ruled that article 3 of the Enabling 
Act had further violated civil servants’ rights since it maintained the 
“pretence” of a complete re-organisation, so denying civil servants the 
right to call for a judicial examination of the re-organisation to see 
whether their offices would be affected. This too was a violation of civil 
servants’ rights protected under article 129 of the Reich Constitutim.^
The Thuringian government accepted the Reichsgericht’s verdict 
without disem®. If there was opposition, none was recorded in either 
the cabinet files, or in the many copies of the Reichsgericht’s decision * * *
I® ThHStAW, ThFiMin/6 Bl.88 Decision of the Reichsgericht, 20 June 1930
I ThHStAW, ThFiMin/6 Bl.89 Decision of the Reichsgericht, 20 June 1930
I® ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 BH. 215016 25th sitting of the State Ministry, 30 June 1930
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circulated around the government.61 The Thuringian government’s 
announcement of the Reichsgericht’s decision stated that article 3, 
paragraph 1 was to be regarded as illegal (rcchtsungukig), but that the rest 
of the act would remain in force62 The Finance Ministry wrote: “the 
opportunity for its use has been omitted (istfortgefalien)”63
If it can be argued that Frick did not use article 3, paragraph 1 of 
the Enabling Act to dismiss non- or anti-Nazi civil servants, did he use 
any other means to dismiss those lukewarm or hostile to him? On a 
general level, the answer is no. Files relating to civil servants and 
Angestellten reveal no evidence of any discernible change in their 
conditions. Office life appears to have carried on as much the same as it 
did prior to Frick’s appointment, though whilst some civil servants may 
have welcomed Frick, others must have dreaded him. However, on an 
entirely different level, Frick did resort to a more obvious means of 
purging administrators. He banned all civil servants from membership in 
any communist organisation. At first glance, that a Nazi minister should 
enact such a decree appears obvious, without the need for any further
61 See ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/6 Bll.44-48; ThMdl A/633 B11.P5; ThMdl D/20 Bll.38-42; 
ThMdl, G/50 BU.249-253; Landtag von Thuringen/30
62 GcsetzsammlungfilrThdringe/i, nr.20,1 July 1930, p.103
63 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/6 Bl.43 ThFiMin memorandum to all ministries, 1 July 1930
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explanation. However, the decree was not issued until Frick had been in 
office a full nine months. Given the NSDAP’s pronounced anti­
Communist stance, why had this taken so long? It could be argued that 
the conflict with the Reich Ministry of the Interior over the Enabling 
Act (and also over the police subsidies) had forced Frick to play a more 
cautious hand lest his actions provoke the Reich Ministry of the Interior 
into initiating stronger measures against his government. The most 
likely explanation, however, is that the matter were put on hold after 
the Reichsgericht’s decision. Certainly, it appears that abolition of 
article 3, paragraph 1 forced Frick to turn to anti-Communist legislation. 
Frick’s own ministry claimed that the decree was necessary to avoid 
communist intrigues. “In the long run it had become intolerable that 
members of the communist parties make use of public functions as civil 
servants. If the state and it components, the Gcmeinden, are not to come 
to severe grief, it is a pressing order [Gehot] to remove all communist 
civil servants from their offices with haste”® The cabinet agreed with 
Frick’s proposal for banning membership and then initiating 
disciplinary proceedings against any transgressors with the aim of *
55 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/99 Bl.3 ThMdl to ThFiMin, 24 September 1930
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removing them from office .65 * * * * * 71 72However, the cabinet did point out that the 
prohibition ought to be spread out in the widest seneo® The decree was 
issued two days laterV
If judged from Frick’s perspective, the decree was both a failure 
and a success. There were no communists employed in either of Frick’s 
mimstrieo.® In fact, all of the disciplinary cases would be initiated 
outside central government. The archives reveal that from 8 
Bttrgermeister, 6 were dismissed from office,® and 1 Bttrgermeister was 
initially acquitted then dis^aseed7® The remaining Bttrgermeister were 
sentenced to loss of Amtsheziechung, together with loss of pension rights 
and dependants’ support/-’ Likewise, the cases regarding the 23 
were not uniform. There were 13 dismLii^!^a^iS,72 2
Beigeordneten were acquiired,73 and 3 resigned, so proceedings were
I® ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bll.232-233 29th sitting of the State Ministry, 25 September 1930
I® ThHStAW, ThMdl G/99 BL4 ThStMin note, 26 September 1930
® Amts- und Naclmchtenblattfilr Thuringen, 1930, nr78, p.281
I® ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/15, B1L164-170J72 early January 1931; ThMdl G/99 Bll.58, 59 
ThMdl internal memoranda, 9 January 1931
12 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/726, /733, /740, /748, /764, /767
7®ThHStAW, ThMdl G/752
71 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/770
72 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/721, /734, /737, /744, /753, /758, /762, /763, /775, /778, /784, /791
7® ThHStAW, ThMdl G/759, /788
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dropeed7'1- The fate of the remaining 5 has not been recorded.. Apart
from these 5 ‘unknowns’, all the judgments of the Dienststrafkammer 
were delivered between August 1931 and June 1932. The Ministry of the 
Interior did warn those responsible for judging the cases that they 
would have a lot of cases to deal with,® but to what extent Frick was 
expecting such a large number of cases from one tier of Thuringia’s
administration is not known.
Frick’s Attempt to secure Thuringian Citizenship for Hitler
In July 1930 an incident occurred, something, which did not come 
to light until February 1932: Frick attempted to grant Hitler Thuringian 
citizenship. In 1924 the Austrian authorities had stripped Hitler of his 
Austrian citizenship following his trial over Munich Putsch, since they 
feared that Hitler could be deported back to Austria. German 
citizenship was essential, since without it Hitler could not become 
Reich President. Frick’s solution was to appoint Hitler as the Gendarme 
commissioner for the Thuringian town of Hildburghausen, thereby * * *
74 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/762, /789, /791
75 ThHStAW. ThMdl G/711, /712, /71B, /72B
76 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/99 B1.141 ThMdl to Dienststrafkammer Weimar, Dienststrafhof
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automatically granting Hitler Thuringian citizenship, and therefore
German citizenship, since this was a civil service post77
Nevertheless, despite Frick’s attempts to ride roughshod over his 
officials’ concerns by swearing them to secrecy. Hitler refused the 
appointment since he feared public ridicule78 Something, which 
Goebbels agreed with in 1932:
“The journalistic clique have found out that in 1930 Frick made the 
suggestion that the Fuhrer was to be entrusted with a subordinate post in 
Hildburghausen in order to procure citizenship for him. An opportunity 
handed on a plate for caricaturists.”79
After the matter became public, Hermann Brill chaired a Landtag 
committee to investigate the “legality and integrity” of Frick attempt to 
appoint Hitler as the Gendarme commissioner of
Frick appeared at the Committee’s hearings as a witness. Frick
Jena, 21 January 1931
7 J. C. Fest, Hitler (London, 1974), p.784, n.25
78 Fest, loc.cit.; G. Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Der Legalist des Unrechtstaatcs. Fine Politischc Biographie 
(Paderborn, 1992), pp.60, 61. There is also another reason not advanced by other historians. Since 
Frick was the Thuringian Interior Minister, and therefore head of the Thuringian police, Hitler, had 
he accepted this post, would have been Frick's subordinate, a relationship, which Hitler would have 
refused to accept.
79 FrOlh^ich, E. (ed.). Die Tagebiichcr von Joseph Goebfek. Sdmtliche Fragmaite. Au/zdichnungcn 1924 his 
1941. Teil 1, Band II. l.]anuarl9313l. December l936 (Munich, 1987), entry of 4 February 1932, p. 1.22
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said that when he became Minister he was convinced that the question 
of Hitler’s citizenship should be settled once and for all, so far as it lay 
within his power of authority, “in order to finally confer on this Front 
Soldier Adolf Hitler, who, for 4V2 years fought and bled for Germany, the 
rights of citizenship which, until then, had been withheld from him”®1 
Frick had earlier made an attempt to acquire German citizenship for 
Hitler in Bavaria in early 1929,®2 but had been unsuccessful. Frick told 
the Landtag Committee that after this failure he was resolved to use 
other means, and he argued that if thousands of Ostjuden had been 
allowed to enter Germany after 1918 then it wasn’t “right and fair” that 
Hitler had German citizenship withheld from him.
Earlier that year, Kallenbach, the DDP’s Landtag representative, 
directed a Klcine Anfrage to the Thuringian cabinet. He said that the press 
alleged that the Thuringian government was going to grant Hitler 
Thuriogsan citizenship “in any suitable manner”, even though the 
Bavarian government had told the Thuringian government the “weighty
80 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197
81ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUri.ngen/197 B'1.25 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March 
1932. I have used the page notation added to the whole file by the ThHStAW for the sake of clarity
since each of the Landatg Committee’s six meetings were numbered individually.
82 See R. Morsey, “Hitler als Braunschweiger Regierungsrat,” Vierteljahrschefte fur Zeitgeschichte 
(iv). Volume 8,1960
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reasons” why it refused Hitler citizenship in Bavaria. Kallenbach alleged 
that the latest press reports believed that Hitler would acquire 
Thuringian citizenship by being appointed as a Thuringian civil servant. 
The same report, allegedly based on official sources, said that the 
decision to appoint Hitler had not yet been taken.
Kallenbach asked the Thuringian government whether these 
reports were true, and whether it was compatible with its obligations to 
use its civil servants law to appoint Hitler, and show Hitler “personal 
preference in this manner”®. Baum answered that the Thuringian 
government had no intention of letting Hitler acquire citizenship 
through such an appommemt8. both Frick and Willy Marschler 
rejected the cabinet’s decision.22 Frick told the Landtag Committee: “I 
had, so far as I can remember, left absolutely no doubts on that matter in 
that cabinet session through a remark that I, so far as it lay within my 
power, would do everything ... in order to eventually bring about Hitler’s 
citizenship through the means of his appointment as a civil servant.”®
83 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thui'ingen/52 BI.274 Kallenbach (DDP) Kleine Anfrage, 28 
March 1930
84 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/57 Baum to Kallenbach, 15 April 1930
85 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 Bl.119 ThStMin to Chairman of the Landtag’s 
Police Investigation Committee, 22 March 1932
86 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 B1.25 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
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Frick said he had once spoken to Baum on the matter of Hitler’s 
citizenship, asking him whether a solution could be found. “I had firstly 
considered assigning Adolf Hitler to a post in the art department of the 
Staatliche Hochschule fur Baukunst und Handwerk” Frick said that he 
had asked Baum whether the question of Hitler’s citizenship would be 
solved via this appointment. Baum doubted this, but, claimed Frick, the 
Thuringian Minister-President had said implied that the matter could 
be dealt with during the summer if the political scene was quiet and the 
Landtag was in recess ®7 Frick said that he had thought the matter over 
without any agreement or contact with Hitler. Frick realised that there 
would be difficulties within the Thuringian cabinet, and that 
responsibility to head off any problems would fall upon Baum since 
there would have been a majority of the NSDAP, DNVP and Landbund
members had remained united.
Frick told the Landtag Committee that he, as Minister, was 
competent to appoint lower civil servants in the Thuringian Ministry of 
the Interior, and he considered this the correct way in which to appoint 
Hitler. Frick believed that the main thing was not the post, which Hitler 
would be appointed to, but that the desired result. Hitler’s
87 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.27 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
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naturalisation, occurred as a result of entry into the civil service. Frick 
claimed that he had considered appointing Hitler to the vacant post of 
Gendarme Commissioner in Hildburghausen with immediate fee®.®6 
Frick wanted to make the document announcing Hitler’s appointment 
immediately public, but Hitler asked him not to do sc® since “he 
[Hitler] had doubts about the whole matter because he did not consider 
the granting of the right of citizenship as urgent”. Frick argued to the 
Landtag Committee that he had viewed the matter as urgent so that 
Hitler could stand for election to the Reichstag. Nevertheless, despite 
Hitler’s doubts,* 90 Frick said that Hitler had accepted the letter of 
appointment, but had immediately told Frick that he reserved the right 
to decide whether to accept the appointment. Frick said the he only 
realised that Hitler had no intention of really accepting the appointment 
when Hitler described himself as ‘stateless’ during the Ulm Officers trial 
at Leipzig in the September of that year. Frick described his attempt to 
grant Hitler citizenship as “a legal act of state, but which was not
1932
2 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.30 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
2 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.31 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
90 ThHStAW, Landtag von. Thuringen/197 Bl.32 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
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perfect, and which was not effective”.
In order to prevent Hitler’s proposed appointment from becoming 
public Frick had kept the matter secret, sharing it only with 
Oberregierungsrat Haueisen (Thuringian Ministry of the Interior), and 
since Hitler didn’t take up the appointment, the matter remained secret. 
Ministerialrat Guyet told Frick that he doubted the legality of Hitler’s 
letter of appointment and argued that it should be published in the 
government’s official paper, though Frick told the Landtag Committee 
that this wasn’t a formality. Frick argued that he did not consider 
Hitler’s appointment “a matter of particular political significance with 
which the Cabinet must have concerned itself”.. Frick said both letters 
were destroyed after the appointment had failed to come about9.
From Frick’s statements to the Committee it appears that Hitler 
would not have done any work as a Gendarme Commissioner since 
Frick said that Hitler would have taken an immediate leave of absence
and then resigned after a short while, since alongside the letter of 
appointment, a further letter was drafted, in which Hitler renounced the 91
91 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 Bl.39 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
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execution of his duties and his salary. Frick admitted to the Landtag 
Committee that he made no secret of the fact that the aim of Hitler’s 
appointment was not to employ Hitler within the Thuringian civil 
service, but to acquire German citizenship for Hitler92 3
Hitler also appeared in front of the Committee. He claimed he 
was “flabbergasted and surprised” when Frick told him what he had 
done. Hitler told the Committee that he believed that he could not 
accept the letter of appointment and immediately told Frick" Hitler 
denied accepting the letter of appointment or the letter concerning the 
renouncement of duty and salary, claiming that he had destroyed the 
letters a few days later; Hitler further denied speaking to Frick on the
matter afterwards.
Hitler argued that he had allowed the 1929 attempt to grant him 
citizenship in Bavaria to proceed since political parties occasionally 
suggested that German citizenship had been withheld from Hitler on
party political grounds, when, “in reality no opposition would have been
raised against such a naturalisation”. Hitler claimed that it was in his
92 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 B1.36 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
93 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 BU39-41 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
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interest to prove publicly that it was the Bavarian Volkspartei, the SPD 
and the Centre party who would have opposed any attempt to grant 
Hitler German citizenship. Hitler denied speaking to Frick on the 
subject of his citizenship between the failed Bavarian attempt and the 
attempt in Thuringia 94 5 “I personally have absolutely no cause to petition 
the present System, and perhaps the parties, to naturalise me. It is my 
belief that I earned my naturalisation on the battlefield and that I really 
do not have to ask the parties, who, at the time, sabotaged the war and 
have brought us the consequences of our sacrifices, that they are really 
not ready to naturalise anyone.”96
Oberregierungsrat Haueisen told the Landtag Committee that he 
had been asked by Frick to visit him, bringing some appointment 
documents. Upon Frick’s dictation, Haueisen wrote out the letter 
appointing Hitler to the post of Gendarme Commissioner in 
Hildburghausen, with Frick saying he alone would take full
94 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 B1L51-52 Witness Examination of Hitler, 15 
March 1932
95 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bll.55, 58 Witness Examination of Hitler, 15 
March 1932
96 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bll.55-56 Witness Examination of Hitler, 15 
March 1932
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rrspo■ns^bliiry.22 Haueisen also recalled writing out the second letter, 
which stated that Hitler would renounce his salary when he began the 
appoint-mm,97 8 * * 101Haueisen said he had told Frick of his doubts regarding 
the appointment, saying that the Finance Minister and the State 
Ministry ought to be informed, but Frick told Haueisen that he 
represented the Finance Minister, and that he was responsible for seeing 
the matter through9,
Haueisen informed the Landtag Committee that several days 
prior to this meeting Frick had asked him how Gendarme officials were 
appointed, but without revealing why he was interesred.190 (Frick had 
alleged in his statements to the Landtag Committee that Haueisen had 
said that Hitler’s appointment would not contradict any legal or civil 
service regulations9.109 Haueisen said his doubts concerning the 
appointment arose from misgivings over civil service regulations, not
97 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.187 Witness Examination of Oberregierungsrat 
Haueisen, 11 April 1932
2 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.188 Witness Examination of Oberregierungsrat 
Haueisen, 11 April 1932
"ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.188 Witness Examination of Oberregierungsrat 
Haueisen, 11 April 1932
1°0 xHHttAW, Landtag von Thui'ingea/^ Bl.190 Witness Examination of 
Oberregierungsrat Haueisen, 11 April 1932
101 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.30 Witness Examination of Frick, 15 March
1932
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from “political-moral” doubts,1Q7 though he did not consider Frick’s act 
illegal.
Ministerial Guyet said that Hausissn had approached him saying 
that Frick had asked in to assist in a matter of “extraordinary 
significance”, and swore Haueisen to secrecy. Guyet said that Haueisen 
felt pressured by the matter and asked him about it. Haueisen revealed 
that it was a police matter; though Guyet didn’t pursue the questioning 
further to avoid Haueisen coming into conflict with his oath of 
coniddmce.104'
Guyet discovered the source of Haueisen’s concern when, a week 
later, Frick asked to see him on a matter which concerned his section. 
After swearing Guyet to the strictest secrecy, Frick handed Guyet a 
document, in Haueisen’s handwriting, which appointed Hitler to the 
post of Gendarme Commissioner in Hildburghausen. Guyet claimed to 
the Landtag Committee that immediately after he had read the 
document he told Frick that the appointment was not in order; the post 
in Hildburghausen was indeed vacant, but due to current regulations. 102 103
102 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringein/17 B1113 Witness Exaimnation of
Oberregierungsrat Haueisen, 11 April 1932
103 ThHStAW, Laandag von Thhrinnenrl17 BL202 Witness Examination of
Oberregferungsrat Haueisen, 11 April 1932
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the Finance Minister, who was in fact Baum, had to be informed of all 
appointments. “Dr. Frick retorted somewhat sharply that he represented 
the Finance Minister and acted in a dual position as Interior Minister”. 
Guyet told Frick that he was unhappy about becoming involved in the 
matter, and he doubted that the document was valid as a letter of 
appointment for a civil servant,1®’ although Guyet did confess that he 
couldn’t understand why German citizenship was begrudged to Hitler 
when he had won the Iron Cross, f* class in the First World Wan.104 105 06
Following this, Guyet spoke with Haueisen. They both agreed 
that they felt extremely pressured that they both knew about Frick’s 
attempt to grant Hitler citizenship. After Frick left the Thuringian 
government Guyet and Haueisen both discussed whether they should 
inform Frick’s successor (Dr. Kastner, the Justice Minister) but the pair 
still felt bound by their oaths to Frick not to speak on the matter.
Guyet and Haueisen both held the view that the appointment of 
Hitler as a civil servant would not have happened, irrespective of 
whether Frick’s letter was handed to Hitler or not. The whole series of
104 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 BL^H^O Witness Examination of Ministerialrat 
Guyet, 11 April 1932
105 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bll.180, 184, 185 Witness Examination of
Ministerialrat Guyet, 11 April 1932
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events according to Guyet was not “routine” (GescMftsgang): Hitler 
would have neither assumed office, nor would he have received any of 
the rights and duties associated with the post®
Conclusion
The view that Frick used the Enabling Act to radically recast the 
Thuringian government along Nazi lines cannot be sustained. The 
reforms enacted under the Enabling Act within central government, and 
specifically within Frick’s ministries, conform to a 'reshuffle' 
interpretation. Even Frick’s attempt to remove communist or pro­
communist officials, cannot be seen an example of Nazi ideology in 
action, for the SPD dominated Prussian government had enacted a 
similar measure earlier that year, and the success of Frick’s measure, 
despite action against Bttrgermeister and Beigeordneten, is open to 
doubt. Similarly, Frick’s attempt to gain citizenship for Hitler failed, 
though this was due to Hitler himself, but, nonetheless, it is another 
example of Frick being unable to successfully pursue his mandate.
105 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUlingen/L97 Bl.180 Witness Examination of Ministerialrat 
Guyet, 11 April 1932
107 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUllngen/L97 Bl.180 Witness Examination of Ministeriallat 
Guyet, 11 April 1932
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The Reich-Thuringia Police Subsidy Conflict
On 18 March, Severing told the Thuringian government that 
information had given him “well founded doubts” as to whether it was 
complying with the Principles. As a result. Severing said he could not 
authorise further payments if the Land could not produce “conclusive 
proof ” that it was indeed following the Pr^^n^ipl^^s7
In response to Severing’s vague statement, the Thuringian 
government said that if Severing wished to suspend the subsidy, it was 
his duty to furnish the “conclusive proof” that the Principles were being 
ignored. The government pointed out that Severing had not specified 
what these supposed infringements were, and that he had not once 
exercised his right (allowed by the Principles) to ask for information. 
The Thuringian government stated that no new police officials had been 
employed since it had come to power, contrary to lurid headlines in 
social democratic newspapers alleging that Frick had recruited 
‘Putschists’. The only changes within its police force had been scheduled 
transfers and several redundancies, all of which were “entirely in the 
realms of normalcy”, and the Thuringian government claimed that the
1 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1201 W.T.B. “Ein Brief Severings an das thuringische 
Staatsministerium”, 19 March 1930
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appointment and employment of its police officials was regulated by its 
Gcmemdeordmmg Sclhstverwalturgsargelegcnheit. dcr St-ddt^^.* 2
Severing replied saying he favoured initiating an inquiry to clarify 
whether the Thuringian government was adhering to the Principles. To 
assist the inquiry, Severing said he would appoint Ministerialdirektor 
Menzel, who would await an invitation from the Thuringian 
government. However, Severing insisted that until the conclusion of the 
inquiry, the suspension of the subsidy would remain?
The Thuringian government remained astonished that Severing 
had still not specified what he demanding information about, and that 
he wished to send an agent to Thuringia without saying why there 
should be an inquiry. The Thuringian government considered Severing’s 
behaviour to be an “arbitrary and unjustified violation” of the Principles, 
and once again reminded him that he had a duty to state his accusations, 
and then ask for information. The Thuringian government claimed its 
police force had nothing to hide and had no intention of avoiding an 
inquiry, but rejected any such step until Severing specified those facts,
2 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bll.228'229 ThStMin to Severing, 20 March 1930. This was not strictly 
true since Frick appointed Ruhle von Lilienstern as Korrcfercnt in the section for police matters, 
including the surveillance of public order and security, just after the conflict began. See ThHStAW, 
ThMdl G/11 Frick to departments, 22 March 1930.
2 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.232 Severing to ThStMin, 21 March 1930
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which he believed, made an investigation necessary.4 Strictly speaking, 
the Thuringian government was quite entitled, under Number 7 of the 
Principles, to refuse Severing’s offer. It is evident that the Thuringian 
government considered the Reich Minister’s repeated failures to specify 
his accusations as the “weighty reasons” which permitted a refusal.5 
There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that the Thuringian 
government had deliberated whether it should comply.6
Severing response was that he had no reason to add anything to 
his previous letter (21 March) or to alter his standpoint.7 This was 
Severing’s last involvement in the dispute since Hermann Muller’s 
coalition Reich government resigned on 27 March, and Severing ceased 
to be Reich Interior Minister. On 30 March, Heinrich Bruning formed 
the new Reich government, and Joseph Wirth of the Centre Party 
became the new Reich Interior Minister. A new phase in the dispute 
began almost immediately.
On 1 April Frick wrote to Thuringia’s Oberverwaltungsgericht
4 BABL, R 43 1/2315 BU.242^243 ThStMin to Severing, 26 March 1930
5 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.196 “Grundsatze fur die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses fur 
polizeiliche Zwecke”. Although number 7 of the Principles allowed a Reich Interior Minister to 
demand information it did not stipulate that he had to identify those details about which he wanted 
to know more, although it is obvious that exercising this right would cause him to be more specific.
6 See BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.233 Reich Chancellery note “Meinungsverschiedenheiten des
Reichsministers des Innern mit Thuringen”, 26 March 1930
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asking whether Severing had been justified in banning the subsidy, and 
whether the State Supreme Court for the German Reich (Staa:sgcridC:ch^^(’
Jur das Deutsche Reich) or the ordinary courts were competent enough to 
decide the subsidy question./ The Oberverwaltungsgericht did not reply 
until 17 April, by which time repayment of the subsidy had begun, but 
the answers are important in helping to understand the opaque nature 
of the dispute’s early stages.
Dr Otto Koellreutter prefaced his answers by reviewing the legal 
significance of the Principles. He believed it was possible to see the 
Principles as an expression of the Reich government’s willingness to 
bear the costs without wanting to assume a binding commitment to the 
Lander. However, Koellreutter argued that the Principles were an 
agreement [Abkommen] by which the Reich and Lander accepted 
reciprocal obligations, especially since the agreements were in the 
mutual interests of both parties. “This mutual interest of the Reich and 
the Lander has found an agreed outcome in the Principles”. The Lander 
were committed to the maintenance of an effective police force (which 
lay in the Reich’s interests), and in return the Reich promised to help
7 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl. 241 Severing to ThStMin, 27 March 1930
g
ThHStAW, Thuringische Oberverwaltungsgericht/A XI Nr.5 Bl.168 Frick to Thuringische 
Oberverwaltungsgericht, 1 April 1930
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with the costs.9 10 11That the obligations for both the Reich and Lander were
binding was solely a consequence of the regulations within the 
Principles®
Koellreutter answered Frick’s first question by saying that 
Severing had not been justified in banning the subsidy. Koellreutter 
pointed out that if the pre-requisites were not observed, the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior was entitled to suspend payment. However, the 
Reich Ministry of the Interior had to demand information, and “it is 
obvious that it must substantiate exactly this demand for information”. 
It was clear to Koellreutter that Severing had not done so. Severing had 
“failed to recognise” that it was not the Thuringian government which 
had to supply the information, but the Reich Ministry of the Interior 
responsibility to “specify the reasons in the particular and that not until 
then must the Land prove the non-existence of propriety (Anstdnde)Pn
Koellreutter answered Frick’s second question by saying that
9
O. Koellreutter, “Der Kouflict Reich-Thuringen in der Frage der PolizeikostenzuschUsse”, 
Archiv des offentlichcn Rechts (i-March), 20. Jahrgang, 1930, pp.77-78. Koellreutter would be one of many 
after 1933 who tried to create a “bespoke Nazi jurisprudence”. See M. Burleigh, The Third Rcich: A New 
History (Basingstoke, 2000), p.161
10 Koellreutter, “Der Konflict Reich-Thuringen”, p.79
11 Koellreutter, “Der Konflict Reich-Thuringen”, p.80. See ThHStAW, Thuringische 
Oberverwaltungsgericht/A X1 Nr.5 B11.112--95RS “Gutachten betrifft Reichszuschuli fur polizeiliche 
Zwecke”, 17 April 1930
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ordinary courts were not competent to decide in public-legal disputes 
without special legislative provisions.0 The State Supreme Court was 
competent, under article 19 of the Reich Constitution, to decide in the
matter since it was a legal dispute between the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior and the Thuringian government. It did not matter that the 
dispute had a political aspect since the dispute was a legal one.* 13
At first glance, Koellreutter’s conclusion that Severing had not 
been entitled to ban the subsidy appeared to vindicate the Thuringian 
government’s stand during the dispute. However, Koellreutter’s 
commentary on the significance of the Principles puts this into a 
different context. Koellreutter’s view that the Principles involved 
reciprocal obligations for both the Reich and Lander, strongly suggests 
that he believed the Thuringian government’s position in the dispute to 
be mistaken.14 In other words, even though Severing had acted 
incorrectly, he was nevertheless legally entitled, under Number 7 of the 
Principles, to request information, and appears to be
arguing that Severing would only have done so if he legitimately believed
Koellreutter, “Der Konflict Reich-ThUringen”, p. 81
13 Koellreutter, “Der Konflict Reich-Thuringen”, p.82
14 See ThHStAW, Thuringische Oberverwaltungsgericht/A XI Nr.2 Bd.4 Bl. 69RS Guyet to
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that the Thuringian government was not observing the Principles. This 
certainly appears to be the case. On 21 March Severing’s 
Oberregierungsrat disclosed to the Reich Chancellery that Severing had 
justified the subsidy’s suspension with reference to Number 6 of the 
Principles,15 i.e. the Thuringian government was not taking the 
“appropriate measures” necessary to “guarantee unconditionally” the 
non-political behaviour of its police force.16
Yet if Severing believed this, why should he have been so vague in 
his accusations? This can only have been due to the nature of the 
information, which had given him his “well founded doubts”. Was it a 
leak from within the Thuringian government, gossip, rumour, or merely 
the talk of NSDAP and SA members expecting rewards because a fellow 
party member was in government? When, how, and through which 
means did it reach him? In fact, did Severing possess any information, or 
was he perhaps hoping to bluff the Thuringian government into an 
admission of wrongdoing? Unfortunately the Reich government sources 
contain no record of any information passed to Severing, and the
Koellreutter, 16 December 1930
15 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.193 Reich Chancellery memorandum “Einstellung der 
Reichszuschuftzahlungen fur Polizeizwecke an das Land Thuringen”, 21 March 1930
16 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.195 “Grundsatze fur die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses fur 
polizeiliche Zwecke”
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Thuringian Ministry of the Interior’s files relating to policing matters
have been so comprehensively weeded back to before Frick’s 
appointment that there is no way of knowing if Severing’s accusations
were correct:.
So what did motivate Severing into making his accusations 
against the Thuringian government? The answer may well lie in a story 
by the Vossische Zeitung newspaper, a clipping of which is in the Reich 
Chancellery files. The day after first Severing’s letter (18 March) the 
Vossische Zeitung contained the text of an alleged interview between Dr. 
Janson, Oberburgermeister of Eisenach (Thuringia), and a former 
Prussian police officer, named Machts, who had applied for the post of 
Eisenach’s police commissioner.
Janson asked Machts what he would do if the NSDAP, and 
possibly the Stahlhelm, decided to attack (losschlagen) the state. Machts 
was alleged to have been evasive when he replied that he would follow 
the orders he received. Detecting this evasiveness, Janson then asked 
Machts what he would do on his own initiative, and Machts answered 
that he would act according to his civil servant’s oath and duties. Janson 
was still not satisfied, and he pressed the question: “Would you take 
steps against the National Socialists?”, and Machts confirmed he would.
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When asked whether he could provide references regarding his 
suitability, Machts was told that his suggestion of Prussian police 
officers was not satisfactory. Janson claimed that almost all were 
“contaminated”, and asked if there were members of the NSDAP or the 
Stahlhelm who could vouch for him. Machts did not know any, but 
Janson was said to have replied: “it is absolutely necessary [unbedingt 
notig] that you find National Socialists or Stahlhelmers [sic], who can 
fully and personally vouch for you and can ... intercede for you with 
Minister Frick ... [who] has announced that he has received very 
unfavourable information about you.” Following comments about his 
war record and his relationship with his brother, who was a Prussian 
police officer and a member of the Reichsbanner, Machts was told: “In 
these circumstances I cannot ... allow you to take up office in Eisenach. 
You would immediately encounter the strongest resistance of the 
National Socialists and the Stahlhelm”. However, if Machts could obtain
references from National Socialists or members of the Stahlhelm “in the 
desired sense of Minister Frick”, Janson said he would receive the job.?
B^^h the Reich Chancellery and the Vossische Zeitung believed that
17 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.^04 Vossische Zeitung “Severing bricht Bezlehungen zu Frick ab”, 19
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this was the information to which Severing had referred. The Reich 
Chancellery unquestionably echoed Severing’s viewpoint when it 
commented: “it could appear doubtful whether the non-political
character of the police as a whole, as well as the non-political conduct of 
the candidate [Machts] ... is guaranteed.”* But to what extent did the 
‘Eisenach Interview’ reflect events within the Thuringian Ministry of the
Interior?
The matter appears to have been ignored until Janson began legal 
action against Arno Schrooth, editor of the Eismaccher Volkszeitung, who 
was said to have reproduced the ‘Interview’ in a “distorted and insulting 
manner” and reproached Janson with “high treasonable intrigues”. 
According to Janson’s lawyer, Machts was to have been appointed, but 
the decision had been reversed when it emerged that Machts had a “bad 
reputation” and appeared “fully selfish”. The discussion had not, as had 
been claimed, concerned politics, but personal matters and the 
accusations against Machts. Janson’s lawyer asked for the testimony of 
Ministerialrat Guyet since he had suggested Machts “in good faith”, but 
had subsequently warned Janson about Machts when his personal
March 1930; See TheTimes “Fascist Activities in Thuringia: Reich subsidy suspended”, 20 March 1930
18 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.193 Reich Chancellery memorandum “Einstellung der
Reichszuschukzahlungen fur Polizeizwecke an das Land Thuringen”, 21 March 1930
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characteristics had become known.19
Guyet said that Machts had visited him in July 1929 and had 
asked for an appointment in the Thuringian police, but had been told 
that this was impossible due to state regulations. However, Guyet 
believed that Machts could be appointed to the municipal police, 
possibly even to Eisenach, since he had been a Prussian police officer 
since the early 1920s and because of the “good and strict impression” he 
had made. Guyet informed Janson that he had a possible candidate for 
Eisenach, but warned that he did not know Machts so it was Janson’s 
responsibility to vet Machts himself. Janson was impressed with Machts 
and wanted to consider appointing him. Guyet agreed that Machts 
would first have to serve as a probationer elsewhere since Janson did not 
want to appoint Machts straight away. Machts subsequently worked 
without pay for 6 months in Jena’s police, with the intention that he 
would eventually be transferred to Eisenach.
Up to this point Guyet’s testimony appears honest and 
straightforward. Given that the details relate to 1929, there appears no 
straightforward reason why Guyet would lie, other than to cover up
19 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/68 Oberstaatsanwalt (Eisenach) to ThMdl, 14 April 1930. Schrooth 
was fined 150 RM and sentenced to 15 days imprisonment, with the relevant sections of the court’s 
judgement to be published in his newspaper within one month. See ThHStAW, ThMdl G/72 B1.71 
Thuringisches Amtsgericht Strafbefehl, 10 June 1930
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either incompetence or negligence. However, his testimony dealing with 
events in 1930 suggests something less innocent.
Guyet claimed to be surprised when, in February 1930, Frick said 
he had heard “bad things” about Machts. Guyet did not reveal how Frick 
knew this, but Guyet contacted Jena’s Oberburgermeister and asked 
him to report on Machts. Guyet was told that Machts’ conduct was 
good “in every respect”; although the Oberburgermeister said a teacher 
had alleged that Machts had sought to invalid himself out of the war by 
deliberately wounding himself. As far as the Oberburgermeister knew, 
Machts had complained about the allegation. Then, on 2 March, two 
men visited Guyet, one of who had ‘connections’ with Jena’s police, and 
the other was a Landtag representative of unspecified party 
membership. Guyet asked the man from Jena to make enquiries about 
Machts “in order to be sure”. The information arrived the next day. 
Machts was said to have made a bad impression and not considered 
suitable for higher rank. Furthermore, Guyet was told that another 
individual had corroborated the allegation of Machts deliberately 
wounding himself during the war, and also that Machts’ brother had 
supposedly escaped redundancy from the Prussian police because of his 
membership in the SPD. Guyet passed all this information to Janson 
since he knew that Janson “put importance upon a politically neutral
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personality ... and ... the composition of Eisenach’s town council
probably did not want a member of a left-wing party”. Shortly 
afterwards, Janson told Guyet that he wished to be entirely open with 
Machts about this information. Janson then met Machts in Berlin, and 
the ‘Interview’ was published shortly afteiwards20 21
The fact that Janson and Guyet only told their story after the 
event is suspicious. Clearly, without Janson’s lawsuit, there may not 
have been any attempt to deny that the ‘Interview’ was in any way 
accurate. Similarly, Guyet would not have recorded the background and 
context to the ‘Interview’. Why should they not have done so? If they 
were initially reluctant, the only possible explanation is Frick’s presence 
as Minister. It was claimed that the references to Frick in the ‘Interview’
were a yet Guyet’s mention of Frick’s disclosure about
Machts, and of the visit by the two unidentified men offering to 
‘investigate’ Machts does suggest that party politics had indeed begun 
to permeate the decision and policy making process within the Ministry 
quickly after Frick’s appearance in office. On 28 January Frick informed 
his Ministry and the head of the police that in all matters of
20 ThHStAW, ThMdl G/68 Guyet to ThMdl, 8 May 1930
21 See BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bll..^G(^-^'20Z W.T.B. “Strafantrag des Oberburgermeister von 
Eisenach”, 20 March 1930
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“fundamental and political significance ... I reserve my right to personal 
decision and ask that they are put before me”?2 It was said, later in the 
year, that Frick had used this to pass lists of applicants for the police to 
the NSDAP so that it could investigate their political opinions and 
affiliations?3
The change in Reich government at the end of March saw the 
beginnings of a rapprochement between the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior, now led by Joseph Wirth, and the Thuringian government. On 
2 April Wirth met Hermann Munzel, one of the Thuringian 
government’s representatives to the Reichsrat. Munzel said his 
government did not want to continue the conflict with the new Reich 
government, and as a sign of his governments sincerity Munzel said that 
it had never supported Frick’s provocative statements during the earlier 
Bund Adler und Falken dispute with Severing, Wirth was well disposed to 
such statements, and saw it as the basis for negotiations and made a 
settlement possible.^ Munzel asked for a meeting with Bruning, and
22 ThHStAW, ThMdl A/28 Bl.25 Frick to Geschaftsabteilungen and the Leiter der 
Landespolizei, 28 January 1930
23 BABL, R 43 1/2316 B1.33RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
24 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.255 Reich Ministry of the Interior note, 4 April 1930. The Bund Adler 
dispute had begun in February and had ended before Severing left office. See Chapter 5, pp.220-224
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Wirth suggested that Munzel request it himseff2?
Munzel met Brtining on 5 April. The Reich Chancellor also 
acknowledged the Thuringian government’s statements as “a suitable 
foundation for an early settlement of the conflict”, and suggested that
Munzel contact Wirth in order to discuss the broader details. Munzel
agreed, but asked for Brtining’s “friendly influence” to be brought to bear 
upon Wirth to ensure that no further conditions were placed upon his 
government by the Reich Ministry of the Interior in the next round of 
talks.?? On 10 April, Wirth met Erwin B^^m, Thuringia’s Minister- 
President. Baum said his government would discuss the question of the 
further payments of the subsidy in its cabinet meeting on 14 April. 
Proposals for settlement of the dispute would then be submitted to 
Wirth’s ministry.'??
A resolution to the dispute quickly followed. In the Reich cabinet 
meeting of 16 April, Wirth read out a letter from the Thuringian 
government. The letter referred to the Wirth-Baum meeting of 10 April 
in which had “thoroughly explained” that there had never been
25 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.254 Reich Chancellery note “Streit Thuringens mit dem Reich”, April
1930
26 BABL, R 431/2315 B1.256 Reich Chancellery note, 5 April 1930
27 BABL, R 43 1/2315 BT2<63 Reich Chancellery memorandum “Meinungsverschiedenheiten 
mit Thuringen”, 12 April 1930
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any violation of the Principles. Wirth had repeatedly asked Baum 
whether there had been any changes within the Thuringian police, 
especially the recruitment of Nazis, Baum had replied that the only 
changes had been those proposed before Frick had become Minister, 
and it was “particularly incorrect” that any Nazi had joined the police. 
The Thuringian government expected that these remarks would satisfy 
Wirth and that he immediately withdraw the “unfounded” suspension 
of the subsidy. There would also be an immediate agreement to the visit 
of Wirtfrs State Secretary, Zweigert, who would talk with Frick., After 
reading the letter to the Reich cabinet, Wirth said that there could no 
longer be any doubts about payment of the subsidy. However, Wirth 
stressed that “a ... careful surveillance of the ministerial activity of Herr 
Frick is urgently necessary” in light of reports about the establishment 
of a new ‘field’ police (Flurpolizci). The Reich cabinet noted Wirth’s 
remarks and agreed with his proposals,^ and these assurances by the 
Thuringian government were given as the justification for Wirth 
removing the ban on payment of the subsidy.30
Zweigert arrived in Weimar on 29 AprriL^. He began by referring to
90
“ BABL, R 43/1442 B1.316 W.T.B. “Die Antwort Thuringens an das Reich”, 17 April 1930 
BABL, R 43 1/1442 Bl.314 Ministerbesprechung, 16 April 1930
BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.265 W.T.B. “Die Beilegung der Meinungsverschiedenheit mit
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the many reports the Reich Ministry of the Interior had received 
concerning political tendencies within Thuringia’s police. Particular
cases were discussed, but no settlement was reached. The Thuringian 
government promised to examine the cases mentioned and report back 
to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Nonetheless, the Thuringian 
government again issued its standard assurance that there had been no 
new appointments or dismissals within its police force since Frick had 
joined the government - save those planned beforehand.* 31
On 30 April, the Vossische Zeitung once again turned its attention to 
Thuringia. The newspaper argued that no-one doubted B^^m’s intention 
to keep his promises, but until evidence to the contrary came to light, 
there would be reservations as to whether Frick’s coalition partners 
could keep him in check. The newspaper argued that the NSDAP in 
Thuringia was pursuing the same goals as the KPD had done in 1923: 
manipulating its governmental position to achieve anti-constitutional 
goals, and so eliminate opposition under the fig leaf of legality. The 
Vossische Zeitung knew that two Nazis - Gerichtsassessor Ortlepp and 
Staatsanwaltsschaft Floel - were contemplated as police directors for
Thuringen”, 17 April 1930
31 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.^<59 W.T.B. “Der Besuch des StaatssekretUrs Zweigert in Weimar”, 30 
April 1930
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Weimar and Gera.32
On 3 May, Wirth, prompted by the Vossische Zeitung s article, 
asked Baum if the occupation of these posts had been considered in light 
of the talks with Zweigert.33 Baum replied that his government had not 
yet discussed the matter. However, whilst claiming that he did not want 
to pre-empt any cabinet decision, Baum said:
“it cannot be practical, on the one hand ... to rule out fundamentally 
membership of the NSDAP with the occupation of offices, when on the other 
hand, as the case is now in Thuringia, that the highest leader of police 
matters, the Minister of the Interior, belongs to this party”.
Baum said he had had discussions about Floel and he would not be 
appointed, but the appointment of Ortlepp had still not been decided. 
Baum promised to inform Wirth about the cabinet’s opinion as soon as 
it had discussed the matter on 14 May, and he asked for Wirth’s opinion 
upon the “fundamental question” of NSDAP members in police posts.34
Baum’s statement is significant since it represents the beginning
32 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.269 Vossische Zeitung, “Nationalsozialistischen Polizeidirektoren?”, 30
April 1930
33 BABL, R3007/241 Bl.17 Wirth to Baum, 3 May 1930
34 BABL, R3007/241 B11.17RS48 Baum to Wirth, 9 May 1930
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of a new direction in the policy of the Thuringian government vil-d-vil 
the Reich. From the conflict’s beginning (18 March) to Wirth ending it 
(16 April) the Thuringian government had consistently denied all 
accusations made against it. From now on, the Thuringian government 
would ask what was exactly wrong with the appointment of Nazis, and 
resort to constitutional means to undermine the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior’s argument. But why, when the policy of denial had successfully 
achieved repayment of the subsidy, was this change deemed necessary? 
The answer is that Baum could no longer deny the Reich’s allegations 
since the Vossische Zeitung's report, and Wirth’s letter of 3 May, were 
essentially correct: Nazis were being considered as senior police 
officials.
Responding to the Thuringian government’s U-turn, Wirth 
hoped that Baum would be able to influence matters, so that a renewal 
of the conflict - which Wirth regarded as over - could be avoided. He 
reminded Baum that it had been his assurances, which had led to the 
raising of the ban, and Wirth hoped that these would also be valid for 
the future.
Wirth then dealt with the repercussions of appointing Floel and 
Ortlepp to the police directorships in Weimar and Gera. He argued that
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these would place the Reich and Thuringian governments in a difficult 
position vis'fi-vis the agreement reached only a month before. These 
appointments, so soon after repayment of the subsidy, created “an 
entirely new situation” which, Wirth felt, forced him to re -consider the 
subsidy’s continued payment. For Wirth the “fundamental question” 
was whether a National Socialist could be a civil servant. He pointed out 
that his predecessor (Severing) had decided that a civil servant could be 
a member of a staatsfeindlich (hostile to the state) party, but could not be 
‘involved’ in its activities. Wirth, carefully avoiding whether he viewed 
the NSDAP as such, believed that even if the NSDAP was not considered 
staatsfeindlich, there would still be severe doubts with the appointment of 
a civil servant (and NSDAP member) to a leading position within the 
Thuringian police, since article 8 of Thuringia’s civil servants’ law placed 
particular obligations upon officials. Wirth imagined that this view 
would play a “decisive role” in the consideration of whether such an 
employment was compatible with the Principees..
If the Thuringian government believed it could evade the issue 
until Wirth lost interest, it soon discovered that Wirth was as ready as 
Severing to take direct action. However, Wirth, unlike Se'vering, was
35 BABL, R 3007/241 Bll. 19-20 Wirth to Baum, 12 May 1930
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prepared to ‘turn up the heat’ gently, without ruining any chance of 
settling the dispute. Wirth took the opportunity, first recognised in 
Aprii,l to demand that the Thuringian Ministry of the Interior refund 
part of the police subsidy for the financial year of 1929, a move permitted 
by Part II, Number 2 of the Prlnc^plet?2 Wirth informed the Thuringian 
Ministry of the Interior that it had been paid for 379 more officials than 
it actually had (1283). Therefore, the 1,126.54 Reichsmarks paid out for 
each of the 379 phantom officials be returned, i.e. RM 426,958.66.? The 
Thuringian Ministry of the Interior ignored the request;.
On 19 May the Thuringian cabinet finally discussed the question 
of the police appointments. The towns of Weimar, Gera, Gotha and Jena 
were to receive police directors; Hildburghausen would be administered 
by a Landrat, but no decision had been made concerning Ze^A-Mehht.32 
The appointments were to come into effect on ljuly.?0
With the announcement of these appointments, the change 
within the Thuringian government, which had been subtly initialed by 36 37 38 39 40
36 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.252 Wagner to Zweigert, 1 April 1930
37 See BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1H^<5RS “Grundsatze fur die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses 
ftir polizeiliche Zwecke”
38 BABL, R 43 1/2316 B1123-24 Wirth to ThMdl, 13 May 1930
39 ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 B1L190-19120th sitting of the State Ministry, 19 May 1930
40 Thtfnngisches Staatsministerium (ed.). Amts- und Nacfaichtcnblatt ftir Thuringen. I. Teil. 
Rcgcrmgsblatt, 10. Jahrgang, 1930 (Weimar, n.d.), nr.57,16’ July 1930, p.221
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Baum’s new stance towards the Reich Ministry of the Interior, had 
finally come to fruition. But was Wirth justified in believing that Nazis 
actually had received important police posts? Both he, and Severing 
before him, had assumed this to be the case, but no known 
appointments had, in fact, been made. So, how many appointees- if any
at all - were Nazis?
It is certain that two Nazis were appointed on 19 May: Georg 
Hellwig and Walter Ortlepp). Hellwig, Weimar’s new police director, 
was a retired Oberregierungsrat from Frick’s ministry who had only 
recently joined the NSDAP on 1 April 1930/1 although it was alleged that 
he had been “utterly in accord” with Frick’s views for years.4, Walter 
Ortlepp, Hellwig’s deputy and leader of the state criminal police office 
(Landcskriminalpolizcistelle),41 42 3 4was by far the more senior NSDAP member 
of the two. Ortlepp had originally joined the NSDAP in 1923,00 and then 
again in 1927 whilst employed as a Hilfsrichter in the Landgericht 
Weimar.45 Of the other appointees, nothing definite can be ascertained.4,
41 ThHStAW, ThMdl Personal File Georg Hellwig, “Military Government of Germany - 
Personnel Questionnaire”, 20 September 1945, p.81. Hellwig had been one of the civil servants retired 
under article 3, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Act.
42 BABL, R18/5051 B1.20 Brill to Wirth, 17 June 1930
43 ThHStAW, ThStMm/60 Bll.190-191 20th Sitting, 19 May 1930
44 ThHStAW, ThMdl D/49 (NSDAP) “Personalbogen”, n.d.
45 BABL, NSDAP Membership File Walter Ortlepp (9.7.1^^0), SS file. See also Das Deutsche
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Rohde, Gotha’s police director, had previously been a Fachreferent in the 
Thuringian Economics Ministry, and it was alleged that he owed his 
appointment to his connection with the leader of Weimar’s NSDAP.46 7 It 
was also alleged that Polizeimajor Kehrl, the appointee to Gera, had
“made no secret of his National Socialist conviction in front of his
officials”, although he was believed not to be a party member48 Thien, 
the Landrat appointed to Hildburghausen, was the only appointee said 
to be pro-Republic.49 However, one appointee provides ground for 
speculation on the status of the ‘unknowns’. Hellmuth Gommlich was 
the eventual appointee to Zella-Mehlis.50 His personal file states that he 
did not join the NSDAP until 1 December 1931 because Gauleiter Fritz
Sauckel would not let him.
“It lay in the interests of the Party that he [Gommlich], as the then leader of 
the police office in Zella-Mehlis, remained a non-party member.”51
Ftihrerlexihon 1934/1935 (Berlin, 1934), p.344
46 The Thuringian DVP believed that none of the other appointees were Nazis. See BAK, NL 
1002/61 Bl.10 Bauer and Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27June 1930
47 R 43 1/2316 B1.41 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
48 ThHStAW, RStH/132 Bl. 14 Brill to Menzel (RMdl), 26 May 1930
40
R 43 1/2316 B1.41RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
50 ThHStAW, ThMdl Personal File Hellmuth Gommlich B1.86 decision of ThStMin, 24 May
51 ThHStAW, ThMdl Personal File Hellmuth Gommlich, “Anlage zum Personalbogen”, 1940.
1930
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Nevertheless, Gommlich became active for the NSDAP in June 
1930.52 Perhaps Frick and the NSDAP had realised that at this stage of 
the dispute more could be achieved by stealth, rather than by further 
provocation. Hellwig and Ortlepp were already NSDAP members, so any 
attempt by the NSDAP to annul their memberships would only have 
met with a cynical reaction about the motive, and allowing Gommlich to 
join the NSDAP would have only reinforced the belief that the 
Thuringian police was a hotbed of Nazism.53 Therefore, it may well have 
been argued that it was better to let attention to focus upon Hellwig 
and Ortlepp, so that Gommlich was ignored. Therefore, if Gommlich, as 
the head of the police in a small town like Zella-Mehlis, was not allowed 
to join the NSDAP because it served party interests, the same may well 
be true for those appointed to Gera, Gotha, Jena, and Hildburghausen. 
There is no certain way of knowing whether these appointees were 
Nazis, but given that Gommlich’s application was turned down, yet was 
not dissuaded from being active for the party, suggests that what was 
valid for Gommlich, was also valid for the other appointees.
On 20 May, Baum defended the appointments by claiming that
BABL, BDC NSDAP Membership File Hellmuth Gommlich (11.7.1891), OPG File.
52 ThHStAW, ThMdl Personal File Hellmuth Gommlich B1.4RS “Lebenslauf”, 22 May 1938; 
ibid, B1.210 Gau Personnel Office note, 3 April 1941
53 See BABL, R18/5051 Bll.26-42 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930
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cabinet opinion was unanimous. “[I]t cannot be feasible to exclude 
members of the NSDAP, according to capability and performance, in the 
occupation of state offices.” Such a policy, argued Baum, could well 
violate article 128, paragraph 1 of the Reich Constitution. It was “not 
logical” for a Nazi to be a minister of the interior, yet deny employment 
opportunities to suitably qualified and experienced members of the 
same party:
“I would like to admit that one can find, in the mere membership of the 
NSDAP, no reason for the objection of this appointment of a civil servant to 
the office of state police in Weimar.”,"
Baum claimed that only Hellwig was a member of the NSDAP and that 
Hellwig had never been politically prominent except after his 
retirement. Nevertheless, Baum believed that Hellwig would exercise 
“the same restraint from a political point of view”?, Baum had been 
firmly against the appointment of both Floel and Ortlepp to the police 
directorships of Gera and Weimar since he believed that neither wer'e 
capable of being police directors. Baum asked Wirth not to aggravate his 
position within the Thuringian cabinet again by objecting to the
54 BABL, R3007/241 Bll. 21-22 Baum to Wirth, 20 May 1930
55 BABL, R3007/241 B11.2P21RS Baum to Wirth, 20 May 1930
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appointment of Hellwig, and especially to Ortlepp’s since Ortlepp had 
not been appointed to a leading, but subordinate post in the 
directorship. Baum believed Ortlepp was qualified for the post and did 
not doubt that he, like his superior Hellwig, would carry out his duties 
in a non-political manner®
Responding almost immediately, Wirth now believed it was the 
right time to comment upon these proposed appointments since he 
claimed that he had deliberately avoided any real discussion of the 
matter. Wirth regretted that he could not share Baum’s view, and he 
stressed that the question - whether Nazis could be civil servants - was 
raised due to the guidelines relating to civil servants. As far as Wirth 
was concerned, the appointment of Nazis contradicted Number 6 of the 
Principles, and he repeated that this obliged the Lander to guarantee 
unconditionally the non-political character of the police in order to 
ensure that it was “an unconditionally, constitutionally loyal and 
reliable instrument of Republican executive power ... In this respect the 
conditions are no different from those with the Reichswehr”. In view of 
the Thuringian government’s divergent interpretation of the Principles, 
and because Wirth placed importance upon them being understood 
correctly, he informed B^um that all the Lander were invited to a
® BABL, R3007/241 B1122-22RS Baum to Wirth, 20 May 1930 
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conference in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The aim was to 
establish a uniform interpretation of the Principles, so that future 
disagreements would be prevented.,
The conference met on 28 May. All the relevant Lander ministers 
attended, though Frick did not.57 8 Wirth referred to the “fundamental 
importance” of the question, which the appointments had provoked and 
reiterated his view that they were incompatible with Number 6 of the 
Principles. He stated that the Reich Ministry of the Interior would pay 
the subsidy only if the Principles were adhered to: if the Thuringian 
government persisted, payment would cease.
After discussing the NSDAP’s revolutionary character, with the 
conference expressing the “unanimous view ... that the constitutionally 
hostile aspirations of this party must be resisted with all means”, Wirth 
asked Baum to revoke the appointments. If they went ahead, Wirth 
again reminded Baum that he would consider himself obliged to suspend 
the subsidy. Wirth’s stand had the full backing of the conference, Baum 
evaded the challenge by answering that the final decision lay with the 
Thuringian Landtag, which would discuss the matter on 24 June. No 
doubt Wirth felt that he was being ‘strung along’ by Baum, although the
57 BABL, R3007/241 B11.23-23RS Wirth to Baum, 23 May 1930
58 See The Times, “Fascist Officials in Thuringia: Reich Request for Dismissal”, 30 May 1930
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Reich Minister does not appear to have reached the end of his patience 
with Baum’s evasiveness. He gave Baum one last chance by saying he 
would formally ask the Thuringian government to reverse its dcc^sion.52 
Wirth did so; again stressing that failure to comply would lead to 
suspension of the subsidy.?
To maintain the pressure upon the Thuringian government, 
Wirth distributed a paper entitled “Can a National Socialist be a police 
official?” to all the Lander, including Thuring.a * Through an analysis of 
statements by Hitler, Goring, Goebbels and Otto Strasser, the paper 
argued that the NSDAP regarded the card carrying civil servant only as 
“an exponent of his party” and its views within the realm of his official 
activity. This would not be all that important, argued the paper, if the 
NSDAP did not strive after “the radical change of the system of 
government” in a manner which was neither organic, nor gradual, but a 
complete reorganisation and reconstruction, so that the NSDAP would 
achieve “its final goal, the Third Reich”. It was argued that since the 
NSDAP would be unable to achieve the necessary majority of votes 
needed to effect legal change, this complete overhaul would be brought
BABL, R 43 1/2694 B1.255 W.T.B. “Konferenz der Innenminister der Linder uber die 
Gewahrung von Reichszuschttsse fur Poiizeizwecke”, 28 May 1930
60 BABL. R3007/241 B1.26 Wirth to Baum, 30 May 1930
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about through force. Therefore, it would be necessary for the NSDAP to
have the instruments of state power - the police and the Reichswehr - 
on its side, or at the very least, neutral. In view of this, the paper
concluded that was impossible for a police official to be a member of the 
NSDAP since membership would conflict “most gravely” with his 
official duties and create “indifference” towards the state’s existence, 
welfare, and security in an official who was entrusted with the 
maintenance of its authority and security®
On 2 June, the Thuringian cabinet rejected Wirth’s request and 
decided it would to appeal to the State Supreme Court for the German 
Reich should Wirth carry out his threat* 63 Baum told Wirth that the 
cabinet had been unable to decide whether it should comply with the 
Reich Minister’s request to revoke the appointment® In retaliation, 
Wirth suspended payment by claiming that the Thuringian government 
had not observed the criteria for payment.tr
BABL, R134/90 B1.55 Menzel to the Lander, 3 June 1930
BABL, R134/90 Bll ..^(5-66 “Kann ein Nationalsozialist Polizeibeamter sein?”, n.d.
63 ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bl.193 22nd sitting of the State Ministry, 2-3 June 1930
63 BABL, R 3007/241 B1.26RS Baum to Wirth, 4 June 1930
®6 BABL, R 3007/241 Wirth to Baum, 6 June 1930; R 43 1/2315 B1.3O3 W.T.B. “Einstellung der 
Zahlungen des Reich an Thuringen”, 6 June 1930; See The Times, “Reich and Thuringia: Police subsidy 
stopped again”, 10 June 1930
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Throughout the dispute Frick had remained silent. In the 
Reichstag session of 17 June, he made a rare incursion into the dispute, 
and his speech is of some interest. Frick claimed that the suspension of 
the subsidy was “simply illegal and unconstitutional”, but conceded that 
Wirth, unlike Severing, had at least made an effort to understand the 
nature of the dispute. Nevertheless, Frick argued that neither Reich 
Minister had any evidence to suggest that Thuringia’s police had been 
“contaminated by National Socialism”. Turning to the May 
appointments, Frick claimed that the first was made on 1 April, after the 
conflict began. To what extent this is true is not known since there is no 
documentary evidence in support of Frick’s claim, and it is entirely 
feasible that Frick had said this merely to antagonise Wrrthh However, 
if the date of 1 April is correct, it raises the possibility that B^um and 
Munzel had deliberately lied to Wirth and Bruning in their repeated 
statements that no Nazis had been appointed. But to what extent Baum 
and Munzel had lied, were aware of lying and had consented to this is 
neither revealed in any Reich or Thuringian government documentation, 
nor in their personal file. h However, the change in Baum’s statements
66 1n the Bund Adler dispute Frick had deliberately provoked Severing.
67 ThHStAW, ThStMin/262 Personal File Erwin Baum; ThStMin/341 Personal File Herman
Munzel
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of May concerning appointments of Nazis, and his obvious lack of a 
problem, with this, suggests that Baum was aware of something. 
Nevertheless, Frick misled the Reichstag when he denied that National 
Socialist principles were factors in determining the appointments.
“I did not start from the principles as they, for example in Prussia ... prevail, 
that one simply appoints deserving party comrades to politically important 
posts, ... solely because of their service to the party, [and] without the 
necessary education and training.”
Frick insisted that he was only concerned with appointing 
Fachreferenten (specialist advisors), and argued that this was the case 
with Hellwig’s appointment as Weimar’s police director. Frick argued it 
was automatically assumed that because Hellwig was a member of the 
NSDAP, the police in Thuringia was riddled with National Socialism. 
Frick blamed this assumption for leading to the re-suspension of the 
subsidy, whilst Prussia, which he claimed was operating an alleged 
Parteihonzcnwirtschaft (spoils system for party members), was still in 
receipt of the Reich subsidy. Frick said that the belief that Nazis were 
unsuitable for police posts came from “the lie” that the NSDAP wished 
to overthrow the Republic by force. Frick tried to assure his listeners 
that this was untrue by claiming that he had given assurances to
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previous Reich Interior Ministers to this effect. Wirth, Frick continued,
could not exclude Nazis from office since it would have no
constitutional foundation, and Nazis would become second-class 
citizens. Referring to his appointees, Frick claimed he had made them 
swear to serve in a non-political manner and to the best of their abilities, 
and he did not doubt otherwise. Once again, Frick uttered the 
Thuringian government’s plea of mitigation:
“It is an absurdity ... [as] the Herr Reich Interior Minister demands - that a
National Socialist may not be a police sergeant, or ... a police director also, 
whilst I, as a National Socialist, am the highest commander of Thuringia’s 
police.”®
Wirth, who was in the Reichstag, said little. Perhaps the pending 
case before the State Supreme Court urged him to be cautious lest he 
jeopardise the Reich’s chances of winning. Rather, what Wirth did say 
appears to have been directed towards Frick’s coalition partners in an 
attempt to cause dissension amongst them, in the hope of isolating Frick, 
if not depriving him of his ministerial position. There were, Wirth 
argued, conservative forces within the Thuringian government who
68 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, IV. Wahlperiode, Band 427,177th sitting, 17 June 1930, p.5512, 
col.I-p.5515, col.II
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were well aware of the “severity of the conflict and of the range of 
difficulties” which Frick’s actions had brought upon the Land. 
Nevertheless, Wirth said he had no intention of resuming payment of 
the subsidy because the pre-requisites were “invalid” due to the 
possibility of Nazi cells within the police and the appointment of a Nazi 
as a police directohh
The Thuringian government’s petition against Wirth’s suspension 
of the subsidy was brought before the State Supreme Court for the 
German Reich on 26 June. The Thuringian government argued that the 
administration of a police force was the sole business of a Land, just as 
the administration of a Land’s government was the business of no other 
authority, save the Land itself. The Thuringian government argued that 
non-payment of the subsidy could not be based upon the proposed 
candidates’ membership in the NSDAP. Referring to article 130 of the 
Reich Constitution which guaranteed freedom of political opinion and 
of association to all oUcGals,70 the Thuringian government argued that 
no disadvantage could result to a civil servant who belonged to the
6® Verhandlungen des Reichstags, IV, Wahlperiode, Band 427,177th sitting, 17 June 1930, pp.5518, 
col.I-II, p.5522, col, II
7° Stite E,M. Hucko, The DemocraticTradition: Four German Constitutions (Oxford, 1987), p. 178
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NSDAP, and argued that Wirth’s reasoning was “indefensible” and
“biased”71 72There was no way, the Thuringian government claimed, in 
which two members of the NSDAP could influence its police force to the 
detriment of its apolitical ethos. Hence, the Land requested a temporary 
arrangement for payment of the subsidy. It argued that failure to secure 
payment would result in the quick depletion of funding for the police, 
and consequently the Land would have little choice but to find another 
way of maintaining the essential aspects of the police, e.g. ruthless cost­
cutting. The only other alternative, the government suggested, would be 
to sack police officers and rely upon the personal service of private 
citizens, as permissible under article 133 of the Reich Constitution 
which stipulated that all citizens were obliged, according to the 
provisions of the legislation, to provide service for state and local 
authorities.?
On 17 July, the two sides met in the State Supreme Court. An 
attempt by Dr. Bumke, President of the Reichsgericht, to bring about a 
compromise between the two sides failed almost immediately. Zweigert 
(Reich Ministry of the Interior) “saw no political opportunity so long as 
the present conditions in Thuringia persisted”, whilst Guyet
71 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.306 W.T.B. “Thuringens Klage beim Staatsgerichtshof”, 26 June 1930
72 See Hucko, The Democratic Tradition, p. 178
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(Thuringian Ministry of the Interior) referred to a prior statement that 
there could be no assurance of change in the future/5
Following a short statement on the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior’s motivation for renewing the ban, the Thuringian government’s 
argument was presented. The Land fully opposed the Reich Ministry of 
the Interior’s view that both the Reich and the Lander were under a 
form of contractual obligation by being signatories to the Principles. The 
banning of the subsidy did not have a “legally valid” motive since its sole 
justification was that the civil servant appointed as police director 
(Hellwig) was a member of the NSDAP. This fact, it was argued, was 
deemed to be all the more relevant when the head of Thuringia’s police 
(Frick) belonged to the same party. The Reich Ministry of the Interior 
had simply referred to membership in the NSDAP with the statement 
that the NSDAP sought the violent overthrow of the Republic. Guyet 
believed this interpretation to be “thoroughly unjustified”. Therefore, 
the ban, if based upon these premises, was contrary to article 128 of the 
Reich Constitution, which said that all Germans were equal when 
considered for public officc.e In addition to this, Number 6 of the
3 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.8 W.T.B. “Die Sperre der Thuringer PolizelzuschUsse vor dem 
Staatsgerichtshof”, 1ZJuly 1930
74 See Hucko, TheDemocraticTradition, p.l77
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Principles was valid for uniformed police officials only; mere 
administration staff - implying police directors - were exempt.®
Turning to the financial costs of non-payment of the subsidy, it
was claimed that if payment of the subsidy was not guaranteed the 
Thuringian government would be forced to abandon its claim to the 
maintenance of an armed state police, and instead establish a militia. 
Guyet argued that the suspension of the subsidy was designed to shake 
his government’s financial stability, “perhaps even to ruin it”. When the 
Court’s decision was published in October, Guyet claimed that the 
Thuringian government would be 1.25 million Reichsmarks worse off. 
Guyet said the Reich considered the dispensation of a temporary 
settlement as improper since it would involve a decision by the Court, 
which, in the final analysis, was of a political nature. Since the 
constitution of this judicial body laid down that such decisions were not 
possible, the Thuringian government feared that this would lead to the 
Reich Ministry of the Interior appealing - under article 48 of the Reich
Constitution - to the Reich President to issue decrees so that action 
could be taken against the Thuringian government, particularly with
BABL, R 43 1/2316 BH.8-9 W.T'.B. “Die Sperre der Thuringer Polizeizuschusse vor dem
Staatsgerichtshof”, 17 July 11930
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regard to the creation of a militia®
The Thuringian government's other representative Dr..
Koellreutter was not convinced by his government’s case., As far as he 
was concerned, the Court was authorised to dispense temporary 
settlements, and his government’s proposal was to secure a temporary 
legal peace and secure its finances. He believed the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior’s argument, that continued payment of the subsidy to Thuringia 
under the present conditions, as representing “a considerable 
endangering” of the Reich’s finances and security, to be “doubtful”, and 
could possibly lead to the enactment of decrees by the Reich President. 
If the Reich Ministry of the Interior considered the Thuringian police to 
be endangered, then the Reich Ministry of the Interior had to produce 
the evidence. Regarding whether the dispensation of a temporary 
settlement would involve a political decision, Koellreutter argued that 
all matters before the Court were political. The present issue involved 
the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s obligation to pay the subsidy, and all 
the Thuringian government wanted was recognition of its right to be 
treated no worse than the other Lander whilst the dispute was in 7
76Ibid.,Bl.9
77 This is undoubtably a reference to his report of 17 April in which Koellreutter had told 
Frick that the Principles were a legally binding agreement for both sides. See above, pp.5-6
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progress. The Reich Ministry of the Interior had an obligation to uphold 
the legal peace and normalcy in Reich-Lander relations until the Court’s 
final decision, and so for this reason the Reich Ministry of the Interior 
had to recommence payment of the subsidy®
The Reich Ministry of the Interior’s argument was discussed by 
Zweigert. He doubted the Court’s authority to dispense temporary 
settlements by claiming that previous settlements could not be quoted 
as precedents since they were issued with the consent of both parties. 
Furthermore, Zweigert argued that a temporary settlement would place 
an intolerable burden upon the Reich by forcing it to construct policy on 
the foundation of a settlement, which was neither definite, nor 
conclusive. Furthermore, all legal disputes of the Lander were political, 
and “[t]he prohibition of the police subsidy is a political act which is 
directed against staatsfeindliche aspirations.”79 Any temporary settlement 
concerning a political act would not decide the dispute, and Zweigert 
again stressed that any Reich-Thuringia rapprochement was out of the 
question so long as the present situation within Thuringia persisted. It 
was not the responsibility of the Court, he argued, to interfere in the * 70
78 Ibid., Bl.9
70
BABL, R 43 .1/2316 B1.10 W/T.B. “Der Polizeirechtsstreit Thuringen-Reich vor dem
Staatsgerichtshof”, 17 July 1930
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Reich’s policies for the maintenance of security and order since this was 
the sole preserve of the Reich Interior Minister. If the Court could not 
decide whether a temporary settlement was permissible in the matter of
political acts, then Zweigert believed that the Court ought to remain 
cautious in its judgments since “[t]he political significance is, for the 
Reich government, as for the Thuringian government, too great to be 
able to tolerate a provisional ruling.”®
Wirth’s Ministerialdirigent, Haentzschel, also doubted the 
existence of the essential criteria for a temporary settlement. He 
pointed out that the Thuringian government was not entitled to a 
monthly subsidy of 255,000 RM because the Reich was not obliged - as 
agreed in the Principles - to make fixed sum payments to the Lander.80 1 
Haentzschel said that the Reich’s only obligation was to place 195 
million RM in the Reich budget for the express purpose of police costs 
within the Lander.^ However, Haentzschel argued that the Reich’s 
obligation was not an individual one, but rather a collective
80 Ibid., B110
81 This was correct. Part II, number I of the Principles stated that the subsidy’ given to the 
Lan.der would be established by Reich-Lander discussions and the Reich budget. See BABL, R 43 
1/2315 B1.196 “Grundsatze fur die Gewahrung eines Reichszuschusses polizeiliche Zwecke”
87 The subsidy was worth 203 million RM in 1927, 195 million RM in 1929, 1930, 1931, and 
190 million RM in 1932. The Lander were prohibited from asking for more money whilst the 
agreement was in force. See BABL, R 43 1/2694 B1.248 “Vereinbarung”, appendix in, RIM to ThMdl, 15
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responsibility to the Lander, which did not involve payment since it 
was subject to the decision of the Reichstag. Haentzschel argued that 
there had not been any intention to conclude a binding contract when 
the agreements were drafted.8, Haentzschel said that under article 48 
of the Reich Constitution, the Reich had the duty to place the police of 
each and every Land at the Reich President’s disposal, so therefore the 
subsidy existed solely for the reason of providing the Reich President 
with a reliable instrument of executive power; Yet, “at no time can the 
Reich be expected to finance revolutionary intrigues in a Land. It is not 
the question of the occupation of two high police posts, but the 
question of the methodical saturation of the Thuringian police with National
Socidlitits”.* 83 84
The State Supreme Court gave its verdict the following day. 
Bumke argued that the Court was entitled to dispense a temporary 
settlement, and that such a settlement would not interfere with the 
working of the Reich executive in an improper manner. Article 19 of
January 1928
83
It was recognised at the time that any of the Lander might not sign the agreement. See 
BABL, R 43 1/2694 Bl.247 RIM to ThMdl, 15 January 1928; R 43 1/2315 Bl.194 Severing to the Lander, 5
January 1929 
R4
BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bill W.T'.B. “Der Polizeirechtsstreit Thuringen-Reich vor dem
Staatsgerichtshof”, 17 July 1930, emphasis added.
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the Reich Constitution allowed the Court to arbitrate in this disputt ®
However, Bumke stated that the Court could neither decide 
upon the Thuringian government’s claim that the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior was obliged to pay the subsidy, nor upon the Reich’s assertion 
that the Reich Interior Minister had a right to suspend payment. A 
possibility existed to order a provisional settlement, but, as Bumke 
pointed out, this could have occurred only if it was necessary to 
prevent disadvantages resulting to one party for want of a settlement. 
Bumke ruled that the Thuringian government’s claims of financial 
hardship should the subsidy be suspended were “without credibility”, 
but pointed out that the Reich Ministry of the Interior had argued that 
payment of the subsidy would lead to a “considerable endangering” of 
its internal security and order. Consequently, Bumke argued that he 
could not grant the Thuringian government’s request when the 
interests of the Reich would be threatened®
Quickly following this decision, Wirth sent another letter to the 
Thuringian Ministry of the Interior, which, like that of 13 May, was 
designed to maintain pressure by demanding partial refund of the 1929 * *
85 BABL, R 43 12316 Bl.12 W.T.B. “Urteilsbegrundung im Polizeirechtsstreit Thuringen- 
Reich”, 18 July 1930
86 Ibid., B1.13; See The Times, 22 July 1930
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subsidy. It was now calculated that the Thuringian government had 
been overpaid for 363 police officers, as opposed to the May figure of 
379. Further, the amount paid for each officer was not the 1,126.54 RM 
previously quoted, but was revised upwards to 1,731.12 RM: a 
difference of 604.58 RM per officer. The Thuringian government was 
expected to re-pay this difference, which was 219,462.54 RM. In total, 
Wirth now demanded that the Thuringian government return 
646,421.20 RM, an amount which constituted 21.3% of the just over 3 
million RM of the subsidy the Land had received for 1929.87
This letter had been the first contact between the two sides 
since Wirth had banned the subsidy in early June,88 and to begin with 
the Thuringian government simply ignored this demand also.89 
However, the question of a refund for the 1929 subsidy would occupy 
centre stage in the Reich-Thuringia feud for several months, and the 
Reich Chancellery would be dragged into a ‘no man’s land’ between 
the two governments, where it would play a larger role than before, 
and one which it appears not to have particularly welcomed.
On 1 September, Baum wrote to Bruning and to Wirth
87 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bll.24-25 Wirth to ThMdl, 22 July 1930
88 See ThHStAW, ThMdl A/35 B1.30 ThMdl note, 21 July 1930
RQ
BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.17 W.T.B. “Vorlaufig keine Ruckzahlung der Polizeizuschusse durch
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emphatically rejecting any return of the excess subsidy for 1929 until 
the State Supreme Court had decided the subsidy question for 1930.7 
Wirth, clearly annoyed by this latest example of obstinacy, informed 
the Thuringian government that Reich Finance Minister Dietrich was 
authorised to deduct the outstanding 646,421.20 RM from the tax 
revenue transfers paid by the Reich to Thuringiaa1 That same day, the 
Thur’ingian government’s representative, Munzel, drew the Reich 
Chancellery into the dispute when he appealed to BrUning, attempting 
to side step Wirth in the process. Munzel asked State Secretary 
PUnder for a meeting with Bruning so that he could deliver Baum’s 
letter of 1 September. It was hoped that BrUning could bring about a 
Reich cabinet resolution forcing Wirth to drop his refund demand..* 7 * 9 * * * *,
A meeting with Bruning was scheduled for 9 September, but Munzel 
was told that his government “scarcely has the right to ask” for the 
Reich cabinet’s intervention because if a Reich minister (vk. Wirth) 
had overstepped the bounds of his authority, it was a matter for the
Thuringen”, 16 August 1930
7 BABL, R 43 1/2316 B11.22-22R.S Baum to BrUning, 1 September 1930; R 43 1/2316 B1.25
Baum to Wirth, 1 September 1930
01
BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl, 20 Wirth to ThStMin in W.T.B. “Schriftwechsel uber die
Jahiesabrechung der Thuringer Polizei”, 3 September 1930; See The Times, “The Reich and Thuringia:
cutting off supplies”, 5 September 1930
92 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.15 Reich Chancellery note, 3 September 1930
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Reich government alone, not the Lander. This rebuke notwithstanding, 
Munzel informed Ptinder that his government would not be prevented 
in bringing this “important matter” to Bruning’s attention in order to 
secure a change in poilyy93 Munzel eventually met Bruning, and 
handed over Baum’s letter, but the record does not mention any 
discussion of the subsidy question for either 1929 or 193094 95 96Wirth 
received a copy of Baum’s letter.
On 13 September, Reich Chancellery Ministerialrat Wienstein 
telephoned Haentzschel to ensure that Wirth produced a written 
reply to Baum’s letter® (Quite why Wienstein had believed this was 
necessary is not clear since Wolffs Telegraphisches Buro had published 
Baum’s letter on 3 September along with Wirth’s reply of the same 
date.3) Haentzschel said that he had not received Baum’s letter and, in 
any case, he, Haentzschel, could not discuss the matter with Wirth for 
several days. Haentzschel’s own opinion was that the Thuringian 
government was attempting to merge the dispute over the 1929
07
BABL, R 43 1/2316 B1.16 Reich Chancellery note, 4 September 1930
04
BABL, R 431/2316 Bl. 26 Punder to Wirth, 9 September 1930
95 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.27 Reich Chancellery note “Forderung des Reichsministeriums des 
Innem auf ZurUckzahlung von fur polizeiliche Zwecke im Jahre 1929 gezahlten Betragen”, 18 
September 1930
96 See BABL, R 43 1/2316 B1.20 W.T.B. “Schriftwechsel uber die Jahresabrechung der 
Thuringer Polizei”, 3 September 1930
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subsidy, with that of 1930, into one single issue when the two were “in 
no way connected”, and he revealed that the Thuringian government
had actually admitted that its subsidy for 1929 was “too much”97
Wienstein persisted since Bruning would only answer Baum’s 
letter once he knew Wirth’s opinion. The Reich Chancellery’s remark 
that Bruning “would be grateful if any negotiated way out could be 
found”, is a possible sign of Bruning’s displeasure at being dragged into 
the dispute, and a reminder to Wirth that he settle the matter quickly. 
Whatever the significance of the statement, Wienstein discovered that 
Wirth had no intention of bothering the Reich cabinet with the refund 
question “in any way”.98 Evidently Wirth considered the 1929 refund 
matter closed since the outstanding amount had been ‘recovered’ when 
Dietrich had withheld part of the Reich tax revenue transfers to the 
Thuringian government. Reviewing the refund dispute a month later, 
the Reich Chancellery noted that once Munzel was told that a change 
in Wirth’s view was “scarcely anticipated”, he had ceased to be a 
nuisance. However, the review noted that Wirth had no intention of
97 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.27 Reich Chancellery note “Forderung des Reichsministeriums des 
Innern auf ZurUckzahlung von fur polizeiliche Zwecke im Jahre 1929 gezahlten Betragen”, 18 
September 1930
OQ
BABL, R 43 V2316 BlL.^53-29 Reich Chancellery note “Meinungsverschiedenheiten 
zwischen Thuringen und dem Reichsministerium des Innern wegen der Polizeigelder”, 19 September
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answering Baum’s letter until the State Supreme Court had fixed a 
date to decide the subsidy dispute of 1930, and this does not appear to 
have influenced events since Zweigert had discovered that the 
Thuringian government had not asked for the refund issue to be 
stepped up. Concluding the review, the Reich Chancellery believed 
that it was “advisable” to await Wirth’s written answer, and “instigate 
nothing” if the Thuringian government did not renew the matter® On 
6 October Bruning met Hitler, Gregor Strasser and Frick to secure 
Nazi support for a ‘constructive opposition’ in the Recchatag.1® Frick 
attended in his capacity as leader of the NSDAP’s Reichstag faction, 
but it appears that neither Frick nor' Bruning discussed the dispute 
given the lack of any later reference to the meeting by either side 
during the course of the dispute.
Wirth’s determination to stand firm against the Thuringian 
government intensified when, in September, Braunschweig became the * *
1930
99 BABL, R 43 1/2316 B1.30 Reich Chancellery note “Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen
Thuringen und dem Reichsministerium des Innern wegen der Polizeigelder”, 10 October 1930
100
H. Bruning, Memoiren 1878-1934 (Stuttgart, 1970), pp.191-192; H. Punder, Politik in der 
Reichskanzlci. Aufceichnungen aus den Jahrcn 1929-1932, edited by T. Vogelsang (Stuttgart, 1961), p.64, entry 
of 5 October 1930; E. FrOhlich, (ed.). Die Tagebucher von Joseph Gocbbcls.ScIrntiiche Fragmente. Aujzeichnungen 
1924 bis 1941. Teil 1, Band 127.Juni 1924-30. Dezember 1930 (Munich, 1987), entry of 4 October 1930, p.613
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second Land to have a Nazi minister in its coalition government. Anton 
Franzen, Braunschweig’s Nazi Interior and Education Minister, soon 
came to the attention of the Reich government after he was alleged to 
have claimed that a Nazi arrested during a riot outside the Reichstag 
was a member of Braunschweig’ Landtag. In view of the allegation, 
Wirth, in a Reich cabinet meeting on 30 October, said he had the 
“gravest doubts” about paying November’s police subsidy to 
Braunschweig, and that he had written to the Braunschweig 
government informing it that the subsidy could be suspndded.101 Wirth 
feared that payment of the subsidy to Braunschweig would lead to 
“disadvantageous repercussions” upon the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior’s argument for banning Thuringia’s subsidy, which would be 
put before the State Supreme Court. Wirth was clearly worried that 
the two issues would become entangled, and that the Thuringian 
government would naturally seek to exploit the contradiction of 
Wirth banning the subsidy to one Land whilst paying it to another, 
when both Lander possessed Nazi ministers. With this in mind, Wirth 
asked the cabinet’s permission to suspend Braunschweig’s subsidy. 
Bruning disagreed feeling that the “greatest caution was called for”, in 
case Braunschweig’s Landtag considered altering its Schutzpolizei “in
101 See BABL, R 43 1/2267 Bl.125 Wirth to the Braunschweig State Ministry, 27 October 1930 
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a radical sense”, i.e. along Nazi lines® Justice Minister Bredt felt that 
Franzen was guilty only of patronage towards one individual, whilst
Frick had broken the Principles, so, Franzen’s behaviour was not
sufficient to justify withdrawal of the subsidy. Post Minister Schatzel 
and Transport Minister von Guerard both believed that it was not the 
time to interfere in Braunschweig, and Finance Minister Dietrich felt it 
would be best if the subsidy was transferred provisionally to 
Braunsche^^eh^.1® Only Zweigert, Wirth’s state secretary, saw no 
alternative but to suspend Braunschweig’s subsidy.®* Despite this lack 
of enthusiasm, Wirth reiterated his conviction that Nazis could not be 
civil servants, and in particular police ministers, since the 
Schutzpolizei was of “great significance” - the Reich had to rely upon it 
unconditionally. BrUning pointed out that the Reich regarded Nazis 
just as dangerous to the state as Communists. He proposed that Wirth 
and he be authorised to resolve the situation in Braunschweig, to 
which the cabinet gave its assen®.1®5
The following day Munzel contacted the Reich Chancellery to 
see if Wirth had answered Baum’s letter of 1 September. Munzel was
10?
BABL, R 43 1/1447 BH.115R1S-146 Ministerbesprechung, 30 October 1930 
®® BABL, R 431/1447 B11. M-4RS1M7 Ministerbesprechung, 30 October 1930
104
BABL, R 431/1447 B1.1^z4<5 Ministerbesprechung, 30 October 1930
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told that Wirth had mentioned the dispute with the Thuringian 
government, but that the Reich cabinet had not differed from Wirth’s 
view. Later that day, Baum spoke with Bruning on the 1929 refund 
question. Bruning said that he would raise the matter with the Reich 
cabinet, and said he was willing to speak personally with Baum once 
more. However, the Reich cabinet would only discuss the refund issue 
after Baum had met with Bruning (scheduled for 4 November’). The 
Reich Chancellery noted that Baum was still attempting to have the 
Reich cabinet force Wirth to drop the issue of the 1929 refund until 
after the State Supreme Court had decided the subsidy dispute of 1930. 
However, Baum’s wish was “out of date [ubcrholt]" since Reich Finance 
Minister Dietrich had been withheld the 646,421.54 RM from 
Thuringia.1® Once again the Thuringian government had failed to 
achieve any reversal of its situation. The subsidy for 1930 had been 
withheld in early June, and in September the Land had almost 650,000 
RM withheld because of its refusal to refund just over one-fifth of the 
1929 subsidy. From the perspective of the Thuringian government 
insult had been added to injury, and its financial situation threatened
105 BABL, R 431/1447 B11.147-147RS Ministerbesprechung, 30 October 1930
106 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bll.31-32 Reich Chancellery note “Polizeigelder und Thuringen, 
insbesondere Weigung Thuringens, fur 1929 zuviel erhaltene Zuschusse zuruckzuzahlen”, 3
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to deteriorate even further.
In late October, Wirth informed the Reich Chancellery that a 
reduction in the subsidy was “unavoidable”, even though the amount 
for 1927 to 1932 had already been fixed by Reich-Lander negotiations. 
Worried that the interior ministries of the Lander would oppose any 
reduction, Wirth drafted a letter (in agreement with Dietrich), which 
Bruning would send to the Lander explaining the situation. 107 Wirth 
was said to envisage a 10% reduction of the subsidy, although he and 
Dietrich had not yet decided how much was “absolutely necessary in 
the interest of the Reich’s finances”. It was certainly recognised that 
the subsidy was of “great significance” for the Lander - Prussia’s 
subsidy amounted to 50% of its costs, whilst the smaller Lender 
received between 60% and 65%?® The Vossische Zeitung earlier in the 
year had claimed that Thuringia’s subsidy was as high as 90%?® but to
November 1930
08 BABL, R 431/2694 B1.242 Wirth to Punder, 16 October 1930
05 BABL, R 43 1/2694 BU.243-244 Punder to Bruning, “Rundschreiben an die 
Ministerprasidenten der Lander wegen Herabsetzung des Reichszuschusses fur polizeiliche Zwecke 
im Haushaltsjahr 1931”, 29 October 1930
008 BABL, R 43 12315 B1.203 Vossische Zeitung “Severing bricht Beziehungen ab”, 19 March 
1930. H. Patze and W. Schlesinger (eds.), Geschichtc ThUringens. Teil 5(ii), (Cologne/Vienna, 1978), 
p.510, also claims 90%. H. Jacob, German Administration since Bismarck: Central Authority versus Local 
Authority (New Haven, 1963), p.89, claims 80%. Neither work cites a source for the amounts quoted, 
nor explain why it was so high.
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what extent the subsidy actually covered the Thuringia Ministry of the
Interior’s costs is not clear from the documentation. The Wirth-
Dietrich letter sent by BrUning cited the Reich’s “extraordinary serious 
financial position” as the reason why it was not possible to overlook 
the subsidy when cut backs in other areas was “an unavoidable 
obligation”. There had to be “a decrease in relevant expenditure ... and 
in modest limits [mtfssige Grenzm]". However, it was pointed out that 
although a reduction in the 1931 subsidy (195 million RM) was 
“essential”, a cut in the subsidy for the remainder of financial year of 
1930 “must be disregarded”.110 111
Although the reaction of the Thuringian government to this 
letter is not extant, it can only have further intensified its distrust and 
suspicion of the Reich government and its motives. It will be 
remembered that the financial constraints imposed on the Lander by 
the Principles were already strict. The subsidy was to fall from 203 
million RM in 1927, to 195 million RM in 1929,1930,1931, to 190 million 
RM in 1932, and that the Lander were prohibited from asking for more 
money whilst the agreement was in foccy.1®
110 BABL, R 43 1/2694 B11.244-245 to the Minister-Prasidenten der Lander, 29
October 1930
111 BABL, R 43 1/2694 B1.248 “Vereinbarung”, appendix in, RIM to ThMdl, 15 January 1928
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BrUning met Baum on 4 November. BrUning promised to 
influence Wirth’s Ministry so that proceedings before the State 
Supreme Court “would in no way he distorted on the side of the Reich”.
BrUning then talked with Zweigert, who was told about Bruning’s 
agreement (Ahsprache) with B^um. Zweigert believed that Baum’s wish 
could be realised, since he was in complete agreement with Wirth and 
would do “his utmost” to expedite matters regarding the Court. The 
Reich Chancellery’s opinion was that “[njothing is to he instigated ...for the 
time heing”.112
Once again the Reich-Thuringia dispute over the subsidy (for 
1930 at least) appeared to have reached an amicable stage from which a 
settlement satisfying both governments could be achieved. Face to face 
discussions, like those of April, and mainly initiated by the Thuringian 
government, had helped to reduce tension. Yet this apparent detente, 
like its predecessor seven months earlier, was placed in jeopardy by 
events within Thuringia.
As part of the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s attempt to 
support its claim of political malpractice within the Thuringian police, 
it had steadily been collecting evidence on conditions within the
11?
BABL, R 431/^^16 B1(^(0 Reich Chancellery note, 4 November 1930, original emphasis
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service. In May and June, Hermann Brill, of the Thuringian SPD, had 
supplied Wirth and Menzel with material on NSDAP activity within 
the Thuringian poiice.® Wirth also received, via a third party, 
information detailing alleged NSDAP infilitration and sympathy within 
the servic®'® Testimonies from Thuringian police officers and private 
citizens had supplied the Reich Ministry of the Interior with sufficient 
material to compile a 40 page deposition for the Slzate Supreme Court 
in late Septem!:®®* 114 115 *and a further 20 page deposition in early 
Dectmbtc.lc
On the basis of the evidence collected Wirth believed that as soon 
as Frick became Minister he had immediately taken steps “to undermine 
the Thuringian Schutzpolizei through [the] methodical introduction of 
National Socialist employees”. To achieve this Frick abolished the 
previous method of personnel management within the Thuringian 
Ministry of the Interior since the previous Polizeidezermt (head of 
department) was not a Nazi, but belonged to the right of the DVP and
117
08 See ThHStAW, RStH/132 Bll.13-16 Brill to Menzel, 26 May 1930; BABL, R 18/5051 B1.46
Wirth to Brill, 6 June 1930; R 18/5051 Bll.20-22 Brill to Wirth, 17 June 1930
114" See BABL, R 18/5051 B11.26-44 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930
11508 BABL, R 431/2316 B133352RS Wirth to Bumke (StGH), 23 September 1930 
OOO BABL, R 43 1/2316 B11.99-108RS Wirth to Bumke (StGH), 1 December 1930
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was therefore not considered “sufficiently ‘trustworthy’ ”.117 118In his place 
Frick appointed Ruhle von Lilienstern, an ex-leader of the state police 
who had conducted personnel policies against pro-Republic officers, 
and Polizeihauptmann Fiedler, a known Nazi.
In order to carry out Frick’s order of 28 January that he personally 
examine all personnel matters, lists of applicants to the police were 
routinely passed to him. The Reich Ministry of the Interior discovered 
that the applicants were not only officially vetted by Ruhle von 
Lilienstern and Fiedler, who were both identified as NSDAP 
Vertrauensleute (confidants), but also that the candidates’ political 
opinions were investigated unofficially by the NSDAP since Frick had 
handed these lists over to the party.1® As a result there were said to be 
many examples of officers appointed due to party political reasons, 
without reference to their ability and/or experience. For example, the 
Thuringian Ministry of the Interior’s Fachrefemt doubted KehiTs 
technical qualifications, yet Kehrl was appointed as Gera’s Police 
Director since he was close to the NSDAP and Ruhle von Likenere®®1® 
The promotion of Altenburg’s head of police was said to have
11701 R 43 1/2316 B1.33 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930; R 43 1/2316 B1.102RS Wirth to 
Bumke, 1 December 1930
118 R 431/2316 B1.33RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
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contravtnte Thuringia’s regulations and due to his political relations 
with the higher ranks of Thuringia’s police force.1® A candidate’s 
application to join the police was rejected due to his physical condition, 
yet through the NSDAP’s confidants the candidate (a Nazi) was 
introduced to Ruhle von Lilienstern, and the candidate was appolnesh a1 
Another police officer was appointed despite the availability of better- 
qualified candidates and that a police check had revealed him to be a 
“zealous” Nazi.* * * 122 *A transfer was offered to an officer by the 
Sonderhausen NSDAP on condition he join the NSDAP, and the officer 
was said to have joined the party.m Prior to Gommlich’s appointment as 
the Police Director of Zella-Mehlis, its police force was considered pro­
Republic, but after his posting there had been a “sudden change”. It was 
alleged that Gommlich had openly said that he wanted to use his 
influence in the Thuringian Ministry of the Interior for the purposes of 
promotion, and officers were said to have felt compelled to move closer 
to the NSDAP as a consequence. Gommlich’s influence was said to have
60 R 43 1/2316 B11.112RS-1O3RS Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
®0 r 431/2316 B11.H7RS-108 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
66 R 431/2316 B1.34 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
62 R 431/2316 Bl37 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
®3 R 43 1/2316 Bl.102 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
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already been felt in several instances.124 For example, a candidate had 
continually tried to join the police in Zella-Mehlis, but had always been 
rejected since police checks had revealed him as a Nazi. After 
Gommlich’s arrival in Zella-Mehlis, the candidate was appointe®.125 
During the Verstaatlichung of the Thuringian police, politically 
‘undesirable’ officers did not remain in service, sometimes without 
reason, sometimes with “apparent reasons” (Schcingrunden). One officer 
was retired because he had joined the Deutsche Staatspartei (DStP). 
Medical excuses were also used against politically undesirable 
officiaee.i®
Wirth and the Reich Ministry of the Interior believed that as a 
consequence of such personnel policies Nazi cells had formed within the 
Thuringian police. The centre of this network was Frick in the 
Thuringian Ministry of the Interior. The first echelon (Staffel) beneath 
Frick was the NSDAP’s six Landtag representatives, who were each 
‘allocated’ a police district. The second echelon consisted of all areas 
where the various police forces (state, communal, etc.) had more than 20 
officers. The third echelon utilised all officers and officials as
124 R 431/2316 B11.40RS-41 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930 
R 431/2316 B1.34RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
22 r 43 1/2316 Bll. 101-104 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
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^nfomaent®.129 This system was believed to operate “entirely without let 
or hindrance”, and was blamed for the undermining of morale within the 
police.®8 Many officers were ordered to spy upon colleagues who held 
left-wing views,®9 and one officer was alleged to have confiscated and 
opened the personal correspondence of subordinates in order to discover 
their political views.1® AllendOTf, a dentist from Gotha, was identified as 
an important part of this system. “A whole series of officials have direct 
dealings with Dr. Allendorf and give him a running report on events 
within the police”. Allendorf was believed to pass this information to 
confidants within Thuringian Ministry of the Interior, and use his 
influence to secure promotion for officers who had been subjected to 
disciplinary actCoeo131 Kohler, an NSDAP Stadtrat member, ran the 
confidant’s system in Hildburghausen. Kohler was in direct contact 
with Hellwig, Weimar’s Nazi police director, and reported to him about 
conditions in Hildburghausen Schutzpoliziei. Kohler was alleged to 
have told Hellwig how many officers were Nazis and how many were
®7 R18/5051 Bll.28-30 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930 
®8 R18/5051 B1.32 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930 
®9 R 43 1/2316 B11.114RS-105 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930 
1® R 43 1/2316 B1.105 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
iai -
' R 43 1/2316 B11.35-35RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930; R 43 1/2316 Bll.106-107 
Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
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RepubHcana232 Kohler was also believed to have used his influence to 
assist Nazis with promotion and also to have a known anti-Nazi official 
exclddeh a3 There had also been systematic attempts to influence the 
Thuringian police in a Nazi spirit, since Nazi newspapers were left in 
officaa,1. and offices were used by Nazis to recruit and carry out 
propaganda activities for the MSDA/.1'/ Kehrl was said to have ordered 
all the police districts in Gera to purchase Nazi newspapers and remove 
pro-Republic newspapers,136 and it was also claimed that Jena’s police 
had withdrawn its notices from pro-Republic newspapers so that the 
population would have to read Nationalist or Nazi newspaperr 12 It was 
said that the use of the ‘Hitler salute’ by officials - irrespective of rank - 
was an everyday occurrence. For example, Hellwig, the Nazi police 
director of Weimar, was said to greet his officials in this rnmnar.138
The Police School at Sonderhausen operated at the third level of 
the informer system and had a “particular significance” since all * 62
132 R 43 1/2316 B1.35RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
R 43 1/2316 Bl1^35I^i^'^^36 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930 
H4
R 43 1/2316 B1.47RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930 
ns
R 431/2316 Bll.105-106 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
62 R 431/2316 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
62 R 43 1/2316 B1.103RS Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
62 R 43 1/2316 Bl.38 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
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candidates for the Thuringian police were trained there.139 Witthoft, the 
director, had been active in volkisch circles since 1924, and by 1930 was 
“an absolute adherent [Anhtingc]" of the NSDAP. Witthoft was said to 
see it his duty to replace pro-Republic officials with Nazis, and appoint 
anti-Republic officials for non-technical subjects so that police 
candidates would be instructed in an anti-Republic maniner.ee Civilian 
teachers were said to have encountered “a reactionary character 
[Geprdge]” in the school.®1 Witthoft had made no secret of his personnel 
policy, saying that political membership, not ability, was “the most 
important and decisive question” determining the calling up 
[Embcrufung] of officials to the police scliooir42 Three officers appointed 
as teachers at the school were said to owe their appointments solely to 
their relationship with Witthoft or the NSAAP,140 141 * 43 144whilst 12 police 
candidates appointed to school were identified as Nazir.1"® Two officers 
were promoted to the rank of Polizeihauptmann without fulfilling the
no
R18/5051 B1L30, 32 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930
140 R 43 1/2316 B1.44RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
141R18/5051 B1.30 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930
444 R 43 1/2316 BU.99RS-100 Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
143
R 431/2316 Bl.45 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
144
R 43 1/2316 B11.45RS-46RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930; R18/5051 Bl.32 Hauff to 
Wirth, 6 June 1930
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regulation of a successful year at a higher police school.1®1 A policeman
was denied access to an officer's course since his wife's social class was
not considered sufficiently high enough (it was alleged that Witthoft 
had blamed the poor quality of officers’ wives on the 1918 Revolutiool.o6 
A candidate was refused admission to the school after the NSDAP in
Altenberg had alleged that his parents read the Ostthiiringer Zeitung, a 
social democratic newspaper, even though a previous police check into 
the candidate’s background had revealed nothin®.145 146 47 Officials who made 
pro-Republic remarks were reprimanded and spied noon,® and 
candidates were also spied uhon 0® In addition, pro-Republic officials 
were subjected to a social boycotting®
Wirth estimated that on the basis of this cell formation within 
the Thuringian police 50-60% of its officers and at least 300 officials 
were followers of the NSDA0.1® The leader of the Schutzpolizei in
145
R 43 1/2316 B11.34RS'35 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
146 R 43 1/2316 Bl.lOl Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930
147 R 431/2316 Bl.34 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930 
14ft
R 43 12316 B11.1OO-1OOR.S Wirth to Bumke, 1 December 1930; R 43 1/2316 B11.45545RS 
Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
140444 R18/5051 B1.32 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930
® R 43 1/2316 B1.47 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
151R 431/2316 B11.37'37RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
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Weimar believed to be closely connected to the NSDAP, p and many 
officer's were said to be member’s, adherents or confidants of the
MSDA/Ji Wirth considered these cells to be “subversion cells”
(Zersetzungszellcn) since he believed it was incompatible with the Reich 
constitution to employ officials in the state police who belonged to a 
party which openly professed violent overthrow and elimination of that 
constitution. “The formation of cells is an open secret within the ranks 
of the state police”, and pointed out that Frick himself had confirmed 
the existence of these “subversion cells”. Wirth argued that if a police 
minister knew of such “subversion cells”, and tolerated their existence, 
then the police was “no longer the demanded non-political instrument 
by the Reich government, and it cannot be demanded of the Reich to 
subsidise such a police [force]”.* 154
To what extent this material corresponded to the actual state of 
affairs within the Thuringian police is not known given that the vast 
majority of the evidence came from personal testimony. However, the 
Thuringian government’s near paranoid allegations that Wirth was
IS?
R 43 1/2316 B1.41RS Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
63 R 431/2316 B11.42RS-44 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
1S4
R 431/2316 B1137I^f^-38 Wirth to Bumke, 23 September 1930
184
Chapter Four: Frick as Interior Minister II
engaged in a conspiracy with the Reichsbanner against the Land, it 
could be argued, revealed Thuringian fears that a damaging and 
accurate picture of conditions within its police force had indeed been 
uncovered by the Reich Ministry of the Interior. It could also be argued 
that the Thuringian government’s failure to have the refund question 
dropped, and that the 1931 subsidy was to be reduced, were additional 
factors in prompting the outburst.
The first notice alleged that the examination of witnesses had 
demonstrated that Wirth’s claims were “almost entirely incorrect” and 
that he was the victim of an “extensive system of informers and 
denouncers inside the Thuringian police.”155 Baum argued that the 
letter of Reichsbanner Gaugeschaftsfuhrer Dietzel to an Obersekretar 
Muller, and which enclosed a questionnaire about NSDAP activity in 
the police school at Sonderhausen, proved beyond a doubt that Wirth 
had received “thoroughly false material from the Reichsbanner”. Baum 
then added an intriguing rejoinder: “Whether he [Wirth] has given the 
order for the procurement of such materials shall never be established 
with any certainty.”156 Baum’s second notice claimed that a police raid
ThHStAW, ThMdl A/35 Bl.54 “Pressenotiz” attributed to Baum, 11 November 1930
156 ThHStAW, ThMdl A/35 Bll.56-57 “Pressenotiz”, 11 November 1930. Dietzel had supplied 
material for Hauff’s letter of 6 June to Wirth. See BABL, R18/5051 Bl.30 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930
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on the Reichsbanner’s offices and Muller’s private rooms had provided 
further proof of an informants’ headquarters [Spito^entrale], which 
had “obviously” supplied Wirth with material. These police officers, 
Baum continued, had violated their oath of secrecy “in the grossest 
manner” and would face dismissal from office or other disciplinary 
action. It was revealed that these officers had not sent the material
direct to Wirth, but via the Reichsbanner and a Kriminalkommissar in 
Erfurt’s police headquarters. As with the first press notice, Baum 
ended the second with an attempt to portray Thuringia at the mercy of 
a conspiracy by claiming that the allegations in Nazi newspapers, that 
Prussian government offices had been ordered to spy on Thuringia, 
were becoming more plausible.157
Frick entered the fray by appealing to the loyalty of his police 
officers. Subtly threatening those staff who considered helping the 
Reich Ministry of the Interior by recapping the punishment, which 
had befallen those who had already done so, Frick claimed that his 
staff condemned “such treasonous action”, and that the “prevailing 
majority” supported his Ministry. Any police officer who succumbing 
to “insinuations, promises, and enticements” would receive “the most
157
ThHStAW, ThMdl A35 Bll.58-59 “Pressenotiz” attributed to Baum, 12 November 1930, 
original emphasis
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grievous official punishment” and possible summary dismissal. Any
officer who acquired information on any attempt to subvert the force
from within or without was reminded that it was “his official
obligation” to immediately report it to the Ministry in W'eimar,1^
Baum sent these notices to Bruning in an attempt to have him 
pressurise Wirth, Baum failed. Bruning merely acknowledged 
receipt,159 and Wirth denied that he had instructed the Reichsbanner 
to procure information for him.a
Haentzschel, who had been present at their examinations, 
confirmed that witnesses felt intimidated. They felt “extremely 
harassed under these circumstances, and to some extent, feel their' lives
threatened on the basis the behaviour of the Nazis in Weimar.” The 
Thuringian government had admitted that witnesses would feel 
intimidated by these actions and refuse to testify as a result. The State 
Supreme Court’s Reporter (Berichterstatter) readily believed the claim 
of Thuringian government that this “was not intended”.lrl
ITO
ThHStAW, ThMdl A/35 BlL<50-61 “Pressenotiz” attributed to Frick, 13 November 1930 
BABL, R 43 1/2316 B1.67 Baum to BrUning, 13 November 1930; R 43 1/2316 Bl.76 Reich
Chancellery note “Verwaltungsstreitfahren des Landes Thuringen gegen das Deutsche Reich wegen
der Zahlung von Polizeikostenzuschusse”, 18 November 1930 
160
BABL, R 431/2316 B1.61 Reich Chancellery note, 13 November 1930
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As part of the State Supreme Court’s investigations Fritz 
Sauckel, Gauleiter of the Thuringian NSDAP, was called as a witness.
He claimed that his party had not wielded any “illegal and forbidden 
influence upon the composition and activity of the police.”1® This, he 
claimed, was contrary to party policy since the NSDAP sought to 
achieve its goals by constitutional means. However, Sauckel said that 
he had argued to Frick that NSDAP members could not be excluded 
from a civil service career. Frick had agreed that Nazis could be 
admitted like any other citizens, provided that they fulfilled the 
relevant criteria. Frick was said to have “expressly emphasised” that 
NSDAP members had to fulfill their official duties. Sauckel claimed 
that there were very few NSDAP members within the police, perhaps 
no more than 20?® Sauckel denied that there was any deliberate 
recruitment of NSDAP members into the police, and claimed that after 
the party’s success in the Landtag election it had received a hundred 
petitions from members asking for party recommendation for 
appointment in the police. Sauckel had passed these to the Ministry of
161 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bll.82-83 Haentzschel memorandum, 17 November 1930
162 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUrmgen/197 Bll.lO-lORS Witness Examination of Fritz 
Sauckel, 13 November 1930
163 See ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 B1.12 Witness Examination of Fritz Sauckel, 
28 November 1930
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the Interior, but said that the NSDAP was later surprised “how little 
success they had.”164 Frick had been approached in the hope that he 
could change this, but Frick said he could not help since he had to 
follow regulations. Sauckel told the investigation said that in “one or 
two” instances Frick had forwarded lists of applicants for the police to 
him. Sauckel claimed that Frick had asked him to do this since it 
would damage the NSDAP’s image if party members were appointed 
ahead of applicants already under consideration. Sauckel said that he 
made inquiries “on one side or another” about the applicants’ party 
membership and their reputation. The information which came back 
was “very different” - a collection of not knowns, members of various 
parties, or non-party members. It was “seldom the case”, argued 
Sauckel, that applicants were NSDAP members. Anyhow, Sauckel 
claimed that the NSDAP was never told of the reason for the inquiry, 
and that the party had answered to the best of its knowledge. It 
certainly was not the case, Sauckel stressed, that the NSDAP 
automatically had a good reputation, whilst all other parties had a bad 
one. The lists were returned to Frick, and the only comments added 
were the applicant’s reputation and what party he belonged to, if
164 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.ll Witness Examination of Fritz Sauckel, 13 
November 19.30; BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.83 Haentzschel memorandum, 17 November 1930
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any?05 Sauckel revealed that Frick believed that there was an 
“unspoken stipulation” that SPD members belonged in the police, and 
so it had a left-wing bias. Frick “considered it necessary in the interests 
of impartiality that members of the National Socialist Party, and of the 
bourgeois parties, were appointed in corresponding proportion.” 
However, Sauckel stated that Frick had “stressed again and again that, 
above all, it depends upon the personal reliability and ability [of the 
applicant], and for this reason, the acceptance of National Socialists 
with [an] unfavourable reputation which could be prejudicial to the 
reputations of the party and the police must be hindered.”* 166
The Court reporter proposed examining Frick to hear whether 
he had actually passed the names of applicants to the NSDAP for 
vetting. Haentzschel objected on the basis the investigation could only 
hear testimony from third parties, not those under investigation. 
Following the use of delaying tactics, including having his ministry 
appeal to the Court, Haentzschel delayed Frick’s appearance until 27 
November, with the proviso that it was conditional upon the Court’s
165 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 Bl . ll Witness Examination of Fritz Sauckel, 13 
November 1930
166 ThHStAW, Landtag von ThUringen/197 BLURS Witness Examination of Fritz Sauckel, 13 
November 1930; See Landtag von ThUringen/197 B1.12 Witness Examination of Fritz Sauckel, 28 
November 1930
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acceptance,1? The Thuringian government had given permission for 
Frick to appear as a witness in mid-October.®
Frick testified that soon after coming into office he had reserved
the more important personnel questions, including the appointment 
and promotion of civil servants and police officials, for his own 
personal decijik^n^®? He claimed that social democratic viewpoints 
were “hardly compatible with the duties of a police official” since they 
led to extreme pacifism or class war aspirations. It was with these 
considerations in mind, that Frick claimed he had passed the list of 
applicants on to Sauckel, whose confidentiality, Frick claimed, could 
be relied upon to produce details about the applicant’s personality, 
character, reputation, and political standpoint:. He argued that 
aptitude for the job was of more consideration than the applicant’s 
political allegiance. Frick claimed that although he had used Sauckel’s 
information in reaching his decisions, he alone had made the decisions. 
As a consequence of the NSDAP’s investigations, 4 or 5 names were 
crossed off a list of 50. Frick rejected the view that he wanted “to * * *
167 BABL, R 43 1/2316 81^.6^^-^!87 Haentzschel memorandum, 17 November 1930; R 43 1/2316 
B1.81 Zweigert to Punder, 18 November 1930
168 ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bl.236 30th sitting of the State Ministry, 14 October 1930
160 .
See ThHStAW, ThMdl A/28 Bl.25 Frick to all departments and leader of the police, 28
January 1930
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recast the Thuringian state police into a National Socialist Parteitruppe” 
since he believed that most candidates did not belong to any party.. He 
claimed that since he was an outsider (from Bavaria), he had to rely 
upon local knowledge from the beginning.170 171Paul Hennicke, SS- 
Sturmbannfuhrcr and an NSDAP Landtag represenaativee71 was one of the 
locals Frick relied upon because of his “personal and local knowledge”. 
When asked why he had used these unofficial means, Frick answered 
that official police reports were “colourless and often restricted 
themselves to the formal ‘not known’ ”. Frick believed it was more 
“purposeful and efficient” to use his ‘confidants’ since he thought that 
the police did not possess the necessary resources to submit a report 
which was “satisfactory and efficient”. Frick denied that he had an 
‘open door’ policy for the recruitment of NSDAP members into the 
police. Only a “negligible fraction” were employed - the vast majority 
were rejected.
“In the sanctioning of the candidates lists I allowed myself to be led by the
170 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bll.13-14 Witness Examination of Wilhelm Frick,
8 November 1930
171
See ThHStAW, Landtag von 81i.I1^<9-17^0 Personal File Paul Hennicke; See
BABL, R 18/5051 B1.I30 Hauff to Wirth, 6 June 1930, for the claim that Hennicke had been given 
‘responsibility’ for Gotha’s police district
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thought that destructive elements must be kept away from the police and 
that a German conviction [Gelilnulg] was required, because otherwise the 
danger of a failure of the police in a serious case and its general 
contamination existed.”1'2
By mid-November the examination of witnesses had finished, 
although the State Supreme Court was still collecting material.'73 Both 
the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Thuringian government 
were now waiting for the discussion before the Court, scheduled for 20 
January 1931.22 But once again, the uneasy peace between the two 
governments almost collapsed.
Baum had complained to BrUning that Wirth had written to the 
Thuringian government saying that he wanted the Court to collect 
more evidence, Baum believed that he had an agreement with the Reich 
government that Wirth was not to file any more applications for 
evidence, and the Court Reporter himself felt that no more material 
was necessary. Baum believed Wirth was trying to delay matters since 
“the most thorough evidence” had been collected. The relevant * * *
17? «
ThHStAW, Landtag von Thuringen/197 Bl.14 Witness Examination of Wilhelm Frick, 28
November 1930
173 BABL, R 431/2316 Bl.81 Zweigert to Punder, 18 November 1930
174 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.91 Reich Chancellery note “Verfahren vor dem Staatsgerichtshof 
zwischen dem Reichsministerium des Innern und Thuringen wegen Zahlung der 
Polizeikostenzuschusse”, 27 November 1930
193
Chapter Four: Frick as Interior Minister II
specialist (Sachbearbeiter) in the Thuringian Ministry of the Interior 
had argued that none of Wirth’s assertions “corresponded] to the 
actual facts”, and that some had already been dealt with. BrUning was
asked to assert his influence and make Wirth retract his request since 
Baum and the rest of the Thuringian government wanted the court 
case to happen “without fail”.175
Bruning took Baum’s concern seriously Punder talked with 
Zweigert, and it emerged that Wirth’s letter had been sent without 
any consideration to the agreement (of 4 November) to hasten the 
resolution of the dispute. Zweigert had had “strong doubts” about the 
letter and had “urgently recommended” to Wirth that BrUning would 
like to be told about the letter before it was sent. Zweigert was “very 
surprised” that this had not happened since Wienstein, who was 
usually “kept constantly informed”, had received “no announcements 
whatsoever” about the letter.176
In reply, BrUning said Baum’s complaint was of “particular 
value” due to Wirth’s failure to keep him informed. BrUning had 
spoken with Wirth, and Baum was told that the Reich would not
175
BABL, R 43 1/2316 Baum to BrUning, 2 December 1930. Wirth had sent
another 20 page deposition to the State Supreme Court the previous day. See B11.99-108RS Wirth to 
Bumke (StGH), 1 December 1930
176 BABL, R 43 1/2316 BH.96-96RS Reich Chancellery note, 5 December 1930
194
chapter Four: Frick as Interior Minister II
initiate any action, which would lead to a postponement of the court
case. B^^m was also told that Wirth’s request did not involve any 
drawn-out statements, so the date set for the appearance in the Court - 
20 January 1931 - was not in doubt. Both sides, Bruning warned, had to 
abide by the dctte.ee The State Supreme Court was already making 
pie^paartitioire5^.®
In the period before Christmas, the dispute underwent its final 
development. The Reich Chancellery files suggest that the Reich 
government’s determination was beginning to flag, possibly even with 
Wirth himself. Evidence for this comes from “purely personal 
discussions” between PUnder, Zweigert and Bumke on the dispute, 
and which, to some extent, had been defined by Wirth and BrUning. 
These talks had resulted in Bumke visiting Bruning to offer his services 
as an ‘honest broker’ and negotiate a compromise, which would not 
encounter “fundamental disapproval” from either government. Bruning 
welcomed the move, but told Bumke that due to the details of the 
conflict he must meet Wirth. That same day (18 December) BrUning, 
PUnder, Wirth and Zweigert discussed this development and * *
177
BABL, R 431/2316 BU.97'97RS BrUning to Baum, 10 December 1930
178 ThHStAW, Landtag von Thtiringen/30 Bumke to ThStMin, 15 December 1930
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approved Bumke’s initiative, but it was suggested to Wirth that he 
saw to it that a draft compromise was drawn up.179
Zweigert drew up a plan that afternoon.180 Wirth stressed, 
however, that although he approved of Bumke’s intervention, he was 
“in no way” committed to the details. Wirth emphasised that the 
details must be discussed, and the situation had to be avoided that 
they came from him. Bumke was to be informed of the details only 
verbally, and only by BrUning. Later that evening Bumke, BrUning, and 
Punder discussed the details. Bumke approved of this “suitable 
foundation for his compromise proposal”, and said he would approach 
Baum in the same unofficial manner “to determine the view of the 
other party”. Bumke would then invite representatives from the Reich 
government (Wirth, Zweigert, and Punder) and from the Thuringian 
government (Baum, Frick, and Guyet) to the State Supreme Court?81
Zweigert’s agreement contained 4 points. First, the Reich and 
Thuringian governments were to agree that the question of whether 
the NSDAP pursued revolutionary (umsturzjcrische) or punishable 
(strafbare) aims was not to be decided in the settlement. Furthermore,
170
BABL, R 431/2316 B1.109 Reich Chancellery note, 18 December 1930
180 Punder claims that he was co-author of the draft. See Punder, Politik in der ReichskanZkk 
p.82, entry of 21 December 1930
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neither side was to refer to this question in their reaction to the
settlement. Second, the Reich government was to raise the ban on the 
subsidy, and at a later date re-pay the money withheld, but without
interest. In response, the Thuringian government was to drop its 
application to the Court to have the Reich government pay the 
subsidy Third, the Thuringian government was to undertake the 
obligation that the non-political character of the Schutzpolizei, like 
that of the individual officer, was guaranteed unconditionally. In 
addition, the appointment, promotion and transfer of police officials, 
would not be managed according to party politics, but only due to 
professional interest and suitability. Both the Reich and Thuringian 
governments were to agree that the “fundamental rejection” of social 
democrats was just as “incompatible” as the passing on lists of 
applicant to a political party for the purpose of vetting political 
allegiances. The Thuringian government was to guarantee the 
fulfillment of this condition “in its entirety”. Last, the question of 
whether the Principles were a legal obligation or a political 
commitment was not to be pre-judged by the compromise.181 82
The Thuringian government quickly accepted Bumke’s
181 BABL, R 43 12316 B11.109RS-110 Reich Chancellery note, 18 December 1930
182 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bll.lll-lURS Reich Chancellery note, 18 December 1930
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initiative.183 Both sides met in Leipzig on 22 December, and although 
“[o]ccassionally everything was rather critical”,184 185the two governments 
agreed to the plan. Zweigert’s proposal underwent just one alteration. 
The Thuringian government rejected the clause that the Reich should 
re-pay the withheld subsidy without interest. The conflict, which had 
begun 9 Vi months earlier, had finally ended.®i
Conclusion
This chapter examined Frick’s policy towards his police force by 
examining the ‘Police Subsidies dispute’ between the Thuringian 
government and the Reich Ministry of the Interior. It looked at the 
beginnings of the dispute and the reasons why Reich Interior Minister 
Carl Severing felt he had to ban the subsidy. It then considered the 
initial resolution of the dispute under Reich Interior Minister Joseph 
Wirth, the voltcfacc of the Thuringian government when it openly 
appointed Nazis to the Thuringian police and how it tried 
unconvincingly to justify this move. Attention then focused upon the 
State Supreme Court’s role in the dispute, its defeat of the Thuringian
183 Ptinder, Politik in derReichskanzlei, p.70, entry of 21 December 1930
184 Ptinder, Politik in derReichskanzfci, p.83, entry of 24 December 1930
185 BABL, R 43 1/2316 W.T.B. B1.116 “Annahme des Vergleichsvorschlags im Streitverfahren 
zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und Thtiringen”, 22 December 1930
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government’s attempts to force the Reich Ministry of the Interior 
reverse its position, the Court's role in uncovering alleged Nazi
infiltration of the Thuringian police at all levels, and the role how the 
Court’s President eventually brokered a compromise deal between the 
tow sides in which the Reich subsidy was paid, but that in return 
Frick’s plans were defeated when he had to guarantee the non-political
nature of his officers and the police force as a whole.
199
Chapter Five:
Frick as Education Minister
chapter Five: Frick as Education Minister
The Politicisation of Educational and Cultural Life in
Thuringia
The review of Frick’s career has shown that Hitler had
sufficient justification to consider Frick as the ‘right man for the job’, 
given Frick’s long career in police administration. Even so, Frick had 
no experience of educational or cultural matters. Theoretically, this 
posed a handicap. In practice, steps were taken to overcome this. The 
appointments of Ortlepp, Hellwig and Gommlich to police 
directorships have shown how Frick favoured the assignment of key 
posts within his ministerial jurisdiction to NSDAP members or 
sympathisers; Thuringia’s Education Ministry would also experience 
an apparatchik policy.
Frick’s Personnel Policy: The Appointment of the
National Socialist Fackreferenten
To assist with the transformation of Thuringia into a model of 
Nazi government1 Frick appointed two Fachrefcrenten (specialist 
advisors) within his first week in office. Gustav Zunkel was assigned
1 W. Frick, “6 Monate nationalsozialistischer Mftiister in Thuringen", 
Nationakotdkstischejhrbuch, 5. Jahrgang, 1931, p.l77
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responsibility for high schools, colleges and the University of Jena; 
Fritz Wachtler was selected for Volhschulen and Berufschulen? Both 
Zunkel and Wachtler were high ranking Nazis. Zunkel was the 
leader of the SA in Thuringia,2 3 whilst Wachtler, it will be 
remembered, was one of the six NSDAP representatives elected to the 
Landtag in December 1929.4 *
Party credentials, however, were not the sole criteria for 
eligibility for appointment. As with Frick’s police appointments, 
technical expertise was also essential. Zunkel and Wachtler were 
both experienced teachers, and would be in a position to counsel 
Frick on which policies would be necessary to create a more 
nationalist curriculum, and they were as Fachreferenten entitled to 
participate in departmental meetings and examine the Ministry’s 
documentation?
Frick also appointed Hans Severus Ziegler6 as Fachreferent for
2 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/210 B1.2 Frick to Zunkel and Wachtler, 30 January 1930 
® See ThHStAW, RStH/205 B1.74 SA-Gruppe Thuringen (ed.), SA im Kampfum Deutschland
(Weimar, 1937); Das Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon 1934/1935 (Berlin, 1934), p.548. No file exists for Zunkel 
in the ThHStAW.
4 Werist’s? 10. Auflage (Berlin, L935), p.l665; Das Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon, p.510
2 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/210 Bl.2 Frick to Zunkel and Wachtler, 30 January 1930
® Werist’s?, p.l782; Das Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon, p.546
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theatrical, cultural and learned (wisscnschaftlich) matters. Ziegler was 
also another high ranking Thuringian Nazi. He had been deputy 
Gauleiter since 1925, and editor of Der Nationalsozialist. Ziegler had 
also founded the Thuringian branch of the Kampfb^undfiir dcutsche Kultur
in March 1928 and was its Landesleiter.7 In contrast to the 
appointments of Zunkel and Wachtler, the exact date of Ziegler’s 
appointment is not known. One source has suggested November 
1930® though Burkhardt Stenzel favours April the same year? There is 
no letter of appointment for Ziegler, and his personal file reveals 
nothing since it deals with his activity after 1933?° However, it is 
known that by the end of September 1930 Ziegler was identified as a 
Fachreferent of the Thuringian Education Ministry’s official
documentation®
B. Stenzel, “Das Deutsche Nationaltheater in Weimar. Symbol und Schauplatz 
kultureller Praktik um 1930” in L. Ehrlich and J. John (eds.), Weimar 1930. Politik und Kultur im Vorfeld 
derNS-Diktatur (Cologne/WeimarWienna, 1998), pp.228-234
g
R. Baumgartner, Weltanschauungskampf im Dritten Reich Die Auscinandersetzungen der Kirchen 
mit Alfred Rosenberg (Mainz, 1977), p.l3; U. Zeise, “Experimentierfeld Thuringen. Hans Severus 
Ziegler und der nazi-faschischte ‘Kampfbund fur deutsche Kultur' (KfdK) in Thuringen von 1929­
1933”, Diplomarbeit, Friedricl'^'Schill<^i^-l^t^ii^<^i^^itt^t:Jena, 1984, pp.22, 28
9 Stenzel, “Das Deutsche Nationaltheater in Weimar”, p.235. See also J. John, R Jonscher, 
and A. Stelzer (eds.), Geschichte in Daten. Thuringen (Munich/Berlin, 1995), p.226
10 ThHStAW, ThVbMin Personal File Hans Severus Ziegler
® ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1199 Bl.34 Judgement of the Oberprufstelle fur Schund- und
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The Appointment of “Fanatical German Nationalists”
In addition to the appointments of Zunkel, Wachtler, and
Ziegler, it was Hitler’s wish that “fanatical German nationalists” were 
placed within the educational system.* 12 During its rise in Thuringia 
from 1922 onwards, the NSDAP was in close contact with the volkisch
right, with these groups and individuals from this milieu benefiting 
from Frick’s assumption of ministerial power. Within the first six 
months of Frick’s tenure, Weimar became an important location for 
those organisations and groups hostile to the Republic and its 
government. In the spring of 15930 Weimar held a conference of volkisch 
youth groups,13 * 15and in June, the Kampfbund fur dcutsche Kultur met in 
Weimar “in recognition of the accomplishments of Frick’s ministry”.® 
Frick attended both conferences.! Weimar was also the location for 
the conference of the Reich leaders of the National Socialist Pupils’
Schmutzschriften (Leipzig), 25 September 1930
12 Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen”, p.463
13 D. Orlow, The History ofthe Nag. Party: Volume 1 1919-1933 (Newton Abbot, 1969), p. 126;
John, et al, op.cit, p.227
3 B. Miller Lane, Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945 (Cambridge, MA., 1968),
p.157
15 G. Ndiba, Wilhelm crick. Der ILei^^list des Ucntdnatc^atcs Eine Itislirische Biographic 
(Paderborn, 1992), p.59
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League,16 17 18and of the Deutsche-Christlichen. Arhettsgmeinschaft des 
Grofideutschlands.1' In early 1931 Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche thanked 
Frick for a government donation of RM 5000 for the upkeep of the 
Nietzsche Archive in Weimar r
Nonetheless, it is the appointments of Paul Schultze- 
Naumburg and Hans F.K. Gunther, which help illustrate the NSDAP’s 
relationship with the volkisch right:. This, in turn, reveals the extent to 
which Frick had to rely upon others in the execution of his ministerial
duties.
Paul Schultze-Naumburg
On 28 March 1930 the architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg? and 
Frick signed a contract detailing ^^^hultze-Naumburg’s duties and
16
BABL, R 134/90 Bll.192-193 “Der Nationalsozialismus und die Schule”
17 K. Scholder, Die Kirchen und das Drittc Reich. Band I. Vorgeschichte und Zeit der lllusionen, 1918­
1934 (Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1977), p.239; L. Siegele-Wenschkewitz, Nationalsozialismus und
Ki^ehc.R^cligiotn^iPcdltifi^ k^t^ftPartei und Staat bis 1935 (Dusseldorf, 1974), p.24
18 B. McIntyre, Forgotten Fatherland: The Search for Elisabeth Nietzsche (London, 1992), p.l79.
Frick’s attempt to secure further funding for the Archive by introducing a bill to extend the 30
year copyright on Nietzsche’s works, was rejected by the Reichsrat. See McIntyre, loc.cit.
IQ
See ThHStAW, ThVbMin Personal File Paul Schultze-Naumburg; ibid., Staatliche 
Hochschule fur Baukunst, bildene Kunste, und Handwerk Weimar/126 Personal File Paul 
Schultze-Naumburg; Das Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon, p.443; Wer ist's?, p.l458; C. Zentner and F.
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remuneration upon becoming Director of the Weimar Art School on 1 
April 1930?° The contract was recognised by the government,® and
announced in the final paragraph of the Wider die JSjgeeki^ltJ^t^ decree of 
5 April?? Although Frick denied that Schultze-Naumburg was a 
Nazi®3 many believed that Schultze-Naumburg’s appointment owed 
much to his political connections and activity. Schultze-Naumburg is 
said to have known Hitler personally since the mid-1920s,2? and to 
have introduced Walther Darre to Hitler2? Schultze-Naumburg was a 
well-known member of the volkisch right, having once been editor of 
the journal Volk und Rasse (produced by the racist publisher Julius F. 
Lehmann), one of the Nordic Ring’s “leading lights”,?® and an early
Bedurftig, DasgtvsseLexikon des dritten Reiches (Munich, 1985), p.524
90
ThHStAW, ThVbMin Personal File Paul Schultze-Naumburg Bll12^i-'^<c 
9® ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bl.163 14th sitting of the State Ministry, 28 March 1930
See Amtsblatt desThtiringischen Ministeriums •fj^ir^VoyU^liikl^^ng^, 1930, p.41
23 Stenographischc Berichte aber die Sitzimgcn des Funften Landtags von Thuringen. Band 11. bis 35. 
Si^unnft.Jjnnurl^S.MaiWO), (Weimar, n.d . ), 34th sitting, 22 May 1930, p.889, col.II
24 Neliba, Wilhelm Frick, p.59
25 Das Deutsche Ftihkeklexikon, p.225; B. Miller Lane and LJ. Rupp, Nazi Ideology before 1933: A 
Doatmentation (Manchester, 1978), pp.l47, 166-167 notes 88-90; A. Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Walther 
Darrt and Hitler's Green Party’ (Bourne End, 1^i35), p.59
9® P. Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870­
1945 (Cambridge, 1989), pp.473, 474
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director of the Kampfbund fur deutsche Kultur2' Schultze-Naumburg’s 
house in Thuringia was a frequent meeting place for many Nazis,
volkisch thinkers and race-hygienists, including Ziegler, Darre, Hans 
Gunther, Hitler, and Frick.®
Schultze-Naumburg’s presence on the volkisch right, however, 
does not explain how he secured his nomination, nor his 
appointment. This is important since an answer could help reveal the 
extent to which Hitler gave any prior consideration to what Frick 
was to achieve in office. Given Schultze-Naumburg’s acquaintance 
with Hitler since the mid-1920s, it more than possible that Schultze- 
Naumburg’s nomination (as will be shown with that of Hans 
Gunther) had been under consideration by Hitler since early 1930. It 
has been argued that Schultze-Naumburg’s appointment was brought 
about through the suggestion of Zieglce29 although Schultze-
N. Borrmann, Paul Schiuttze-l^c^^^u^murB 1869-1949. Maier, Puhlizjst, Architekt. Vom 
Kulturreformcr der fahrhundertwende zum Kulturpolitiker im Dritten Reich (Essen, p.l83; A.E.
Steinweis, “Weimar Culture and the Rise of National Socialism: The Kampfbund far deutsche Kultur”, 
Central European History (iv-December), Volume 24, 1991, p.406; Miller Lane, Architecture and Politics, 
p.l57
® Bramwell, Blood and Soil, pp.75, 78; G. Nehba, “Wilhelm Frick und Thuringen als 
Experimentierfeld fur die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung”, in D. Heiden and G. Mai (eds.),
Nationalsozialismus in ThlirinBPn (Weimar, 1995), pp.89-90 
29 Steinweis, “Weimar Culture”, p. 414; Zeise, “Experimentierfeld Thuringen”, p.29
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Naumburg himself claimed that Frick had asked him to become
Director of the Weimar Art School.30 31 32The initial draft of the Wider die
Negerkuhur decree, which Frick presented to the Education Ministry 
in early February, omitted any mention of Schultze-NuunibgroO The 
decree’s final version announcing Schultze-Naumburg’s appointment 
gives the impression that it was added almost as an afterthought, 
given its location in the final paragraph. The earliest documentation 
on Schultze-Naumburg’s appointment is dated 25 March 1930 - a 
mere three days before the contract was signed.3?
The Appointment of Hans F.K. Gunther
Hans Gunther,33 like Schultze-Naumburg, was a noted figure in 
volkisch and pseudo-scientific ‘race studies’ circles. Through the 
influence of his publisher (Lehmann) Gunther became a biological 
racist and won the support of social darwinist scholars, such as Fritz
30 See ThHStAW, Staatliche Hochschule fur Baukunst, bildene Kunste, und Handwerk 
Weimar/29 Bl.14 copy of Schultze-Naumburg speech
31 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1004 Bll.163-164
32 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1497 Bl.^4
33 See P. Rees, Biographical Dictionary of the Extreme Right since 1890 (London, 1990), pp.165­
166; Zentner and Bedurftig, Das grosse Lexikon, p.232; L.L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich (New 
York, 1976), p.232
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Lenz and Alexander Ploetz, as well as coming into contact with 
Schultze-Naumburg and Darre.34 Yet the circumstances surrounding 
Gunther’s appointment to the Chair of Social Anthropology at the 
University of Jena are not entirely discernible. Weindling believes 
that Gunther was recommended by Max Robert Gerstenhauer, who 
was not only a volkisch publicist and a leading figure in the Deutsche
Christm movement, but also Frick’s Ministerialrat in the Education 
Ministry.35 *However, it is interesting to note that in early February 
Hitler hoped that a chair for racial studies would be established at the 
University, and that Gunther would become the occupant. Hitler 
believed that this would lead to Thuringia becoming the “starting 
point of another radical spiritual change.”®
Again, as with Schultze-Naumburg, archival material relating 
to Gunther is dated only a few days prior to his appointment, and it 
reveals little. On 12 May, Frick informed the Thuringian cabinet that a 
chair in archaeology would become vacant within the philosophy 
faculty from 1 October. Frick said he intended to transfer the chair to
34 Weindling, Health Race and German Politics, pp.3I3, 472; Bramwell, Blood and Soil, pp.40,
42,44,45,48-49,75
35 Weindling, Health Race and German Politics, p.478
36 Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen”, p.463
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the mathematical and natural science faculty, whereupon it would be 
endowed with a professorship in social anthropology. Gunther, the
author of “well-known books on racial studies”, would occupy the 
chair; Frick requested this move be placed on the cabinet’s agenda, so 
that he could personally explain “[t]he necessity of the occupation of 
this ... chair and of the professorship.”3. The files have not recorded 
Frick’s explanation, but the Thuringian cabinet approved without a 
murmur®
On 21 May it was announced that Gunther' would be appointed 
as Professor for Social Anthropology in the University of Jena with 
effect from I October 1930.2 The University’s Senate thought 
otherwise, and lodged a unanimous protest against the appointment 
because it believed the government had ignored the University’s 
ancient right to be consulted and take part in deliberations 
concerning professorial appoin^l^n^^itts*” The Senate was particularly 
steadfast in its attitude since Gunther’s appointment had been wholly 37 * 39 40
37 ThHStAW, ThFiMin/6 B1.94 Frick to ThStMin, 12 May 1930
3R
ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 B1.188 19th sitting of the State Ministry, 14 May 1930;
ThVbMin Personal File Hans F.K. Gunther Bl.1
39 Thuringisches Staatsministerium (ed.), Amts- mid Nachri<^ihJ^^rnUott far ThtirinBai. I. Teil.
ReBienmBsbkat:, 10. Jahrgang, 1930 (Weimar, n.d.), nr. 41, 21 May 1930, p. 1-47
40
BABL, R 43 1/2315 B.l.297 Vossische Zeit/nB, “Jena protestiert”, 28 May 1930; The Times,
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rejected by the University’s teaching staff. Gunther’s appointment,
like Schultze-Naumburg’s, was believed to rest upon the merit of his 
service to the NSDAP. It emerged that prior to his appointment, 
Gunther had touted himself as a candidate for professorships in 
philosophy, early history, eugenics, race studies and anthropology. 
The majority of the members of the Mathematical and ^^i^ntific 
Faculty were not convinced that Gunther had the scientific training 
necessary to be either a lecturer in anthropology or race studies, or for 
successful research or teaching, and they were “not convinced that 
original scientific accomplishments are contained in his previous 
writings”.41 This is perhaps why Frick, on 12 May, devised his solution 
of establishing the Chair for Social Anthropology.
Even though the University’s Senate and teaching staff were 
hostile towards Frick’s brazen manipulation of his ministerial right to 
be involved in the appointment of professors for party political goals, 
others in Germany and Thuringia applauded the move. Hitler 
considered Gunther’s appointment as Frick’s “greatest racial-political 
act”42 Frick’s Nazi biographer, Hans Fabricius, proudly recalled Frick
“Reich and Thuringia: Police Subsidies stopped again”, 10 June 1930
41 BABL, R 43 1/2315 B1.298 Vossische Zeitung, “Warum Jena protestierte”, 29 May 1930
42 Neliba, Wilhelm Frick, p.59
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receiving a letter of congratulations from Jena’s students,43 *with 
support also coming from the Student Council of Munich’s Technical 
High School,144 and the Catholic Corporations of Munich.45 46 47
Frick also appointed the anti-Semitic writer Adolf Bartels to a 
lectureship in literary studies.^ In May, Frick failed in his attempt to 
appoint the Privatdozent Dr. Ruge to the chair of philosophy at the 
University of Jena45 The University Senate rebelled since Ruge had 
allegedly been sacked from the University of Heidelberg because of 
insanity. It had also been alleged that Ruge had a conviction for 
incitement to mudder.48
43 H. Fabricius, Reichsinnenminitier Dr. Frick, der revolutionAre Staatsmann, 1. Auflage (Berlin, 
1933), p.44; BABL, R143/90 B1.180 “Ober den NS Deutscben Studentbund”
K.D. Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik. Fine Studie zum Problem des Machterverfalls 
in der Demokratie, 5. Auflage (Villingen, 1971), p.l34; E.J. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Flitler: 
Germany, 1918H933 (Basingstoke, 1993), p.226
4'5 BABL, R 143/90 Bl.181 “Ober den NS Deutschen Studentbund”; G. Pridham, Hitler’s Rise
to Power': The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933 (London, 1973), p.211
46 H. Patze and W. Schlesinger, Geschichte Thtiringens. Teil 5(ii) (Cologne/Vienna), p.512; 
Rees, Biographical Dictionary, p.26
47 BABL, NS 26/1221 Personal File Wilhelm Frick
48 O. Dutch, Hitler's Twelve Apostles (London, 1939), p.210; W. Mtlnzenberg, Nazjfihrer, 
sehendichan (Paris, U^.3-4), p.72
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Frick's Cultural and Education Measures: The “ Wider die
NegerkulturDecree
In the same week as the appointments of Zunkel and 
Wachtler, Frick initiated one of his most infamous acts as Thuringia’s 
Education Minister. In a memorandum to the section dealing with 
theatrical affairs, Frick asked to compose - in agreement with that 
section - an “official decree” which would appear in the government’s
Amts- und NachrichtsnblotL The decree would be similar to an enclosed
paper entitled GpB<PldIpNeBcrkultur49
The paper’s preamble began with the assertion that for years 
“racially-foreign influences” had been asserting themselves in almost 
every cultural sphere undermining “the moral forces of the German 
Volkstum” “Jazz band and percussion music, Negro dances, Negro 
songs and Negro plays represent a glorification of the Negertum and 
deride the German feeling of culture.” Arresting these “manifestations 
of decay” were said to be in the interest of the German people. The 
decree would be enforced, through articles 32, 33a, and 53, paragraph 2 
of the trade regulations (Gswcrbpordnung).
49 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1004 B1.^<52 Frick to Theatre Section (ThVbMin), 3 February
1930
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The first stage of the decree concerned itself with demanding
higher ‘standards’ from theatre owners applying for licences. For 
example, under article 32 licensing authorities could refuse licences if
they believed that the applicant did not inspire confidence concerning 
the ‘artistic’ merit of his business. In view of this, article 33a allowed 
the authorities to revoke licences if performances of operettas, songs, 
theatrical pieces and exhibitions did not display “a high interest in art 
or knowledge”, and were considered as running counter to “good 
morals”. Performances of music and theatrical pieces, such as Jazz, 
were also seen as contrary to “good morals”. In order to guard against 
these “manifestations of decay” the licensing authorities were 
entitled, under articles 32 and 33a, to examine the past character of 
the applicant, the nature of previous performances held by him, and 
whether any future performances would “injure” the population 
(Volk).
Section two of Wider die Negcrkultur stipulated that, under article 
53a, the licence could be revoked if “a deficiency of quality” became 
evident:. Under article 33a licences would also be revoked if facts 
against the licensee came to light revealing that any performances or 
recitals ran counter to “good morals”. Licences would also be revoked
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if prior performances had been unethical. “In all cases it is the duty of
the police authorities ... to take steps with all keenness [aller Schcirfe] 
and to initiate the action for the withdrawal of the granted licence”.50
Frick asked for comments on the text, and if any additions 
were believed necessary. To this end, commentators were reminded to 
take note of his letter of 3 February, and the first page of Volkischer 
Beohachter of 31 January.51 By the time of the decree’s publication on 5 
Aprii,52 53changes had been initiated. The decree was now known as 
Wider die NegerkuUur fiir das deutsches Volkstum, and was attributed to 
both the Interior and Education Ministries. Finally, whilst the text in 
the ‘draft’ had not changed, two paragraphs had been added at the 
end. 55
It was also the police’s duty to prevent “the infection of the 
German Volkstum by racially-foreign non-culture” in tandem with
50
ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1004 “Gegen die Negerkultur”, 4 February 1930
51 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1004 B1.]^15zt Frick to ThVbMin, 14 February 1930. See 
Volkischer Beohachter, “Gegen die Negerkultur”, 31 January 1930. The article was attributed to 
Gottfried Feder.
52 Amts- und Nachrichtenhlaitt fiir Tkiringen, 1930, nr.30, 12 April 1930, p.114-115; Amtsblatt des 
ThUringis(^lb:cIMinist.eriumsJ^iir\OikcsSJiidung, 1930, nr.6, 22 April 1930, pp. 40-41
53 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1004 Bll.166-168
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the Education Ministry, and to do everything “to preserve, advance 
and strengthen German art, German culture and the German 
Volkstum in the positive sense.” The Weimar Art School was to 
become, under Paul Schultze-Naumburg, a “centre point of German 
culture”, whilst the Thuringian State Theatre and Weimar’s National 
Theatre were “to be mindful of their great tradition as custodial 
places of the German spirit and... work in an exemplary manner”54
For what reasons, and on whose initiative, these changes had 
been made, is not discernible. The swift appearance of the draft 
decree so soon after Frick’s appointment suggests that Feder’s article 
was used as inspiration, that it may have been ‘made to order’ or was 
the unsolicited product of a non-NSDAP group or individual, but was 
readily accepted by Frick. Hans Severus Ziegler has been suggested as 
the author of Wider die Negerkultur,55 and this is conceivable since 
Ziegler has been suggested as the originator of Schultze- Naumburg’s 
appointment mentioned in the final draft of the decree.56 But more
54 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1004 Bl.168
55 E. John, Mwsikbolschcwismus. Die Politisierung der Musik im Deutschland 1918-1933 
(Stuttgart/Weimar, 1994), p.371; Stenzel, “Das Deutsche Nationaltheater in Weimar”, p.236
56 Steinweis, “Weimar Culture”, p.414; Zeise, “Experimentierfeld Thuringen”, p.29
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importantly, Ziegler believed that theatre should be a ‘nationally 
minded’ cultural product, and from the mid-1920s Ziegler had led a 
stringent NSDAP campaign against orchestra conductors, theatre 
directors, and the performance of works by Jewish authors and 
playwrights, as well as demanding the creation of a censor’s office. 
Ziegler sought an end to the influence of Jewish ‘elements’, 
‘experiments’ with modern dramas and atonal music, although 
Ziegler’s campaign failed to have any impact.57 Ziegler was also 
deputy Gauleiter, so the possibility that Frick and he were acquainted 
much earlier, and perhaps discussed policy opportunities, cannot be 
ruled out. Ziegler is possible for one further reason: he was deputy 
Landesleiter of the Kampfbund ftir dcutsche Kultur, an organisation that 
was distinctly anti-jazz.
The ‘fight for morality’ initiated by the Wider die Negerkultur 
decree extended into many areas; in fact, Barbara Miller-Lane believes 
that it formed the basis of Frick’s ministerial activity in Thuringia.58 
The performance of plays by Walter Hansclerer, Ernst Toller, Leo
57 Stenzel, “Das Deutsche Nationaltheater in Weimar”, pp.228-234
58 Miller-Lane, Architecture and Politics, p.156
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Janacek, Friedrich Wolf were banned, and the ‘musical bolshevism.’ of 
composers such as Paul Hindemith and Igor Strawinsky was banned 
from state subsidised programmes.59 The theatre programme of 1929­
1930 was already established, although the content was 
overwhelmingly classical, e.g. Goethe, Schiller, Shakespeare. Ziegler’s 
influence, and that of Wider die Negerkultur, was more successful in 
orientating the theatre programme of 1930-1931 along more ‘national’ 
lines. The influence of the classical works remained high, but the 
‘German Freedom Dramas’ that Ziegler had been campaigning for 
since 1926 began to appear in Weimar.60
Although not specifically mentioned in Wider die Negerkultur, the 
cinema, it could be argued, was one aspect of modern culture that 
could have fallen foul of the decree. One area of Frick’s activity was 
the attempt to eliminate the “plague of abortion propaganda” which 
the NSDAP believed emanated from Berlin and posed a great danger 
to the eugenic health of the German population.*1 There was an 
attempt to ban Erwin Piscator’s play Frauen in Not, S 218, which related
59 Baumgartner, Weitanscbauungskampf, p.l4; Patze and Schlesinger, Geschichte Thtiringens,
p.511. E Levi, Music in the Third Reich (Basingstoke, 1994), p.ll
60 Stenzel, “Das Deutsche Nationaltheater in Weimar”, pp.236-238
H. Fabricius, Geschichte dcr nationakosalistische Bewegung, 2. Auflage (Berlin, 193.5), p.43;
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to that part of Germany’s criminal code which outlawed abortion, but 
Thuringia’s Oberverwaltungsgericht in Jena revoked the 
prohibttion.® Likewise, the Thuringian government applied to the
Berlin Censor’s Office (Priifstelle) to have the film Dcr Fall Sonja Petrowa 
withdrawn from general release, but the application was rejected on 
30 May 1930, the same day as the ban on its screening in Thuringia 
was raised. * 62 63 The film Frauennot - Frauengliick was banned because of a 
scene depicting a caesarian operation.64 *
Other aspects of the visual media, e.g. art exhibitions and 
museums, also appear to have been left alone, apart from one notable 
example. In October 1930 Frick, advised by Schultze-Naumburn® 
embarked on a purge of Weimar’s Schloss Museum to remove the 
“cultural bolshevist” works of art that had “nothing in common with
H. Fabricius, Dr. Wilhelm FrickEinLebansbild desReich^^^i^is^fe^sdesIntt^im (Berlin, 1938), p.l9
62 Fabricius, Reichsinnenminister Dr. Frick, p.43; Patze and Schlesinger, Geschichte Thuringen,
p.511
63 See Vorlagen, Antrcge, Grojie Anfragen des Funftai Landtags von Thuringen 1930-1932 (Weimar, 
n.d.), nr.89, p.85; Stenographische Berichte uber die Sitzjmgen des Funften Landtags von Thuringen. Band ii. 36. 
bis 96. Siitjnig (2.]uni 1930 bis 29. Mai 1931), (Weimar, n.d.), 37th sitting, p.1056, col.Ii-p.1057, col.I
64 Amts- und Hachnc-htenblatt fiir Thuringen, 11930, nr.96, 29 November 1930, p.344
6® Fabricius Reichsinnenminister Dr. Frick, p.44; Fabricius, Dr. Wilhelm Frick, p.l7; See H. 
Brenner, Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalso'zialismus (Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1963), p.33, and Neliba, 
“Wilhelm Frick und Thuringen”, pp.88-89 for the claim that the Interior Ministry issued an oral 
order for the purge.
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the Nordic-German nature”, but merely represented “eastern or other 
minor racial sub-humans.”® Seventy works of art by Ernst Barlach, 
Otto Dix, Lyonel Feiniger, Vasily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Erich 
Kokoschka, Wilhelm Lehmbruck, Franz Marc, Emil Nolde, and Oskar 
Schlemmer were removed.66 7 In the words of one historian, Schultze- 
Naumburg’s policies “led to a dictatorship of narrow-mindedness 
which finally deteriorated into iconoclastic riots in the Weimar 
Museum”,6® for example, a fresco by Oskar Schlemmer was 
demoiished.69
As stated in the Wider die Negerkultur decree, it was Schultze- 
Naumburg’s remit to turn the Weimar Art School into a veritable 
“model place of Nazi cultural policy. The significance
of this statement was quickly realised. In an action, described by an 
anonymous Nazi writer as putting an end to “[t]he Eastern
66 Neliba, Wilhelm Frick, pp.59-60; Patze and Schlesinger, Geschichte Thiiringans, pp.511-512
67 ThHStAW, ThVbMin C/1428 Bll.172-174 “Index of the formerly exhibited works of art 
of the Twentieth Century in the Schlofl Museum”; See Miller Lane, Architecture and Politics, p.l57; E. 
Bahr, “Nazi Cultural Politico: Intentionalism vs. Functionalism”, in National Socialist Cultural Policy
by G.R. Cuomo (ed.), (Basingstoke, 1995), p.lO
68 G. Schulz, Vot Bruning zu Hitler. Der Wandel des politischen Systems in Deutschland, 1930-1933. 
Band. III. Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur. Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republik’ 
(Berlin/New York, 1992),, p.150
66701m, etal, op.cit., p.226
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Architecture”,70 1 Schultze-Naumburg sacked 29 teachers from Otto 
Bartning’s architectural school because they were sympathetic to the 
Bauhaus ideas of Walter Gropius; only 15 teachers remained on the
staff.72
School Life and Curricula
Just weeks after his appointment Frick lifted a ban on the 
activity of a nationalist youth group.73 This led to Frick’s first dispute 
with the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and would set the tone for a 
further and more extensive dispute over Frick’s education policy.
The background to the dispute pre-dated Frick joining the 
Thuringian government. Dr. Siefert, headmaster of Weimar’s Wilhelm- 
Ernst-Gymnasium, had provisionally banned the youth group Bund Adler 
und Falken after parents had complained about the hostility which it 
had provoked in their children. Siefert informed the Education 
Ministry that the ban was subject to talks between him and the
70 John, ctal, op.cit., p.226
71 “Dr. Wilhelm Frick”, NationalsozialistischcMonatshcfte, 1. Jahrgang, 1930, p.230
72 Bormann, Paul Schultze-Naumburg, p.192; Miller Lane, Architecture and Politics, pp.156,15/
73 See ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413 Bl.53 Frick to Siefert, 10 February 1930; Frick, “6 
Monate”, p.175
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Bund’s leader7* As a result of his move Siefert complained that he had 
been subjected to criticism by Ziegler in Der Nationalsozialist, and by 
Willy Marschler in the Landtag.74 5 * 77 *Nevertheless, Siefert was not 
deterred. After receiving an answer from the leader of the Bund, he 
told the Ministry that without these attacks by the NSDAP, he and 
other teachers would have concluded that the Bund was not a 
political organisation as defined by school regulations, and the ban 
would have been raised. However, Siefert believed that the ban should 
remain, since the Weimar branch of the Bund saw itself as a Nazi 
youth group.7® Siefert believed he had done enough to prove this.17 The 
question of whether the ban would be lifted or not remained 
unanswered until Frick became Minister and raised the ban.®
Prompted by newspaper reports stating that Siefert had been 
sacked for refusing to follow Frick’s directive, Reich Interior Minister 
Severing informed the Thuringian government that Siefert had been
74 ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413 Bll.1-7 Siefert to ThVbMin, 31 October 1929
75 ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413 B1.6 Siefert to ThVbMin, 31 October 1929; ThVbMin 
B/3413 Bll.8-8RS “Kleine Anfrage”, 3 November 1929
7® ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413 B1L22-23 Siefert to ThVbMin, 13 November 1929. The 
Bund had aligned itself with NSDAP ideology at a meeting in Thuringia on 28 March 1929. See 
P.D. Stachura, Nog Youth in the Weimar Republic (Santa Barbara, CA/Oxford, 1975), p.96
77 ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413 B1.35 Siefert to ThVbMin 30 November 1929
7® ThHStAW, ThVbMin B/3413 Bl.53 Frick to Siefert, 10 February 1930
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well within his rights since article 26 of Thuringia’s staatliche 
Schulordnungsbcrufen prohibited membership in political organisations 
for pupils not old enough to vote. Severing asked whether, and to 
what extent, these reports were correct and requested a report on 
whether the Bund “pursues goals contrary to the Reich Constitution.” 
If these reports were either partially or wholly confirmed, Severing 
requested a further report on the steps the Thuringian government 
intended to take, if any.79 *
The Thuringian government simply ignored Severing’ letter. 
During a NSDAP meeting, Frick attempted to provoke Severing by 
saying he would have to wait a long time for an answer. One month 
later, Severing wrote again. Stating that he had not received a reply, 
Severing claimed that Frick’s attitude had caused him to tell his 
Ministry that all communications from the Thuringian government 
would not be answered until he received an answer to his letter of 17 
February. In addition, Severing suspended the transfer of all 
education subsidies from his Ministry to Thuringia.8”
79 BABL, R 431/2315 B1.189 Severing to ThStMin, 17 February 1930
on
BABL, R 43 12315 BI.^201 W.T'.B. “Ein Brief Severings an das Thuringische 
Staatsministerium”, 19 March 1930; C Severing, Mein Lehensweg. Band II. Im aufund ab der Republik 
(Cologne, 1950), p.231
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The Thuringian government responded that the Bund did not 
pursue aims contrary to the Reich Constitution, so it had no reason to 
take any action.. On the matter of Severing’s unanswered letter, the
Land denied that there had been any decision not to reply, and it 
argued that Severing did not have the right to suspend the education 
subsidies. The Reich Minister’s action was rejected with “all 
firmness”, since the Thuringian government argued that it was 
designed to damage its image and bring about an unnecessary conflict 
between the two governments.81
In response, Se’vering argued that his letter was “the only 
possible answer” to Frick’s behaviour, and claimed that he would 
have been “extraordinarily surprised” if the Thuringian government 
had thought, even briefly, that such behaviour would have been 
tolerated. Frick ought to have been told, Severing continued, that 
there had not been any decision to answer his letter of 17 February 
since the inquiry had been directed to the Thuringian government, 
not to Frick. Therefore, “if Herr Frick anticipates the decision of the 
Thuringian State Ministry - as he has done - then it lies with you to 
prompt the necessary action”. Se’vering said he was unsure whether
81 BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.227 ThStMin to Severing, 20 March 1930
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the Thuringian government had briefed Frick on the matter, so he was 
in the unfortunate position of having to identify the Thuringian 
government with Frick Nevertheless, relations between the 
governments of Reich and Thuringia were restored because of the 
Land’s comments about the Bund. However, payment of the withheld 
educational subsidies could not re-commence because they had been 
“completely disposed of” in the meantime. Whether there would be 
funds in the next financial year was dependent upon “farther political 
development”82
Even though Frick’s official connivance in the anti-democratic 
activity of the Bund Adler und Falken had resulted in a potentially 
damaging dispute with the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Frick 
persisted with the transformation of Thuringia’s relatively liberal 
education to a more nationalist, more aggressive and domineering 
basis. It has already been mentioned that Weimar became an 
important location for extreme right-wing groups, many of which 
were directed towards young people. The National Socialist Pupils’
BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bll.230-231 Severing to ThStMin, original emphasis
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League met in Weimar,83 and the Hitler Youth, the National Socialist 
Students’ League, and the Wandervogel all attended the Kampfbundfur 
deutsche Kultur's conference of 7-9 June 1930.84 There is no evidence to 
suggest that any of these groups received any official or unofficial 
sanction from Frick to begin, continue, or intensify the recruitment of 
school pupils into their organisations. Certainly, there appears to be
no basis for the assertion that school children were to use the Hitler 
salute.85 The fact remains, however, that permission was granted for 
these groups to establish or maintain their public profile in Thuringia 
without let or hindrance. This must have found a resonance amongst 
some pupils - there certainly was a reaction amongst parents.
In late September, a parents’ committee informed the 
Education Ministry that it viewed the increasing tendency of pupils 
being drawn into political activity “with apprehension”, when pupils 
should have been concentrating on their studies. The committee 
agreed that a patriotic education was necessary, yet argued that party 
politics did not have any place in school.86 Fritz Wachtler, Frick’s
83 BABL, R134/90 Bll.192'193 “Der Nationalsozialismus und die Schule”
84 Steinweis, “Weimar Culture”, p.415
85 Dutch, Hitler's Twelve Apostles, p.209
86 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1050 Bl.84 Die Vorsitzenden der Elternbeirate der vier
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Fachreferent for Volksschulen and leader of the National Socialist 
Teachers’ Association in Thuringia, dismissed these concerns. At the 
Association’s conference, Wachtler, undoubtedly taking Frick’s
Ministry as his point of reference, declared that once again Germany’s 
youth was able to think about becoming free from “all the forces of a 
crippling yoke of slavery which a criminal politic has imposed upon 
them ... German teachers do not want to betray this glorious youth”. 
Wachtler argued that the protests of parents and teachers against the 
“glorious desire for independence” in Germany’s youth were political 
or party political, believing that the “alleged neutral attitude of many 
headmasters [was] nothing other than party politics in the sense of the
November Revolution" To this end, Wachtler asked that article 26 of the 
Schulordnung be revised so that concepts such as “desire for 
independence” and “love of the fatherland” should not be considered 
party political concepts, but “foregone conclusions which must be 
expressly cultivated”®
Frick’s regulation “Awakening and Encouragement of the 
Colonial Idea in Schools” (I August 1930) may be seen as an attempt
hoheren Schulen Weimars to ThVbMin, 26 September 1930
8® ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1050 B1.85 Nationalsozialistischer Lehrer-Bund. Gau
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to foster such sentiments. From 1925 onwards the Kolonialc
Reichsarhcitsgemeinschaft had been in correspondence with the 
Thuringian Education Ministry about the dissemination of the 
colonial idea in schools through various media, including exhibitions, 
books and classroom instruction® No doubt Frick’s appearance as 
Thuringia’s Education Minister was viewed as fortuitous by the 
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, given the NSDAP’s vocal and hostile 
demand to overturn the Versailles Treaty, a demand that then 
included the return of Germany’s former colonies. In all likelihood, it 
was the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft that seized the opportunity, 
presented by Frick’s presence in government, to secure a potentially 
more vigorous promotion of its ideas. This appears to be the case, 
since in early April 1930 the Weimar branch of the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschaft attempted to follow up earlier discussions with 
Frick when it sought official permission to distribute its material in 
schools. The Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft asked if the Ministry would 
demonstrate its support by placing a large order for the
Thuringens to ThVbMin, 11 November 1930, original emphasis
88 See ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1002 Bll.<5-29 correspondence between the Koloniale
Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft and the ThVbMin
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Kolonialk^alcnder “which could be placed at the schools' disposal”. The
Deutsche Koloniulgescllschaft also attempted to recruit Ministry officials 
into its ranks by expressing its “particular joy” that Frick had already 
joined.89 The Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft’s attempts to persuade Frick 
continued into May when it pointed out that the Prussian Education 
Minister had issued a decree late the previous year concerning the
treatment of the colonial idea in schools. The Deutsche
Kolonialgesellschaft believed that its activity would be strengthened if 
Frick’s Ministry “recommended to the subordinate teaching 
institutions” a similar decree.9” The decree was duly written up,91 92with 
Frick directing that schools were “obliged [verpflictet]” to awaken the 
colonial idea in “our youth” and pursue such efforts to the best of their 
abilities . 92 The Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft’s lobbying can be seen as the 
influential, if not the sole factor of the Education Ministry’s decision
to issue the decree.
89 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1002 B1.53 Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (Weimar) to 
ThVbMin, 5 April 1930
®” ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1002 Bl.52 Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (Berlin) to 
ThVbMin, 6 May 1930
ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1002 B1.54 hand-written draft, August 1930; ThVbMin A/1002.
Bll.30-34 “Zur Weckung und Pflege des kolonialen Gedankens in den Schulen”
92 Amtsblatt desThtiringischcnMitiisteriums fiir Volksbildung, 1930, nr.13, 22 August 1930, p.90
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That Frick was responsive to lobbying from non-Nazi groups 
regarding school curricula is also evident from his Auslanddeutschtum 
decree of 7 July 1930. Berufschulen pupils were to be instructed in “the 
colonial, world-economic, political and cultural significance of the 
German Volkstum abroad.” The decree stated that teaching material 
on the Auslanddeutschtum was to be developed, if it had not already 
happened; those teachers who had any “theoretical and practical 
questions” were to contact with the Verein fiir das Deutschtum im 
Ausland.rr Like its colonial counterpart, the Verein had been lobbying 
the Education Ministry throughout the 1920s, and had intensified its 
efforts once Frick had become Minister94
In December 1930 Frick recommended the social darwinist
Fritz Lenz’s book: Uher die hiologischen Grundlagen zur Erzieiung, and
Hans Gunther’s works: Rassenkunde des deutschen. Volks; Kleine 
Rassenkunde des deutschen Volks; Ritter Tod und Teufel; and, Der nordische 
Gedanke unter den Deutschen. A reader’s guide to ‘Gunther studies’ was 
also prescribed. All six books were approved for teachers’ and pupils’ 93
93 Amtsblatt desTharingisdh^nMinisteriums fiir Voliisbildung, 11930, nr.12, July 1930, p.77
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libraries, as well as recommended as prizes for pupils . 94 5
No evidence exists to suggest that lists of prohibited books
were compiled during Frick’s ministry. 9® The nearest to any ‘black list' 
compiled were those indices drawn up by the higher censors’ offices 
of ‘trash literature’ (Oberprufstcllen fOr Schund- und Schmutzschriften) and 
published in Thuringia’s Amts- und Nachrichteiblhtt, as well as the lists 
received from other Lander.97 *There is just one example of an attempt 
to ban ‘trash literature’, and again it reveals Frick clearly responding 
to the unsolicited advances of an external agency.
The Kirchlich-Soziaha Bund had taken offence to Maurice
Dekobra’s two books Der Philosoph und die Dime and Ein Freundmadchen 
istgestorhen because they were “the most pernicious diabolical trash, as 
well as filth, in their effect upon ... youth”9® In July, after further 
correspondence with the Bund, the Thuringian Education Ministry
94 See ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/981 Bll.1-30, 35-65
95 Amtsblatt des Thuringischen Ministeriums far Volksbildung, 1930, nr.19, 31 December 1930,
p.149
96 Schulz, Von Bruning Hitler, p.l49; M.-L. Worster-Roftbach and M. Gunhe,
“GrundzUge der nationalsozialistischen Schulpolitik in Thuringen”, in D. Krause-Vilmar (ed.),
Lehrerschaft, Republik und Faschismus. BeitrUgc zur Geschichte der organisierten Lehrerschaft in der Weimarer
Republik (Cologne, 1978), p.223 
079* See ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1184 Bll.14-74; ThVbMin A/1195 Bl1.114a-449; ThVbMin 
A/1196 B11.1-7
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contacted the Berlin Censor’s Office for ‘trash literature’ and asked to
place Dekobra’s two works, and another, Moral um Mittcmacht, on the 
list of material to be blacklisted. The Thuringian Education Ministry 
jusl^ified its request by calling the books “typical mamfestaCioM of a 
sinisterly progressing cultural decay”, which possessed a 
“demoralising tendency and morally reprehensible motives”, through 
which young readers were introduced to “an inferior world where no 
desire for sacrifice for nation and fatherland is recognised”.99 100 101The 
Education Ministry’s application failed outright.1”” The B^u^nd asked 
Frick if he intended to pursue the matter further with the higher 
censor’s office in Leipzig*”* Frick did, but was again unsuccessful in 
his attempt to dictate what Thuringia’s youth could read*”2 Frick, 
however, was much more successful in banning the work of a more
renowned author.
® ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1199 Bl.1 Kirchlich-Sozialer Bund to ThMdl, 22 March 1930 
® ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1199 Bl.7 ThVbMin to Prufstelle Berlin, 6 June 1930;
Fabricius, Reichsinnenminister Dr-. Frick, p.43
100 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1199 Bl.14 Prufstelle Berlin to ThMdl, 4 July 1930
101 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1199 Bl.13 Kirchlich-Sozialer Bund to ThMdl, 3 July 1930
1”2 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1199 Bl'I.^'4-38 Oberprufstelle (Leipzig) to ThMdl, 25 
September 1930
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All Quiet on the Western Front
Within a fortnight of becoming Thuringia’s Minister, Frick
initiated action against Erich Maria Remarque’s war novel AW Quiet on 
the Western Front:. A circular was sent to all Volkschule inspectorates 
asking them to report on whether the book was available in school 
libraries, which teachers had recommended it, and which teachers
had used the book in class.®
Of the 22 inspectorates asked to reply, 11 responded negatively 
to all questions.104 Two inspectorates replied that the book was 
available in libraries since many teachers and parents had 
recommended it, but that pupils did not have access to the bools.®5 Of 
the remaining nine inspectorates, all reported that the book had been 
used in class® Just one inspectorate reported that AW Quiet was 
available in the teachers’ library®7 From these nine reports, it 
emerged that the book had not been employed indiscriminately,
rather that teachers had been selective in the use of themes from the
®3 ThHStAW ThVbMin A/1010 Bl.1 ThVbMin to Schuirate, 7 February 1930
®4 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 B11.4, 5,13,19, 25, 27, 29,33, 35, 36, 38 
ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 Bll.20-22, 30
*4 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 B11.3,6,14, 31, 32, 34, 37,39
®® ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 B1.28
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book. The teaching of history and Icbenskundliche Unterricht (life 
studies) were the most frequent examples cited. For example, 
inspectorate Jena I reported that a teacher had used All Quiet in a 
discussion of the First World War, especially in the imagery of
battles. Another teacher in the same district had used the book to
illustrate the reality of the conflict by taking the gas attack scene as 
an example.108 *From those reports that had specified which aspects of 
All Quiet had been used in class, the effect of technology on warfare 
and its effect upon the ordinary infantryman were the most cited.
Further evidence on the availability of All Quiet was
accumulated when the memo was circulated to vocational schools.
The Education Ministry demanded that if the book had been 
purchased it was to be immediately removed from libraries, and that 
teachers who had used the book were strongly forbidden from using 
the book further.10® The availability and/or use of All Quiet in 
vocational schools was not as extensive as that in Volkschulen, 
suggesting that use of the book was insignificant. One area stated that 
the book had been removed from the pupils’ library; another stated
108 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 Bl.3 Schuirat Jena 1 to ThVbMin, 27 February 1930
*”9 TliiHSlAW, ThVbMin B/3740 Bl.62 ThVbMin to Berufsschulrate, 24 February 1930
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that the book had been used in class. A further two reported that
teachers had abstracted sections for pupils?10 One teacher had
admitted that he could not re.mem.ber which sections he had used or
omitted; although he was certain that he had left out those of a sexual
nature2"
To what extent - if any - the decision making process within 
the Education Ministry was influenced by these results is not known. 
As with many aspects of Frick’s tenure in office, the inner workings of 
the Education Ministry in this matter remains unclear. There was not 
any analysis of the survey’s findings, nor any critique of what 
Remarque’s book was actually about. The Ministry’s inquiries had 
shown that All Quiet was largely unavailable in schools, and that in 
those few establishments where All Quiet was available, the book had 
always been restricted to teachers, a few of whom had used the text 
within specific contexts, and with discretion. This evidence probably 
made little, if no impression upon Frick, given the NSDAP’s hatred for 
the book and Frick’s faithful adherence to the party line.
Nevertheless, The Education Ministry banned the book on 22 * 111
™ThHScAW, ThVbMin A/1010 B11.122, 133, 140,149
111 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 B1.132 Rudolf Swanger to Knabenberufsschule, 11 March
1930
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April:
“We consider the book as unsuitable for scholastic purposes in every 
respect, and we forbid it being given to school boys and girls by the
school, it being recommended to them, or making it a subject for 
instructional discussion.”112 113 114
On 14 May 1930, the DDP’s sole representative asked how the 
prohibition of the book was handled since Remarque’s work was used 
in schools. Surely, he asked, the teacher could make his or her mind 
up as to whether the book was to be used. The government replied 
that the book neither belonged in schools, nor in school libraries since 
it “saw the events of the war from the viewpoint of the latrine”." 
Frick does not appear to have removed AU Quiet from public 
libi'a^n^e^ss"! since the files contain no reference to the matter at all, but 
in December, the Thuringian government initiated action to ban the 
film version of All Quiet. The governments of Thuringia, Saxony,
112 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1010 Bl.151 ThVbMin to the Herren Leiter der hoheren und
Mittelschulen und die Herren Schulrate ftir die Volkschulen, 22 April 1930
113 AussefaiflferichtcdesFtinftenLandtagsvonhttringen 193(0-1932 (Weimar, n.d.), p.ll6, col.II
114 M. Eksteins, “All Quiet on the Western Front and the Fate of a War”, Journal of Contemporary 
History (ii-April), Volume 15, 1980, p.357; Patze and Schlesinger, Geschichte Thtiringens, p.511; 
Worster-Rfbach and GUnhe, “GrundzUge der nationalsozialistischen Schulpolitik in 
Thuringen”, p.223
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Braunschweig, WUrrtemberg and Bavaria petitioned Berlin’s Supreme 
Censorship Board to ban the film version. They succeeded Frick, 
who claimed that the film adaptation “shamefully [depicted] the
Germans as cowards”,115 16 was “openly enthusiastic”117 118 119 120about his 
success, and banned the film in Thuringia on 18 December 1930no
In late April 1930 the SPD had called for the book’s prohibition 
to be revoked immediately^ and in February 1931 Hermann Brill, one 
of Frick’s sharpest critics in the Landtag, attacked the book’s 
prohibition. Brill contrasted the classical spirit of Weimar, of Goethe, 
and of cosmopolitanism, with Frick’s desire to create a spirit of 
Weimar based on “defence” and “resistance”’o Turning to what he 
was believed a manifestation of Frick’s “new spirit of Weimar”, Brill 
referred to the Education Ministry’s circular of 7 February 1930 to the 
Volksschule inspectorates, and the one sent to the Berufschulcn later that
115 M. Eksteins, “War, Memory and Politics: The Fate of the Film All ^uid: on the Western 
Front”, Central European History (i-March), Volume 13,1980, p.75
116 Snyder, Encyclopedia, p.lOl; Neliba, WilhelmFrick, p.58
U7 E. Frohlich, (ed.), Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels. Samtliche Fragmente. 
Aufzeichnungen 1924 bis 1941. Teil 1, Band 1 27. Juni 1924-30. Dezember 1930 (Munich, 1987), 
entry of 14 December 1930, p.646
118 Amts mldNachrChtenblattJurhtrsi)lgen, 1930, nr.102, 22 December 1930, p.368
119 Vorlagen, Antriige, GrofeAnfragen, nr.69, p.68
120
StenographischeBerichte, Band 11, 69th sitting, 7 February 1931, p.l589, col. 1-11
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same month.. Brill claimed that the report’s demand for information 
about those teachers who had bought the book or had used it in the
classroom was “a request for denunciation”.121 122
Brill considered this use of school inspectorates as
“extraordinarily remarkable” since the regulations concerning 
curricula, and material to be used, allowed teachers to introduce 
material of their own choice. It was “quite impossible” to denounce 
and persecute those teachers who followed regulations. As far as he 
was concerned, the prohibition order was little more than an attempt 
by Frick to exclude the youth of Thuringia from a contemporary 
literary trend. Brill argued that the prohibition of All Quiet would 
greatly stimulate desire for the book and propagate its reading: Brill 
said he knew of seven libraries where Remarque’s book had been 
reserved 20 times or more.122 The prohibition of such an overnight 
best seller had done nothing to enhance the reputation of Thuringia 
or Weimar.123 Brill was emphatic that in all cultural areas National 
Socialism had produced nothing other than prohibitions, arguing that 
Nazism did not need to make any exertion to ban anything, but
121 StenographischeBerichte, Band II, p.1590, col.I
122
StenographischeBerichte, Band II, p.l590, col.II
123
Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p.l59I, coI.II
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required a great exertion to produce something greater or better than 
that which it prohibited. Nazism had produced “nothing more than 
the worst kind of trashy literature” and did not possess the “inner
justification” (innere Berechtigung) to ban a work like All Quiet. Brill 
believed that Frick “has the credit, through the prohibition of the 
book... of having added an important chapter to the history of human
stupidity”.
In reply Ministerialrat Schnobel declared that the Education
Ministry had given no verdict about the “worth or non-worth of the 
book”, and had taken no standpoint. He then contradicted himself 
when he said that the question over Remarque’s book was merely 
concerned with whether it was suitable either to be taught to, or 
given to, Volksschule pupils. The Ministry believed that it was not, and 
Schnobel gave the following statement in Frick’s name:
“The book All Quiet on the Western Front... is thoroughly unsuitable for 
use in instruction.. It cannot be justified because of its pernicious content, 
in the greatest part, upon the unestablished judgement and the emotional 
life of the younger generation, for the school to suggest this book to 
pupils.”124
124 StenographischeBerichte, Band II, p.l592, col.II-p.I593, col.I
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The School Prayers Decree
On 16 April 1930 the decree Deutsches Schulgehet was published. 
As with Wider die Negerkultur, this new edict also claimed that 
Ger'many’s misfortune resulted not from economic causes, but from 
the subversion of a ‘fifth column’. “For years Jo^^eign. and racially foreign 
forces [Art- und Volksfremde Krdfte] have sought to destroy the spiritual- 
moral-religious foundations of our German thinking and feeling in 
order to eradicate the German people [Volf], and thereby making it 
easier to dominate.” The decree asserted that the only way in which 
the German people could successfully resist these “dangerous 
influences” was by maintaining the purity of its religious and moral 
character, and passing this to the next generation. This was a “duty of 
the greatest significance” for both parents and teacher's; the latter 
were reminded of the “high responsibility” they held before the 
history of the German people. Claiming that Christianity was 
“inseparably bound” to the Germans, the decree argued that the daily 
school prayer was “a matter of course” in classes where the majority of 
pupils were Christian; and it was not a violation of a democratic 
constitution that school pupils had to forego str’engthening their
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religious beliefs because some teachers had renounced their own
personal beliefs. The next generation of Germans was “the bearer and 
shaper of the German destiny”, and for this reason, it had the right to
“ask for help and strength for the liberation of its people and 
Fatherland by the Almighty Father in Heaven.” Hence, the Education 
Ministry said it would “recommend” [emp/Mmi] the introduction of a 
Thuringian school prayer to be recited by either the pupils or the 
teacher at the beginning or the end of the week Neither the rights of 
the religious organisations, nor the freedoms of belief or conscience 
enjoyed by teachers or pupils would “in no way” be prejudiced by the 
decree. Five prayers were attached to the decree, and the Education 
Ministry expected that one would be chosen. The Education Ministry- 
said it would await a report from the school inspectorates and the 
headmasters to what extent its “wish” was “conformed to, and where
the difficulties occur”*
The Origm of the School Prayers Decree
As with Wider die Negcrkultur, the archives reveal neither the
125
Amtsblatt des Thuringischen Ministeriums ftir Volksbildung, 1930, p.39, emphasis added. The 
full text of each of the five prayers may be found in the Appendix.
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source of the decree, nor the prayers. The first prayer (Dear God, you 
desire with a strong hand) was taken from the Thuringian 
Landeskirchenrat’s coUection,126 but there is no similar
documentation for the other four. One researcher has claimed that
Frick’s Fachreferent Fritz Wachtler wrote four, and Hans Severus 
Ziegler one. However, Zeise has not specified who wrote which, nor 
has he cited any sources to substantiate his claims.^7 Frick does not 
appear to have been responsible. He never claimed to be the author, 
nor did any subsequent Nazi publications name Frick.128
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the right-wing volkisch 
religious group, Deutsche Christen, was responsible. The group was 
formed in Thuringia in early 1929 by two priests, Siegfried. Leffler and 
Julius Leutheuser. The Deutsche Christen spent much time 
disseminating Nazi ideas, although this was done in a manner to give 
the impression that this was not in connection with the NSDAP, even
126 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.ll Landeskirchenrat der Thuringer evangelischen
Kirche to ThVbMin, 7 April 1930
127 Zeise, “Experimentierfeld Thuringen”, p.34; See M. Overesch, Hermann Brill in Thuringen 
1895-1946. EinKUmpfergegen Hitler und Ulbricht (Bonn, 1992), p.202
Frick, “6 Monate”, p.l75; W. Frick, “Thuringische Bilanz”, Nationalsozialistisches 
Jahrbuch, 6. Jahrgang, 1932, p.215; See “Dr. Wilhelm Frick”, Nat^i^onalsozialistische Monatshefte, p.230; 
Fabricius, ReichsinnenministerDr. Frick, pp.46-50; Fabricius, Dr. Wilhelm Frick, pp.18-19
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though many of the Deutsche Christen were NSDAP members. Leffler
and Leutheuser were the prime movers in the establishment of an 
NSDAP Ortsgruppe in Wieratal.’29 In March 1930 the Deutsche Christen’s 
Arbeitsgcmeinschaft held its annual conference in Weimar; with Frick in 
attendance. The Chairman of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft was Max Robert 
Gerstenhauer, Frick’s Education Ministerialrat and a Landtag 
representative for the Wirtschaftspartei™ It was Gerstenhauer, who, 
during the State Supreme Court’s deliberation of whether the prayers 
were constitutional, claimed that the Deutsche Christen
Arheitsgemeinschaft, which “had nothing to do with politics”, had 
written the prayers;’31 Witzmann believed that Gerstenhauer had 
written some of the prayers himsllf.^ The Deutsche Christen were 
possibly the authors for one more reason. The group professed an 129 130 131 132
129 Siegele-Wenschkewitz, NationaLsozialismus und Kirche, p.22; K. Meier, Die Deutschen 
Christen. Das Bild einer Bewegung im Kulturkampf des Dritten Reiches (Halle-Saale, 1964), pp.2-5; G. 
Lautenschlager, “Der Kirchenkampf in Thurlngen”, in Heiden and Mai (eds.), Nationakozialismus,
pp.464-465
130 Scholder, Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich, p.239; Siegele-Wenschkewitz, 
Nat^^o^nl^o?iali^mus und Kirche, p.24. No personal file exists for Gerstenhauer in the ThHStAW
131 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.5 W.T.B. “Fortsetzung und Schluiii. von ‘die Thuringer 
Schulgebete vor dem S^^a^a_sg<^j^ri^fh^;shof ' ”, 11 July 1930
132 See Landesbibliothek Coburg NachlaR Witzmann Ms45L/2.4.3 Bl.lO “Politische 
Geschichte Thuringens 1918-1932” (n.d.)
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extremely anti-Semitic view of the Bible, particularly with regard to 
the Old Testament, which the Deutsche Christen believed was the work
of Jews, whilst viewing Jesus Christ essentially as Aryan?33 The Times
newspaper believed that if the NSDAP had its way instruction in the 
Old Testament would be cut to a minimum because the party believed 
it was essentially Jewish’ in character.’34 There is no evidence 
suggesting that this was ever considered by Frick, or others within 
the Education Ministry, despite concerns that Frick might pursue 
such a policy.133 134 35
Did the decree, like Wider die Negerkultur, undergo any changes 
before publication? There is no ‘first draft’ with which to make any 
comparison, but the Thuringian Landeskirchenrat’s letter, which was 
the source of prayer one, suggests that changes may have been made.
The Landeskirchenrat had asked the Thuringian Education 
Ministry if a notice could be published alongside the prayers stating
133 H.-J. Sonne, Die politische Theologie der Deutschen Christen (Gottingen, 19882); See 
ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1036 B11.2-7 Speech by Dr. Heerdegen-Jena to the Bund fur Deutsche 
Kirche, 5 March 1930
134 The Times, “De-Jazzing Thuringia: Fascist Minister's Decree”, 19 April 1930
135 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1036 Bll.l-IRS Verband der akademischen gebildeten 
Religionslehrer Thuringens to ThVbMin, 25 May 1930
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that the right of schools in religious matters, as granted under article 
136, paragraph 4 and article 149, paragraph 2 of the Reich 
Constitution would not be harmed by the decree.’36 These clauses 
specified that no-one was compelled to participate in any religious or 
ecclesiastical act, that the giving of religious education was subject to 
the teacher’s assent, and that participation in religious instruction 
and ceremonies by children was subject to the consent of the parents 
or guardians.13" The Landeskirchenrat’s request for these clauses to be 
respected may well account for the decree’s announcement that the 
rights of freedom of belief and of conscience of teachers and pupils 
were “in no way prejudiced.”’’® The Landeskirchenrat had also asked 
that additional prayers were produced which all “expressed in a 
particular manner, the request for the liberation of the Volk from its 
present distress”. However, the Landeskirchenrat stipulated that the 
prayers “must be kept free ... from politics ... This appearance must be 
avoided under all circumstances.” The Landeskirchenrat feared that
prayers of a party political nature would encourage anti-Church 136 137 138
136 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.1 Landeskirchenrat to ThVbMin, 7 April 1930
137 /See E.M. Hucko (ed.), The Democratic Tradition: Four German Constitutions (Oxford, 1987),
pp.179,182-183
138 Amtsblatt desThtiringischen Ministeriums fiir Volksblldung, 1930, p.39
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groups who would accuse it of bias, and agitate amongst parents with
the end result that children would be withdrawn from religious 
instruction.” Whether the Landeskirchenrat was against political 
prayers per se, or merely against such overt messaging is open to 
debate. Nonetheless, the Church’s fears that prayers in such a manner 
could lead to anti-Church, i.e. communist, agitation may have been 
influential in making the prayers ambiguous in their references to 
“deception”, “treason” and the “liberating act”.
Implementation and Opposition to the Decree
The reception of the school prayers decree amongst Thuringian 
schools was not overly enthusiastic. The Education Ministry’s file 
contains only six ‘positive’ replies, dated from late April to late July. 
Two schools adopted prayer 1 (Dear God, you desire with a strong hand)* 
whilst two other schools accepted prayer 5 (Hear us, O Lord).139 140 41 Only 
one school chose to introduce prayer 2 (Father, in your alFmighty hand)
139 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.1 Landeskirchenrat to ThVbMin, 7 April 1930
140 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.33 R. Saemann (Uhlstadt) to ThVbMin, 6 May 1930; 
ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.46 Realschule (Schmolln) to ThVbMin, 7 May 1930.
141 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bi.41 Oberlyzeum (Gera) to ThVbMin, 29 April 1930; 
ThVbMin A/1011 B1.42 Realschule (GroHbreitenbach) to ThVbMin, 30 April 1930
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into every class. The school reported that the prayer had been 
accepted with 59 votes against 7, but that there had been strong 
opposition to the measure amongst members of the town council* 1”2 
Another school stated that the prayers had been introduced with no 
difficulties being encountered, although it neglected to state how 
many and which prayers were chosen.’43 The last school to report 
stated that it too had accomplished the introduction of the prayer’s, 
but it had altered prayers 2, 3, and 4 in light of the State Supreme 
Court’s judgement of mid-July that the prayer's were anti- 
constitutional.’44
Opposition to both the decree and prayers was scathing in its 
condemnation. The Thuringian Association of Philologists welcomed 
the introduction of prayers relating to Germany’s situation at home 
and abroad, but the Association expressed concern about the decree’s 
infringements of the right of individual conscience, and the Ministry’s
142 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.44 Realschule (Allstedt/Helme) to ThVbMin, 2 May
1930 I
143 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B1.43 Realschule (Hirsberg-Saale) to ThVbMin, 29 April i
1930
144 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B1.132 Reform-Realschule (Gera) to ThVbMin, 21 July j
1930 i
1
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demand for a report.1^ The Landeskirchenrat noted the decree, but 
regretted that many of its proposals from earlier that month had not 
been accepted, “all the more so, as in the now proposed decree many 
[of the prayers], even from the standpoint of the Christian teachers, 
are contestable”.1”6 Similarly, the Thuringian Association of Religious 
Teachers supported the Landeskirchenrat’s protests that the Ministry 
had “disregarded ... the serious doubts” raised earlier that month, and 
had then, “contrary to our warning, published a decree in which, 
according to our opinion, the prayers are to express party political 
opinions.” Like the Philologists, the Association of Religious Teachers 
welcomed a decree which aimed at the strengthening the school 
prayer since it was “an important piece of religious-moral education”, 
but objected to the decree’s content, feeling that the demand to 
choose from 5 prayers limited their, and the pupils’, freedom of 
conscience, especially since prayers 2 to 4 had “a political hue [which] 
cannot be denied”. The teachers further claimed that it was “inwardly 
impossible” to use prayers which “signify an expression of a particular 
party political opinion”, arguing that school prayers, like religious
145 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B1.34 Thuringer Philologen-Verband to ThVbMin, 18
May 1930
146 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B1..32 Landeskirchenrat to ThVbMin, 26 April 1930
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instruction, should be used “to build the community, not to effect the 
destruction of the community”.1”7 Another teachers’ union had gone a 
stage further when it characterised the decree’s introduction as a 
“shallow party political saturated polemic”, which injured broad 
sections of the German people “with audacity”. The prayers were 
viewed as “phrase-inflated, party political saturated word 
combinations parteipoliti^sche ahgetontc
WortkomhinationenY and “party political ... hate songs [Hajigcsange] 
which are contrary to one of the most valuable articles of the Reich 
Constitution”.”18
The first attempt to annul the decree was made on 14 May 1930 
in the Landtag’s education committee.1”9 Criticising the decree, a 
representative of the SPD argued that the prayers were of a political 
nature, stressing war rather than reconciliation between peoples, 
having no consideration for dissenting teachers and pupils, emanating 
from anti-Semitic tendencies, and in complete opposition to the
147 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1C11 B'1,.36 Verband der akademischen gebildeten
Religionslehrer Thuringens to ThVbMin, 23 May 1930
148 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 Bl.l.31-32 Allgemeine freie Lehrergewerkschaft
Deutschlands to ThVbMin, 27 April 1930
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freedom of conscience guaranteed under the Reich Constitution.”0 
Frick replied that the moral-religious ‘fitness’ [sittlich-religiosc 
Ertuchigung] of a people was necessary for leading it out of distress 
[Not]. Religious education was a part of this, and the daily school 
prayer was an essential factor of this education. Frick denied that the 
decree was designed to restrict teachers, rather' it was a 
“recommendation” [Empfehlung], by claiming that the need for a school 
prayer in a school in a Land, whose majority was Christian and 
national was self-evident. “In the last ten years we have had enough 
opportunity to get to know the foreign and racially-foreign powers - 
by this he [Frick] considered the Jews - which are inclined to destroy 
the spiritual-religious-moral foundations of our German thinking and 
feeling”. Frick stated that no compulsion would be exerted upon 
dissenters to recite the prayers. As regards the opinions of the bodies 
to be consulted (as in the decree), Frick said that their remarks were 
not binding for the government and that Thuringia’s Church had 
objected.”’ Moving to the second prayer’s mention of “deception and 
treason”, Frick alleged that these were the actions of those behind the
149 Ausschufiberchte desFunfien Landtags, nr.33
150 Ibid., p.ll5, col.ii
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social democratic newspaper Vorwfirts, which had recently published 
an article hostile towards the prayers.152
The DVP’s representative said that the impression ought to be 
avoided that the government was exerting a pressure of conscience, 
and that the doubts expressed by the Church and the Teachers’ 
Association ought to be observed. The best prayer, in his opinion, 
remained the Lord’s Prayer. He further stated that there were, “in the 
national sense”, valuable and trustworthy sources amongst Jews. The 
SPD then introduced a resolution aimed at revoking the decree.”3
“AU of the prayers bear a political character. They are prayers of war 
which are, in the sense of the ‘liberating act’, National Socialist Party 
propaganda ... They are party political prayers of hate which in a 
slanderous and truly non-Christian manner reproach the republican 
minded and peace loving part of the Thuringian population with 
‘deception and treason’ ... The prayers are a misuse of religion and a 
misuse of schools for the purpose of party political agitation.””4
The resolution was defeated in view of the government’s
”' Ibid., p.ll5, col.II
”2 Ibid., p.ll6, cotl
”' Ibid., p.ll6, col.II
1>T Ibid., p.ll6, col.II - p.117, col.I
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majority,”® yet the SPD persisted. Two days later the SPD added an 
appendix to the report of the above meeting. They asked who the
“foreign and racially-foreign forces” were; what was meant by 
“deception and treason”; and what was the “liberating act”. Frick 
repeated, “The foreign and racially-foreign powers are the Jews. What is 
understood by ‘deception and treason’ you can look up in the opinion 
of Vorwdrts concerning the Thuringian School Prayers. Vorwdrts has 
understood me correctly”.156
Referring to a committee meeting of 9 May 1930 the SPD stated 
that it had read out the relevant passage of Vorwdrts (morning edition, 
23 April 1930) in Frick’s presence. “Concerning the sense and 
intention of the Thuringian School Prayers there is not the smallest 
doubt. Deception and treason, treason to the Fatherland; hidden 
behind [all of this] is agitation against the foreign policy of the Reich 
and against the Reich Constitution.” Asked whether he had anything 
to say, Frick declared that he had said enough and that the Vorwtirts 
article was “entirely correct.”1”7 When asked about “the liberating act” 
Frick remained silent, and did not contradict the Social Democrats
”8 Ibid., p.I27, col1
”8 Ibid., p.l27, col.II, emphasis added
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when they argued that a National Socialist minister could only 
perceive this as a. future war.”®
The Response of the Reich Government
Frick’s remarks of 9 May 1930 led Reich Interior Minister 
Joseph Wirth to tell Erwin Baum, Thuringia’s Minister-President, 
about his concern. “A deliberate party political tendency has not 
appeared in these pr'ayers without reason, which is all the more 
distressing when, in the [Landtag’s] budget committee, Herr Frick 
declared that the prayers are directed against ‘racially foreign 
elements, namely the Jews’.” Wirth said that he, as Reich Interior 
Minister, was compelled to investigate. “The emphasis on political 
matters in a part of the recommended prayers and the ascribed 
tendency of Herr Fr'ick in the Committee has itself raised the question 
of constitutional validity.””®
replied that the school pr'ayers were dedicated to the 
“German Distress and Hope, [and] they thoroughly correspond to the
”7 Ibid., p.128, col.I
”5 Ibid., p.l28, col.I
ISO”o BABL, R 43 1/2315 Bl.289 Wirth to Baum, 12 May 1930. See ThHStAW, RStH/132 Bl.17 
Brill to Kniep (RMdl), 31 May 1930 for the reports sent by Brill to Wirth.
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essence of a Christian prayer.” The prayers identified “the wicked”, 
but not specific persons, or groups;. Hence, Baum argued, somewhat 
dubiously, that the feelings of dissenters were not violated. 
Nonetheless, Wirth was told that the Thuringian government 
“thoroughly and decisively” rejected the interpretation of article 148, 
paragraph 2 of the Reich Constitution, which said that the feelings of 
all dissenters must be protected. argued that this would lead to
the protection of feelings which did not recognise Germany’s need to 
oppose the Versailles Treaty, the need to end the “deception, treason, 
and inner strife” of the population, nor acknowledge the need to 
maintain Germany’s Christian character. The prayers had to be 
“judged by themselves, removed of all trimmings, [and] in particular, 
the subsequent parliamentary debates”. B^^m maintained that Frick’s 
speeches, in which he identified Jews as the “foreign and racially- 
foreign forces”, were made with an “unambiguous irony”.160
Wirth answered that he attributed “a great and pressing 
significance” to the matter. Wirth asked Baum to repeal immediately 
prayers 2, 3, and 4 without further discussion with the church and 
teachers’ organisations; otherwise he would exercise his
ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 BH.89-90 Baum to Wirth, 20 May 1930, excerpts in,
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constitutional authority, which included the right of appeal to the 
State Supreme Court.’®’ Baum, replying on 24 May, said he too wanted 
the matter to be conducted with a view to a speedy and final 
clarification, but felt “great regret” that the Court was to be invoked 
by the Reich government before the conclusion of the proposed 
discussions. He revealed that the Thuringian government had 
deliberated Wirth’s request to revoke the three contested prayers, but 
had been unable to decide the question of annulment before the 
outcome of the talks. Baum claimed his government was especially 
loath to do this since the Landtag had rejected another SPD resolution 
to annul the decree, but had accepted a resolution calling for the 
continuation of the prayers. Baum said his government would abide 
by a verdict of the Court, although he hoped that it would not 
intervene until after the discussions had finished. But if the Court had
already been invoked, the discussions would continue: only when 
they had been concluded would the Thuringian government come to 
any decision over the prayers’ recommendation.* 161 162
Thuringia to the State Supreme Court, [6] June 1930
161 BABL, R 43 12315 B1.281 W.T.B. “Das Schreiben des Reichsinnenminister Dr. Wirth
an Staatsminister Baum”, 23 May 1930
'®2 BABL, R 43 12315 Bl.282 W.T.B. “Das Schreiben des thuringischen
Staatsministeriums an den Reichsinnenminister”, 28 May 1930
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In view of the Thuringian government's refusal to revoke the 
prayers, Wirth invoked the Court under articles 15 and 19 of the 
Reich Constitution.’®’ The Thuringian government was informed by 
the Court of Wirth’s step.’®4 The two sides dispatched their claims 
and counterclaims. The case was to be heard on Friday, 11 July.’® 
Although the dispute had only arisen a fortnight before, Wirth 
appears to have been determined to avoid a repetition of the police 
subsidies conflict and of being ‘strung along’ by the Thuringian 
government.
The Case before the State Supreme Court for the German
Reich
Zweigert, Wirth’s State Secretary, said the Reich government 
had not found it easy to bring the matter to the Court’s attention, but 
the step had been essential since the Thuringian government had 
refused to withdraw the decr'ee. “[T]he Reich government has 
attributed [a] fundamental significance to the resolution of this
I®' ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B1l.71-74 Wirth to State Supreme Court, 26 May 1930 
1®4 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011. Bl.81 State Supreme Court to Thuringia, 27 May 1930 
I®® See ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B11.^1, 85-92, 108-113, 11(5 for the correspondence
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question. School prayers may not be misused to prepare the way for 
party political goals and injure the feelings of dissenters.” Zweigert
explained that the Reich government’s interpretation of the prayers - 
including their sense and meaning - had been arrived at only through 
an analysis of the prayers’ wording, and from Frick’s statements in the 
Reichstag and in the Landtag. “[N]o doubt can exist that the prayers 
... are against the Jews and social democrats”. The prayers, Zweigert 
continued, were indefensible on the basis of their wording alone; and 
the Thuringian government’s attempt to attribute another meaning to 
the prayers after the fact “can be described as unsuccessful. The 
prayers are directed against the Jews. Thereby, a programme point of 
the National Socialist Party is made the content of school prayers.”* 166
Turning to the subject of opposition to the prayers, Zweigert 
claimed that the discussions in the Reichstag and in newspapers 
agreed with his government’s interpretation. Ecclesiastical circles had 
described the prayers as “profanation [Profanierung] and blasphemy”, 
with both the Thuringian Church and Thuringian teachers aligning 
themselves against the prayers. The teachers’ association had, in fact,
between the State Supreme Court, Wirth, and Thuringia, late May and late June 1930
166 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bll.3-4 W.T.B. “Die Thuringer Schulgebete vor dem 
”, 11 July 1930
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designated the school prayers decree as “one of the most questionable 
measures in scholastic policy since the founding of the state of 
Thuringia”.167 It was undeniable, Zweigert continued, that sections of 
the German population, who had different political outlooks to 
National Socialists, were characterised as practitioners of deception 
and treason, and that Divine punishment should be meted out to 
them. As a consequence, not only were the prayers bound to injure 
broad sections of the German people, but also those who held religion 
in high regard when prayers were misused for party political 
purposes. Moreover, it was irreconcilable with the principles of the 
Christian Church to call for God’s punishment of dissenters. 
Zweigert believed that all Germans - save Nazis and Communists - 
would be injured by the prayers.’68
At this point Geheimer Konsistorialrat Dr. Eger and Prelate 
Mausbach gave their expert ecclesiastical opinions on behalf of the 
Reich government.’6® Supplementing Zweigert’s arguments, Dr. Eger
167 See ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1C^11 Bll.94-96 Thuringer Lehrerverein to ThVbMin, 6
May 1930
I®® BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.4 W.T.B. “Die Thuringer Schulgebete vor dem Staatsgerichtshof 
”, 11 July 1930
I®® BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.4 W.T.B. “Fortsetzung und SchluE von ‘die Thuringer 
Schulgebete vor dem Staatsgerichtshof ’ ”, 11 July 1930
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admitted that Germany’s economic situation ought be considered in 
schools, but the prayers were offensive. Eger argued that the prayers 
“signified an injuring of Protestant feeling if the prayers were so used 
as to make God an implement of human wrath and human hate 
against other people”. Prelate Mausbach agreed that patriotic 
schooling in prayers was “permissible and authorised”. However, he 
saw the prayers as “clear announcements of struggle”, not against 
foreign countries, but against sections of the population. “The 
recommendation of such disputed prayers does not conform to the 
spirit of Jesus Christ”. Mausbach believed it was “no accident” that 
the prayers not only injured the feelings of dissenters but practising
Christians also.
The Thuringian government then argued its case.”® 
Ministerialrat Geheimrat Schnobel (Thuringian Education Ministry) 
regretted that his government had not been granted the opportunity 
to discuss and resolve the matter’ with the religious and teaching 
organisations since the Reich government had immediately invoked 
the Court, even though Schnobel believed that the matter could be
resolved since the doubts were not “of such a fundamental manner”.
BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.4 W.T.B. “Fortsetzung und Schlufi. von ‘die Thuringer
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Schnobel claimed that Frick’s remarks in the Reichstag and the 
Landtag had been provoked by Social Democrats, and argued, like 
Baum, that they were “to some extent ironical and were not meant 
seriously”. Schnobel argued that his government believed that the 
decree had not violated article 148 of the Reich Constitution, since 
dissenters did not have to participate in the prayers and therefore 
their feelings would not be injured. The Thuringian government, said 
Schnobel, had not wanted to exert any influence upon teachers, and 
had withdrawn the request for reports from school authorities; those 
reports, which the government had received, had revealed no 
difficulties. Any contestable interpretation of the prayers had only 
acquired such an aspect because they had been interpreted in a party 
political manner; The Bible, Schnobel maintained, contained Psalms 
and passages in much the same manner as the prayers.™
Ministerialrat Gerstenhauer doubted that the Court could 
arbitrate in this case. He argued that, according to the Thuringian 
Constitution, only the Landtag could lay charges against a minister, 
and only the Thuringian State Supreme Court could decide whether a
Schulgebete vor dem Staatsgerichtshof 11 July 1930
171 BABL, R 43 1^2316 Bl4 W.T.B. “Fortsetzung und SchluE von ‘die Thtlringer
Schulgebete vor dem Staatsgerichtshof' ”, 11 July 1930
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minister had acted illegally or not. The Reich Constitution simply did 
not allow the Reich government to suspend the measures of a Land 
government. Gerstenhauer rejected any idea of banning all national 
sentiments in schools since the Reich Constitution defined them as
German establishments. The sole cause of the Reich government’s 
objection was the reference to “foreign and racially-foreign. forces”. “It 
can only be said that these forces are one of the causes of the German 
distress”. The reference to “deception and treason” referred to high 
treason, but did not place all the blame on “foreign and racially- 
foreign forces”. Therefore, argued Gerstenhauer, all attempts to 
characterise the prayers as unconstitutional failed. Gerstenhauer 
claimed that the decree had not originated with Frick, but rather the 
Deutsche'Christlichm Arhettsgrnieinschaft des Grofidcutschlands which had 
drawn up the prayers, an organisation which had “nothing to do with 
politics”. From the perspective of the prayers, “deception and treason”
meant Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the ‘War Guilt Lie’. 
Gerstenhauer argued that the prayers strove after external liberation, 
and internal moral liberation from evil as understood by the Lord’s 
Prayer’. All the parties represented in the Thuringian Landtag, with 
the exception of the SPD, KPD and DDP had approved of the
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172prayers.17
The Court’s Decision
Before turning to the question of the prayers' constitutional 
validity, the Court dealt with the question of whether this dispute fell 
within its jurisdiction. The Court answered that it was indeed 
authorised on two counts. Firstly, under article 15 of the Reich 
Constitution, the Reich government had the right to supervise the 
implementation of its laws by the Lander, and ask them to correct any 
deficiencies within the legislation. This right, the Court argued, also 
extended to the provisions of the Reich Constitution, since these 
provisions determined the parameters within which the legislation 
was enacted and executed, and the Constitution’s provisions on 
education were a case in point. Therefore, the Court accepted that 
Wirth was perfectly entitled to invoke the Court, since article 15 of 
the Reich Constitution allowed such a move if a dispute arose 
between the Reich and a Land government. Secondly, should article 
15 have not sufficed, article 19 allowed the invocation of the Court by 172
172 BABL, R 43 1/7316 B15 W.T.B. “Fortsetzung und Schluft von ‘die Thuringer 
Schulgebete vor dem Staatsgerichtshof ’ ”, 11 July 1930
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a Reich or Land government over any matter other than a civil 
dispute, The Court rejected the Thuringian government’s argument
that only its own State Supreme Court was the only judicial body 
competent to handle the matter, since the argument was clearly 
between the governments of the Reich and Thuringia.173
Following an examination of how and why article 148 became 
incorporated into the Reich Constitution, the Court argued that from 
the wording of paragraph 2, which stated that “in giving instruction 
in public schools, care must be taken not to give offence to the 
susceptibilities of those holding different views”,174 that this clause 
established “general tolerance as the guiding principle” for the giving 
of instruction schools, i.e. instruction was to avoid injuring the 
feelings of dissenters. Moreover, this regulation was not solely 
directed at teachers, but also the Lander who, according to article 144, 
were responsible for the supervision of the entire school system. The 
Court stipulated that article 148, paragraph 2 was a “legal obligation” 
upon those giving instruction in subjects where there were 
contrasting opinions and interpretations. Therefore, in every school
173 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B11.141RS-M2 Judgement of the State Supreme Court, 11 
July 1930; Hucko, ThcDemocraticTradition, pp.152-453, 154
174 See Hucko, ThcDemocraticTradition, p.l82
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where this was the case, care had to be taken not cause offence. It was 
obligatory to take into account the feelings of dissenters, although it
was not prohibited “to discuss impartially ... questions of religion, 
history, or politics, and to take an opinion on them, but it is forbidden 
to do this in a manner which insults dissenters [and which] appears 
as a disparagement of their individual views and causes them 
distressing and painful feelings in them.” The Court further ruled that 
what was said in schools passed on to the families of pupils, and then 
to the general public. This dissemination of views and opinions would 
injure feelings of dissenters, and this also had to be considered when 
giving instruction in schools. The Court argued that article 148, 
paragraph 2 protected the feelings of dissenters without 
consideration of the fact of whether those feelings were deemed to be 
authorised or not by those giving instruction. No belief was 
“objectively correct”, but in practice this meant that other opinions 
were to be “preserved”, i.e. respected.175
In view of this, the Court stated that the Thuringian 
government’s prayers, and the disputed passages within them, were 
not compatible with the Reich Constitution. The Court ruled that the
175 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B1L142-144RS Judgement of the State Supreme Court, 11
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Thuringian governments argument that the prayers could only be 
judged upon their wording, irrespective of the decree and Frick’s 
statements, was insufficient. The Court argued that the decree and 
Frick’s explanations of it could not be “disregarded”, since the prayers 
could not be understood by their wording alone, least of all by the 
schools which had to know “from what grounds and to what 
purpose” they had been sent the prayei’s. The Thuringian government 
could not, ruled the Court, now push such ‘yardsticks’ to one side - 
they had to be used in the evaluation. Therefore, when the decree and 
Frick’s statements were considered together there was no doubt that 
the contested passages and prayers were against the political views of 
broad sections of the German population, and that they did contain a 
“confession of anti-Semitism” by stigmatising Jews, and others, as
“deceivers” and “traitors”.
Similarly, the claim by the Thuringian government that it had 
not ordered the introduction of the prayers, for the decree’s statement 
that schools were to report back on the extent to which the prayers 
had been accepted, and on any difficulties encountered, was rejected 
by the Court. The Education Ministry “expected and demanded an
July 1930
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account if they were not introduced”. The Court asserted that such a 
“recommendation ... is equal to a decree”, since article 148, paragraph 
2 placed an obligation upon the authorities responsible for 
instruction in schools to discontinue everything which would effect 
an offence against the provision. The Court determined that even if 
the Thuringian Education Ministry had merely “suggested” the 
prayers, an offence would still have been committed since the content 
of the prayers had made it plain to teachers to “turn against the 
definite political views of a definite group of citizens in the manner as 
it occurs in the contested passages of the prayers”. Even the 
recommendation that teachers were to encourage pupils to write 
their own prayers in a similar vein contradicted article 148, paragraph 
2. In fact, it allowed the violation to be thrown into “sharper relief”. 
Following a short recapitulation of the Court’s viewpoint the Reich’s 
petition was granted.176
On 19 September 1930, Thuringia’s Education Ministry 
announced that the State Supreme Court had judged prayers 2, 3 and 
4 to be incompatible with article 148, paragraph 2 of the Reich
176 ThHStAW, ThVbMin A/1011 B11.145-14Z Judgement of the State Supreme Court, 11
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Constitution.177 The decree was not withdrawn formally until 19 June 
1931, and there was no reference to the Court’s decision of the
previous year.1’8 Willy Kastner, Frick’s successor as Education 
Minister, stated that the Ministry reserved the right to lay down - in 
conjtmctran with Thurmgia’s Ctorch and trachere - prinripks for
“appropriate” prayers.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the second of Frick’s ministerial
competencies, that of Education Minister. It examined Frick’s 
successful acts in this area: the appointment of the Nazi Fachreferenten, 
Schultze-Naumburg, and Gunther; the origins of the Wider die 
Negerkultur decree, and its implementation in musical, theatrical, film 
and artistic matters; the introduction of the colonial thinking decree 
and the Auslanddeutschtum decree in schools; and the banning of the 
book All Quiet in the Western Front. The chapter also considered Frick’s
July 1930
177 Amtshlatt des Thuringischen Ministeriums far Volksbildung, 1930, nr.!4, 22 September 1930,
p.95
178 Amtshlatt desThttringischeti Ministeriums far Volksbildung, 1931, nr.12, 6 July 1931, p. 87
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failures, which were much more usual; the conflict with Reich
Interior Minister Severing over the Bund Adler und Falken; the attempt
to ban Schund- und Schmutzliteratur; and the conflict with Reich Interior
Minster Wirth over the School Prayers’ Decree leading to Frick’s 
comprehensive defeat at the hands of the State Supreme Court:.
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Frick’s Relationship with his Coalition Partners
In his post-war memoirs Georg Witzmann (DVP) recorded that
the DNVP, DVP, WP, and LB had all failed to take into account 
Nazism’s “principle of the uncompromising and exclusive totality”, 
which would have made any “honourable coalition” with the NSDAP 
“impossible from the outset.” This initial “error in the whole 
calculation”, which all the parties, including the DVP, had made, meant 
that the coalition with Frick would break up “sooner or later”.1 It was 
unlikely that any government party would suddenly and/or willingly 
defect to the opposition since they had all had rejected a coalition with 
the SPD,1 2 the largest party in the Landtag. Any desertion from the 
government was likely only after one or more of its constituent parties 
had repudiated the idea of collaboration with Frick and refused to 
continue working with him.
Of all parties in the coalition, the DVP was the most liable to 
dissent. Frick’s entry into the government had essentially come about 
because the DVP’s financial backers - possibly at Hitler’s bequest - had
1 G. Witzmann, Thuringen von 1918-1933: Erinnenmgcn eines Politikers (Meisenheim am Gian, 
1958), pp.155-156
2 Witzmann, Tktiringcn von 1918-1933, p. 153
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coerced the party into joining the government. Yet in order to bring 
about any defection of the DVP both opportunity and method were 
needed. The opportunity to cross over was supplied by the SPD by 
tabling motions of no confidence in Frick in the hope that one or more of 
the coalition parties would vote in favour. Eventually the DVP did so, 
but it did not willingly ‘cross the floor’ to the SPDT<PD-DDP 
opposition, but only after Frick and the Thuringian NSDAP provided all 
the justification the DVP needed to overcome its dislike and hostility 
towards the SPD.
On 12 March 1930, Frick exploited his position as one of 
Thuringia’s two chief plenipotentiaries (Hauptbevollmdchtigke) to the 
Reichsrat to denounce the Young Plan in a session of the Reichstag? 
Frick’s “biting commentary”4 surprised his coalition allies as much as it 
did the Reichstag since Frick had been not authorised by the Thuringian 
government to make any statement on the Young Plan, and the DVP 
began to distance itself from Frick?
3 Frick’s speech is in Verhandlungen des Reichstags IV. Wahlperiode, Band 427, p.4392, col.II' 
p.4393, col.I
4 The phrase is Goebbels’. See Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebticher von Joseph Goebbels. Teil 1, Band I, 
p.514, entry of 14 March 1930
5 See BAK, NL1002/61 Bl.9 Bauer and Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27 June 1930
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The DVP considered Frick’s Reichstag speech an affront to the
Reich government and its foreign policy, all the more since the DVP fully 
supported it. During the formation of the Thuringian government the 
DVP had been given numerous assurances that questions of foreign 
policy would remain in the background in order to facilitate inter-party 
co-operation. Frick, as the Thuringian government’s Reichsrat 
plenipotentiary, had made his speech in the government’s name. The 
DVP was surprised by Frick’s action since it was given “without the 
permission and without the knowledge of the Thuringian government”.® 
The consequence of Frick’s “unprecedented conduct” was that the DVP 
refused to participate in any government discussions until Frick had 
given his assurance that he had not spoken as a member of the 
Thuringian government/ On the Tuesday it was reported that there had 
been an extra two cabinet meetings in order to resolve the dispute. 
Those government parties (DNVP, WP, and LB) which shared the 
NSDAP’s views on the Young Plan wanted a government statement that 
would cover Frick’s declaration, whilst the DVP wanted a statement 
saying that Frick had behaved “in a careless manner”. Inter-party 
discussions remained curtailed, and the Allgemeine Thuringische
® WeimarischeZeitung, “Neue Regierungskrise?”, 13 March 1930
7 AUgemeine Thuringische Landeszcitung Deutschlands, “Tharingens Innenminister zum
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Landeszeitung Deutschlands believed an agreement was unlikely since the 
NSDAP would not make any concessions, and Willy Marschler had
raised the possibility of new Landtag elections during an NSDAP 
meeting.8 9The conflict finally ended when the Thuringian government 
issued a statement saying that Frick had not been authorised to make 
his statement in the Reichstag. However, and what is perhaps 
significant, the statement continued by saying that the content and 
wording of Frick’s speech covered the views of the majority of cabinet 
members.
The DVP responded to this snub by saying that even if Frick’s 
statements had coincided with the majority view of the Thuringian 
government, the government’s statement had not given Frick retroactive 
authority to make his statement!
Gunther Neliba, however, believes it is “unlikely” that Frick had 
not been given permission to speak on Thuringia’s behalf,10 since the 
Thuringian cabinet’s resolution of 29 January instructed its Reichsrat
Young=Plan”, 13 March 1930
® AUgemeine Thuringische Landeszcitung Deutschlands, “Die Regierungskrise in Thuringen”, 14 
March 1930 (“Politisches aus Thuringen” column)
9 AUgemeine Thuringische Landeszcitung Deutschlands, “Keine Regierungskrise in Thuringen”, 15 
March 1930; WeimarischeZeitung, “Der Thtlringer Konfiikt beilegt”, 14 March 1930
10 G. Neliba, “Wilhelm Frick und Thuringen ais Experimentierfeld ftir die 
nationalsoziaiistische Machtergreifung”, in D. Heiden and G. Mai (eds.), Nationalsozialismus in
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plenipotentiary to vote against the Young Plan , " and a cabinet resolution
of 12 March instructed its deputy plenipotentiary to issue a protest in 
the Reichsrat/2 These two resolutions mention the plenipotentiary and 
deputy plenipotentiary by title, not by name, and the distinction is 
important since Thuringia’s representation in the Reichsrat consisted of 
two different groups - politicians and civil servants. Baum and Frick in 
their respective roles as Minister-President and deputy Minister- 
President were the Thuringian government’s chief plenipotentiaries in 
the Reichsrat, whilst Willy Kastner, Thuringia’s Justice and Economics 
Minister, was deputy pler^^paotei^'^i^ia^]:.^.” The civil servants 
B^^^o^Ll^l^^c^l^^igte Minister Dr. Hermann Munzel and Ministerialrat Dr. 
Metzler were deputy plenipotentiaries also.14 It is possible that Frick 
sought to exploit the ambiguity of who was to speak on Thuringia’s 
behalf for the NSDAP’s ends. Frick had decided himself that morning to
Thtiringen (Weimar/CologneWienna, p.78
u ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 B1.128 3rd sitting of the State Ministry, 29-30 January 1930. Frick
was present at this session. Bauer (DVP) was the only cabinet member to vote against the resolution. 
See Allgemeine Thuringische Landeszciiimg Deutschlands, “Die Thuringische Regierung gegen den 
Young=Plan”, 31 January 1930
12 ThHStAW, ThStMin/60 Bl.150 8th sitting of the State Ministry, 12 March 1930. Frick was 
absent at this meeting.
13 Thttringisches Staatsministerium (ed.), Amts- und Nachrichtenhlatt far Thtiringen. I. Teil. 
Regienmgshlatt, 10. Jahrgang, 1930 (Weimar, n.d.), nr.8, 25Januar 1930, p.l7
14 Amts- und Nachrichtenhlatt, 1930, p. 17
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denounce the Young Plan whilst on the way to the Reichstag,15 *and had 
done so without Hitler’s prior knowledge, let alone sanction, since
Hitler was forced to deny that he had not supported Frick’s action®
The denouement to the episode involved the Thuringian
government issuing of regulations regulating statements in the 
Reichstag by either members of its govermnent, or its plenipotentiaries
to the Reichsrat.17 18 *
Less than a week later Witzmann (DVP) publicly complained 
that his party’s attempts to work within the government had been 
“repeatedly impeded through [the] unfounded and insulting attacks”/ 
made upon it by members of the coahtion parties, and even by 
government members. Witzmann admitted that from the beginning of 
the coalition’s existence the DVP acknowledged that relations “would 
not always be easy”, yet it had hoped that differences over the policies of 
the Reich government - especially the Young Plan - would retreat into 
the background/ To Witzmann’s regret, this had not happened. For
7 H. Fabricius, Dr. Wilhebn Frick. FinLcbcnsbild desReichsministers desInnern (Berlin, 1938), p. 16
7 VdlkischeBcobachter, “Adolf Hitler dankt Dr. Frick”, 18 March 1930 .
17 See ThHStAW. ThVbMin A/60 BU.85-87
18 Stenographische Berichtc uber die Sitzungen des Ftinften Landtags von Thliringen. Band I. 1. bis 35. 
Sitzung(7.]anuarbis23.Mai 1930), (Weimar, n.d.), 11 sitting, 18 March 1930, p.229, col.II
/ See Witzmann, Jhuringenvon 1918-1933, pp. 157-158
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instance, despite assurances to the DVP, the cabinet had dispatched a 
telegram to Reich President Hindenberg asking him to prevent the 
Young Plan from becoming law. Witzmann argued that Frick’s attack 
upon the Young Plan in the Reichsrat seriously endangered the 
coalition. So anxious was Witzmann to preserve the coalition he asked 
Frick and the NSDAP not to make further co-operation impossible ' and 
warned against “going too far”. It was, Witzmann claimed, up to Frick 
and the NSDAP if they wanted to avoid a renewed government crisis, 
which would be catastrophic for Thuringia. If Frick and the NSDAP 
were as serious as they claimed to be about serving the interests of 
Thuringia, Witzmann said that they must have the necessary respect for 
their coalition partners more than ever before.20 * 22
On 3 April 1930, only ten weeks after Frick had joined the 
government, the Landtag debated the SPD’s first motion of no 
confidence against him?1 Given that it was his party’s motion,! August 
Frolich failed to make much of the opportunity. Even though he argued 
that the NSDAP’s behaviour after Frick had become Minister was on a
20 StenographischcBerichtc, Band I, p.230, col.I-II
2 Stenographische Berichte, Band 119th sitting, 3 April 1930, p.391, col.l-p.410, col. l. Frick was 
not present.
22 Vorlagen, AntrUge, und Grasse Anfragen des Fanften Landtags von Thtiringen 1930-1932 (Weimar,
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par with its activity in Bavaria before Hitler’s Putsch and Mussolini’s 
fascists before the ‘March on Rome’, Frolich stopped short of accusing 
the NSDAP of using Frick’s ministerial position to prepare for a head-on
clash with the Reich authorities. Instead, Frolich merely asserted that 
Frick was not fit to be a minister since his activities, such as wearing his 
NSDAP badge in the Reichstag, constituted a breach of discipline as a 
member of the governmmt.23
Friedrich Heilmann, leader of the KPD, chose to open his speech 
not with an attack on Frick, but ironically, on the SPD. Heilmann 
scorned the SPD’s claims of being tough on Frick since the SPD, whilst 
it had been in the Reich government, had done nothing to obstruct him. 
Similarly, the SPD’s motion of no-confidence in Frick was of no more 
value than the “paper war” that had been initiated against him by Carl 
Severing, the SPD’s ex-Reich Interior Minister. Heilmann accused the 
SPD of tabling the motion solely because it was no longer a part of the 
Reich governmmt”
Heilmann viewed Frick’s actions as proof that the NSDAP was an 
agent of heavy industry, and claimed that Frick’s previous activity in 
Bavaria in 1923 showed how he had used a government position to
n,d.), nr. 157,27 March 1930, p.43. Willy Marschler, the NSDAP’s Staatsrat was ignored.
23 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.392, col.I-p.393, col.I
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secure and advance the position of the NSDAP and its industrial 
paymasters.24 5 Like Frolich, Heilmann asserted that Frick was using 
Thuringia as a base to build up the NSDAP in the rest of Germany. 
Heilmann, however, went further than Frolich when he claimed that 
Hitler’s policies were the result of an understanding with Frick’s 
coalition partners, and that these policies were in full agreement with 
the dictates of heavy industry.26 In conclusion, Heilmann argued, as he 
had done earlier/7 that the SPD’s motion of no confidence in Frick was 
worthless since little could be achieved in the Landtag against fascism 
with a vote of this kind. Yet, he argued, albeit contradictorily, that the 
KPD would support the SPD’s motion since the KPD believed in using 
all parliamentary means whilst organising the extra-parliamentary fight 
against Frick..28
In response, Paul Papenbroock (NSDAP) denied that Frick’s 
policies were in any way responsible for Thuringia’s situation, rather it 
was the “absurd foreign policy of the Reich”. He claimed that Nazi 
participation in government came about from the NSDAP’s feeling of
24 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.393, col.II-p.394, col.I
7® Stenographische Berichte, Band 1, p.395, col. l, p.397, col.I, p.399, col. I
7® Stenographische Berichte, Band 1, p.399, col.II-p.400, col.II
27 See Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.393, col.II, p. 395, col. I
7 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.401, coLI-II. See also ibid., p. 399, col.l
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responsibility towards the population of Thuringia. Papenbroock 
argued this meant “an enormous sacrifice” for the NSDAP since it would 
not, and could not, pursue its policies given Thuringia’s position. 29 30 *
Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel mocked the SPD by claiming that its motion of 
no confidence would actually strengthen Frick’s position. Like 
Heilmann, Sauckel identified the cause of the SPD’s motion as the 
“boundless stupidity” of Severing and the SPD. Frick, said Sauckel, 
would remain in office much longer than the left desired, and all 
attempts by the SPD and the KPD would not distract the NSDAP from 
its work since all attempts were bound to fall®
Meanwhile, Witzmann stated there was no need for the DVP to 
repeat its view on Frick’s measures since this had not altered following 
the last time the DVP had made known its opinion. The DVP recognised 
that the SPD’s motion had been introduced in order to cause difficulty 
for the coalition parties, especially the DVP. Witzmann maintained that 
the DVP wanted the government to continue its collaboration and “lead 
the work begun to a successful end.” Accordingly, the DVP would vote 
against the motion, thus depriving the SPD of any chance of success®
22 Stenographische Berichtc, Band I, p.403, col.I
30 Stenographische Berichte, Band I, p.404, col.II
n StenographischeBerichte, Band I, p.409, col.ll-p.410, col.I
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When put to the vote the motion received 25 votes in favour,32 25 
against,33 and 3 abstentions. All 3 abstentions came from the ranks of the
DVP, including Witzmann himself.34
The DVP’s Relationship with Frick
During the negotiations in January to form the coalition, the DVP 
came under pressure from its own party elsewhere in Germany not to 
participate in government with Frick and the NSDAP. Five months later 
the DVP was still attracting criticism from within its own ranks.
In June, von Kardoff, a leading member of the DVP, argued that 
“parliamentary frivolity” was responsible for the DVP sitting with the 
NSDAP in the Thuringian government. Bauer, the DVP’s Staatsrat, and 
Witzmann told von Kardoff that he was “evidently mistaken” to believe 
that the sole outcome of the Landtag election was the present coalition. 
They claimed the DVP’s Thuringian leadership “would have been 
willing” (gewillt gewesen ware) to form a government with the SPD and
3218 SPD, 6 KPD, and 1 DDP.
33 6 NSDAP, 6 WP, 2 DNVP, 9 LB, and 2 DVP.
34 See Dcr Nationalsozialist, “Mifetrauens=Antrag gegen Minister Frick abgelehnt”, Folge 14; 
Volkischc Beobachtcr, “Ablehnung eines Mibtrauensantrag gegen Dr. Frick im Thuringer Landtag”, 5 
April 1930; Allgemeine Thuringische Landeszeitung Deutschlands, “StUrmische Szenen im Landtag von 
Thuringen. Ablehnung des Mibtrauensantrags gegen Staatsminister Dr. Frick mit 25 gegen 25 
Stimmen”; 4 April 1930; Weimarischc Zeitung, “Der MiLtrauensantrag gegen Dr. Frick abgelehnt!”, 4
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DDP, but pointed out that “nowhere in the party does the inclination 
exist or has existed”. The consideration of Thuringia’s position and the 
past reputation of the SPD were cited as the reasons why nothing had 
happened. In addition, they pointed out that an SPD-DDP-DVP 
government would not have had a majority in the Landtag. Von Kardoff 
had further angered Bauer and Witzmann by suggesting that the DVP 
should have demanded a dissolution of the Landtag. Bauer and 
Witzmann argued that any new election would not have produced a 
different result, and this, they feared, would have made the DVP 
responsible for aggravating Thuringia’s position.35
An anonymous paper revealed that the DVP believed it was 
“additionally decisive” (weitcr maflgebend) that the NSDAP was 
considered closer to the DVP “in important general-political and 
ideological [weltanschauuliche] questions” than the SPD. The DVP 
recognised that the NSDAP’s electorate was derived from socio­
economic and cultural groups that were associated with the DVP, and 
acknowledged that these groups, which had experienced downward 
mobility, had turned the NSDAP. Nevertheless, the DVP was optimistic
April 1930
35 BAK, NL1002/61 Bll.Z-8 Bauer and Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27June 1930
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that these groups “in the future shall sensibly come back to us”.36 The 
paper’s author(s) admitted that the NSDAP had received “a great rush 
from bourgeois circles” since the Nazis portrayal of themselves as 
strongly nationalistic and in favour of ‘order’ had won “the confidence of 
the broadest circles of the citizenry”. The DVP believed that such groups 
hoped that the NSDAP would ‘get tough’ on Marxism, but in fact the 
NSDAP had had “few successes” since membership in the SPD and the 
KPD had not changed. “What the National Socialists have won, they 
have fundamentally taken from the bourgeois parties. Through the 
disintegration of these circles, the Marxists have not been hurt”. The 
irony, the DVP argued, was that the NSDAP were in fact helpers of the 
Marxist parties.37 The DVP believed that the NSDAP would not have 
been so popular with the Thuringian public if they were not “taken as 
excessively important by the Reich”, arguing that the Reich Interior 
Minister Wirth and the social democratic press had given Frick and the 
NSDAP additional publicity.38
The DVP claimed to maintain a critical distance from Frick. Even
though the party opposed many of his actions, e.g. the ‘Reichsrat speech’
36 BAK, NL 1002/61 Bl.2 “Die DVP! und N.S. in Thuringen”. The author(s) and date of this 
document are not known, although internal evidence dates this document from June 1930 onwards 
through reference to the State Supreme Court’s decision in the school prayers dispute of July 1930.
37 BAK, NL 1002/61 Bll.3-4 “Die DVP! und N.S. in Thuringen”
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and the school prayers decree, the DVP had not left the government 
because Thuringia’s interests were deemed to stand “higher than party 
interests”. The Thuringian DVP opposed the view' of its Reich 
counterpart that Nazis, because of their political views, were unsuitable 
to be police directors. It was decisive for the DVP that both Georg 
Hellwig and Walter Ortlepp had sworn the civil service oath, pledging 
non-political execution of their official duties,® and that the NSDAP had 
repeated its disinterest in a violent overthrow of the Republis.® “We 
cannot understand, therefore, how these people can be fundamentally 
excluded from civil service posts, while it is tolerated - entirely 
irrespective of the strong saturation of the police with Social Democrats 
- that even Communists are Burgermeister and thereby exert an 
influence over the local police”. Even though the DVP claimed that its 
Staatsrat, Bauer, was “very frequently in the sharpest opposition to 
Frick”, the DVP supported the Thuringian government since the party 
believed that Wirth was not justified in banning the police subsidies.* 40 41 
Only when the DVP could no longer make its opinion known on
® BAK, NL 1002/61 Bl.5 “Die DVP! und N.S. in Thuringen"
® BAK, NL 1002/61 Bl.10 Bauer and Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27June 1930
40 See the anonymous comments in BAK, NL 1002/61 Bl.4 “Die DVP! und N.S. in Thuringen". 
See also Witzmann, Thtlringenvon 1918-1933, p.l67
41 BAK, NL 1002/61 Bl.lO Bauer and Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27 June 1930; See also 
Witzmann, Thuringen von 1918-1933, p.l67
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important issues, would it leave the coalition.42
The NSDAP had attempted to portray itself and Frick as the 
“saviours of Thuringia”, but the DVP pointed out that Frick “cannot 
actually find the time to save Thuringia” since he was running “two 
difficult ministries as someone not previously familiar with Thuringia’s 
conditions”, and was also busily occupied as the NSDAP’s Reichstag 
faction leader and a “political agitator”.43 44Frick and the NSDAP had made 
“next to no use of their socialism”, and constantly sought to blame “the 
evil Reich policy” - the Young Plan - for Nevertheless, this had not 
stopped the Nazi Party from claiming that it alone was responsible for 
the legislation improving Thuringia’s situation.45
The DVP claimed that its “stubborn fight” (zcihe Kampf) in the 
Landtag against the NSDAP would have been much easier if the LB and 
the WP had “not all too often in the past gone through thick and thin”
42 “[Tjhat is and shall be our most important concern.” See BAK, NL 1^02/61 Bl.ll Bauer and 
Witzmann to von Kardoff, 27June 1930.
43 BAK, NL 1^02/61 Bl.2 “Die DVP!”. See Landesbibliothek Coburg Nachlai Witzmann Ms 
451/2.4.3 “Frick und Genossen” (c.l946) Bl.2, and J. Grass, Studien zur Politik der bllrgerlichen Parteien 
Thuringens in dcr WeimarcrZcit 1920-1932 (Hamburg, 1997), p.313 for similar comments.
44 BAK, NL 1002/61 Bl.3 “Die DVP!”
43 For two examples see Vdlhischer Beobachter, “Die Rettung Thuringens. Fin Erfolg des 
Nationalsozialismus”, 20-21-22 April 1930, and Der Kampf in Thtiringen. Ein Bericht ttber die Tdtigkeit des 
ersten nationalsozialistischen Staatsministers um der fauringischen nationalsozialistischen Landtagfaktion (Weimar, 
n.d.), passim.
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with the NSDAP.* The situation, however, had since improved, with the 
LB now “sharply against” the NSDAP. Ties with the NSDAP, which had 
been necessary for passing legislation, “have unravelled or have become 
weaker”. The DVP felt much freer, but feared that the government might 
collapse. The DVP saw this as leading to either the end of Thuringian 
independence, or a coalition with the SPD, which, the DVP recognised, 
would mean a coalition effectively run by the SPD, given its 18 seats in 
the Landtag. The DVP felt that the question of whether it would have to 
make smaller sacrifices in a coalition with the SPD, given its “radical 
attitude”, rather than with the NSDAP, was one which the DVP’s
electorate would answer with a ‘no’.* 47 48
On 4 July 1930, the SPD’s second motion of no confidence in 
Frick* was debated in the Landtag.49 August Frolich (SPD) initiated the 
debate by attacking Frick’s dismissal of Landrate by saying that this had 
happened in contravention to the assurance to the Reich government 
that there would not be any further dismissal (Ahhau) of staff under the
* BAK, NL 1002/61 Bll.5-6 “Die DVP!”
47 BAK, NL 1002/61BL6 “Die DVP!”
48 Vorlagcn, Antclgc, and Grasse Anfragen, nr.lll, 27 June 11930. The SPD also tabled a motion of no 
confidence against Willy Marschler, the NSDAP’s Staatsrat. See, ibid., nr. 110, 27 June 1930
* Stenographische Berichtc ilber die Sitzungen des Fanften Landtags von Thttringen. Band II. 36. bis 96. 
Sit%ing(2.]uni 1930 bis 29. Mai 1931), (Weimar, n.d.), p.ll6)1, col.Dp.1205, col.II
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Enabling Act. Frolich singled out Baum for alleging that the decision of 
the Reichsgericht was not important, even though Baum had abstained 
from voting on the dismissal of the Landrate.50 Frolich argued that 
Frick’s behaviour in the school prayers dispute had abused his cabinet 
colleagues by first saying that his comments about the prayers were 
ironic, and then later said that his statements were meant in all 
seriousness. Frolich pointed out the irony that one of the school prayers, 
which referred to treason, could be applied to Frick because of his 
participation in Hitler’s Munich Putsch. Frolich sarcastically called 
Frick “a worthy successor of the great Goethe” and called Frick’s 
behaviour “cultural barbarism” (Kulturvcrwildcrung), recognisable from 
the manner in which the NSDAP behaved in the Landtag. “That 
[cultural barbarism] is the new spirit, which has made its entrance in 
Thuringia with Herr Frick and the National Socialists”.51 Frolich turned 
to Frick’s handling of the Thuringian police force and the dispute with 
the Reich government. Frolich argued that if Frick had nothing to hide 
he would have allowed a representative from the Reich government to 
Thuringia to investigate the matter, but Frick had rejected this since he 
was misusing the Thuringian police force to further the NSDAP’s aims.
50 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1162, col.kp.1166, col.ii
51 StenographischeBerichte, Band II, p. 1167, col.Ikp.1169, col.I
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Frolich mocked claims that Frick would support and protect the Reich
constitution. He claimed that Frick had the intention to make the Reich 
Constitution invalid within Thuringia, even though Frick constantly 
accused Wirth of violating the Reich Constitution. The standard of the 
Thuringian Landtag had sunk lower than previously thought possible 
since the NSDAP had been putting their “yob politics” (Radaupolitik) into
effect. Frick’s accusation that the conference of Lander Ministers of late
May was of low repute had also contributed to the intensification of the 
conflict between the Reich and Thuringia, and it was understandable, 
said Frolich, that the conference’s participants had turned away from a 
man “who can only belittle and insult”.52 53Froiich quickly dealt with 
Willy Marschler, the NSDAP’s Staatsrat. Marschler had boasted that if 
the police subsidies remained banned the NSDAP would set up a 
Thuringia police militia wearing brown shirts. Frolich refused to take 
Marschler seriously, since he believed that Marschler could only make 
such threats in public and did not have the courage to do as he
threatened.”
Kallenbach, the sole DDP member in the Landtag, believed that 
the vote of no-confidence would receive a majority, but feared that it
52 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1.1Z0, col.I-1172, col.II
53 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1172, col.II-p.1173, col.I
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would not be sufficient to force Frick to step down,” though Kallenbach 
did not believe that Frick was “sensitive” enough to give up power 
without being forced to, since Hitler’s concept of participation in 
government was a means for the seizure of power. Hitler’s idea, the DDP 
representative believed, was to get rid of the present Reich government 
by undermining it through the use of power and in order to construct a 
‘Third Reich’ in which Hitler would be the dictator, and Kallenbach 
accused “inactive parties” of being the NSDAP’s “stirrup-holders”. Using 
legislation, especially in the areas of administration and personnel 
policy, the NSDAP was attempting to “realise its principles and seize 
power in the state”.” Kallenbach argued that the government was 
completely under the influence of the NSDAP, and the effects of Frick’s 
administrative measures were ever more noticeable. Io his opinion a 
severe crisis of state was brewing over the police subsidies dispute. If 
the State Supreme Court did not rule that the ban on the subsidies was 
unconstitutional financial pressures would lead to a crisis within 
Thuringia, or political pressure would lead to a crisis with the Reich 
government. Marschler’s threat of establishing a militia would lead to a 
“most severe conflict” with the Reich and could lead to a situation
” Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1173, col.II-p.1174, col.I 
55 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1174, coI.I-p.1174, col.II
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similar to that of 1923 when the Reichswehr intervened in Thuringia. 
Kallenbach believed that the Thuringian government did not desire the 
conflict with the Reich government but had to continually tolerate 
Frick’s behaviour.
Many of Frick’s actions had been declared illegal, invalid or 
unconstitutional, and Kallenbach mentioned Frick’s appointment of 
Schultze-Naumburg as an example of the ‘cushy job’ politics 
(Futt:crkrippci^n9<^0lt:iJk)y which “was never so evident and manifest as in this 
Landtag”.” Kallenbach believed that under normal circumstances any 
minister who was guilty of such behaviour would not have been allowed 
to remain in office, and he repeated that the vote of no confidence would 
be passed with a majority, but that Frick would be incapable of drawing 
conclusions from this. Kallenbach accused the DVP of wanting to ignore 
the vote, adding that they had taken on a “huge responsibility” when the 
DVP had “delivered over” the Interior and Education Ministries on the
order of Hitler. The DVP denied this, but Kallenbach argued that the 
existence of this order was openly known and accused the DVP of 
saying that there was nothing to be done. He asked the DVP how long 
they would put up with the situation.
Frolich accused the bourgeois parties of having “not summoned
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up the courage” to lead Thuringia in the direction they wished,” 
accusing the DVP of allowing Frick’s ideas to represent the ‘Spirit of 
Weimar’.” Heilmann (KPD) characterised the five months of Frick’s 
ministry as “a teasing game of footsie, ... a comedy act”. He argued that 
people should not be so excited by the fact that Frick had attempted to 
put Nazi ideas into practice since it was known what type of Nazi Frick 
was and how he would behave in office. In view of this, and the 
complaints raised about Frick, those who had in their power to prevent 
Frick from becoming Minister had done nothing, rather they had 
accepted the assurances of both Hitler and Frick that the constitution 
would be recognised and protected by Frick.”
Heilmann believed that the DVP would not risk voting against 
the no-confidence motion, but would abstain, even though the motion 
would receive a majority of votes. Should this happen, Heilmann 
believed that Frick would not resign but would refer to the fact that 
under the Thuringian Constitution the vote did not have a sufficient 
enough majority to force him to resign. Heilmann then discussed the 
nature of the Thuringian government. He claimed that German
” Stenographischc Berichte, Band II, p. 117^-4, col.II-p.U75, col.I
” Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1175, col.I-II
” Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1177, col.II-p>.11.78, col.I
” Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1182, col.II-p.1183, col.I
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capitalism had attempted to bring the Nazis into government “on a trial 
basis”. “It [capitalism] wanted to put them to the test once, it wanted to 
give them [the NSDAP] the opportunity to show how far they are 
capable of carrying out the policy of large capitalism, with reference to 
the renunciation of their [Nazi] radical phrases. Well, five months have 
passed and the Nazis have passed their test splendidly.” In fact, the 
Nazis, according to Heilmann, had done more than the “most audacious 
hopes” put in them since they had “furnished the proof that they are 
worthy servants of the present rule of capitalism”.60 61
The response of the Nazi Party to this motion of no-confidence in 
Frick and Marschler was more concerned with proving that the SPD 
was in the pay of the French military rather than mounting a sustained 
defence of Frick’s period in office. Sauckel argued that Frolich’s attacks 
on Frick were a failure, claiming that Frick would be appreciated by the 
German population for many years to come for his activity in Thuringia, 
and he asked the DVP if they thought that they could have achieved the 
maintenance of Thuringia’s independence as a Land in a coalition with 
the SPD. 4
The DVP spoke only at the end of the debate. Witzmann said that
60 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 11183, col.I-col.II
61 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1190, col.I-p.1192, col.I
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the DVP answered only to its conscience, and would always do so, 
Witzmann then read out a statement. The DVP, he said, recognised that 
there were “fundamental differences” which separated his party and the 
NSDAP, and so made a collaboration between the two difficult. The 
manner in which leading Nazis in the Reich and in Thuringia had 
attacked the DVP had caused discord within the party’s ranks.62 The 
extent of the complaints, which had reached the Thuringian DVP’s 
leadership “clearly demonstrates what deep agitation has seized broad 
circles of our party”. It regretted that in spite of the “urgent warnings 
and resolute protests”, Bauer, its Staatsrat, had not been successful in 
preventing measures which the DVP believed would be ruled illegal by 
the State Supreme Court and the Reichsgericht. Witzmann said that if 
the DVP, which stated its “severe doubts ... in all openness and with all 
seriousness”, did not vote in the motion of no confidence it was because 
the DVP would not let its actions be determined by the “wishes and 
demands of other parties”, i.e. the NSDAP. When or if the time came for 
the DVP to withdraw its support from the Nazi members of 
government, Witzmann assured the Landtag that it would be solely due
62 The DVP had threatened to leave the coalition because of the NSDAP’s attacks against 
Stresemann and Hindenburg during the Saxon Landtag election campaign. See Vdlkischer Beohachter, 
“Deutsche Volkspartei droht wieder mit Austritt aus der Thtlringer Koalition”, 21 June 1930
290
chapter Six: Frick as coalition Minister
to the DVP’s judgement, not that of other parties . ”
This second no-confidence motion resulted in 25 votes for the 
motion, 22 against, with one absentee (Baum). All five members of the
DVP abstained.” Britain’s Ambassador reported to the Foreign Office 
that there were hopes that the vote would force Frick to resign, but that 
Frick had resisted, since Thuringia’s Constitution determined that a 
minister did not have to resign if less than 50% of a no-confidence vote 
went against them. However, “at the same time the fact that such a vote 
should have been passed by the Landtag has undoubtedly weakened 
Herr Frick’s position”.® Frick had now managed to survive a second vote 
of no confidence in him, but he was undoubtedly in a ‘minority’ position 
amongst the cabinet since he could no longer count upon the DVP.”
This situation, however, did not last long once the NSDAP had 
their spectacular breakthrough in the Reichstag elections of September
1930. * * *
63 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1205, col.l
64 Stenographische Berichte, Band II, p. 1205, col.l. Der Nationalsozialist, “Mihtrauensantrage 
gegen Frick und Marschler abgelehnt”, Folge 37; Volkische Beobachter, “Thuringer Landtag nimmt 
Mifitrauernantrag gegen Dr. Frick an”, 6-7 July 1930; Allgcmcine Thiiringische Landeszeitung Deutschlands, 
“Ablehnung der MiRtrauensantrage gegen Dr. Frick und Staatsrat Marschler Im Landtage”, 5 July 
1930; Weimarische Zcitimg, “Ablehnung der MiRtrauensantrage gegen Frick, und Marschler”, 5-6 July 
1930
” Comment by Newton, Britain’s Ambassador in Berlin, 15 July 1930. See C5822/140/18, FO 
37V14362
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Reichstag Elections
Thuringia, 1928 and 1930
(Source: G. Dressel (ed.), QuellniuyrcchichteThtiringens. Band IV. Wahlcn und Ahstimmungsogebnisse 1920­
1995 (Erfurt, 1995), pp.72-73, 94-95)
Donald Tracey has argued that if the Reichstag election of 
September 1930 is seen as a referendum on Frick, the result was 
“inconclusive, presenting neither a clear repudiation nor an outstanding 
endorsement of the NSDAP.”66 7 On the contrary, the Reichstag election of 
September 1930 confirmed and completed the process of electoral 
breakthrough of the Thuringian Nazi Party, a process that had taken 
less than twelve months. Even when factors such as the higher turn-out
66 Witzmann, Thiiringen von 191J^-1933, p.l74
67 D.R Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia, 1924-1930”, 
Central European History (i-March), Volume 8,1975, pp.46-47
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(both relative and absolute), the increase in spoilt papers, votes for 
minority parties, and the exclusion of Prussian government areas from 
Thuringia’s Reichstag constituency are taken into account® it is quite
clear that the NSDAP secured its breakthrough wholly at the expense of 
its coalition partners, the bourgeois parties. It is perhaps no coincidence 
that those which were squeezed the hardest - the DVP, the DNVP and 
the WP - were precisely those coalition parties which held the same 
number of seats or less in the Landtag than the NSDAP. Only the LB, 
which held more Landtag seats than the NSDAP, maintained its share of 
the vote in the Reichstag election. Similarly, the LB was the only 
coalition party to return more than one representative to the Reichstag. 
Both the DNVP and WP kept their sole representatives, whilst the 
DVP’s representation was reduced by half to one. The Nazi Party 
quadrupled its representation of Thuringia in the Reichstag.® In effect, 
the NSDAP had captured the three Reichstag seats returned to 
Thuringia following the Reichstag election of 19285™ Herbert Albrecht;® * * * *
® These areas were included in the Thuringian Reichstag constituency even though they did 
not vote in the Thuringian Landtag elections.
® For the comparisons see Reichstagsburo (ed.), Reichstag Handbuch. IV. Wahlperiode 1928 
(Berlin, 19:28), pp.212-214; and Reichstagsburo (ed.), Reichstag Handbuch. V. Wahlperiode 1930 (Berlin, 
1930), p.280
™ 1928 was the only Reichstag election in which Thuringia was allocated less than 20 seats 
in its Reichstag constituency.
71 M. Schumacher (ed.), M.dR. Die Reichstagsabgeordnete^i dcr Weimarer Republik in der Zeit der
293
Chapter Six: Frick as coalition Minister
Ernst Katzmann,72 Friedrich Triebel,73 and Frick’s Fachreferent Gustav 
ZunkeF74 replaced Franz Stohr,75 who had been Thuringia’s sole Nazi 
Reichstag representative since May 1924. The NSDAP was now only 
second to the SPD in terms of Reichstag representatives in Thuringia.76
Frick and the NSDAP
Hitler’s decision to participate in the Thuringian government had 
been a momentous move for the party. How did Hitler present this 
undertaking to Nazis like Otto Strasser™ who feared that participation 
in government would not only lead to a conflict of loyalty between the 
NSDAP’s programme and the government’s aims, but also saddle the 
Nazi Party with an unwanted share of the responsibility for the failure 
of the ‘System’?7™
Nationalsozialismus (Dusseldorf, 1994), p.92; Werist’sl 10. Auflage (Berlin, 193.5), p. 13 
™ Schumacher, M.dR, p.324; Werist’sl, p.789
73 Schumacher, M.dR., p.592; Werist’sl, p.1622
™ Schumacher, M.dR, p.639
75 Schumacher, MdR, p.569; Werist’s?, p.l.561
™ Frick headed the L^nd^^]Li:ste and the Reichsliste for the Reichstag election of 14
September 1930, though Frick was eventually elected to the Reichstag in Pfalz. See Allgemeinc 
Thfiringische Landeszcitung Deutschlands, “Die Thuringer Reichstagskandidaten der 
Nationalsozialistischen” (‘Politisches aus Thuringen’), 30 July 1930, and ibid., “Minister Dr. Frick und 
Abgeordnete Stohr nicht thuringische Reichstagsabgeordneten” (‘Politisches aus Thuringen’), 3 
October 1930
11 R. Kuhnl, Die nationalsozialistischcLinke 1925-1930 (Meisenheim am Gian, 1966), pp.224-229 
™ H. Fabricius, Geschichte dcr nationalsozialistische Bewegung, 2. Auflage (Berlin, 193.5), p.42; H.
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In a front-page article in VolMscher Beobachter two days after Frick 
became Minister, Hitler denied that participation in government was 
the result of any misguided notion that the NSDAP could “remove these 
authorities from the general destiny”. On the contrary, he argued that 
participation in government was a means of further broadcasting “the 
necessity of the victory of our idea”, which would contribute to the 
NSDAP’s success “by recognising the prerequisites for the salvation of
our Volk”.™
Hitler’s description of Frick as “one of our most tested fighters” 
was also intended to reassure doubters. Hitler argued that it was Frick’s 
duty to “represent the proclaimed National Socialist Will” within the 
Thuringian government and seize every opportunity, permitted by the 
Land’s constitution, to work for Thuringia, but “use the future for the 
German Volk”..0 Should some NSDAP members have remain unmoved. 
Hitler introduced a ‘get-out clause’ into his argument. He claimed that if 
a contradiction arose between Frick’s aims and the accomplishment of 
them, Frick would immediately resign from the government. Nazis, said 
Hitler, would not participate in government to represent the policies of
Fabricius, Dr.WilhelmFrick.EinLcCrnsbild desReichsministersdeslnnetm (Berlin, 1938), p.l5 
™ VolkischeBeohachter, “Nationalsozialistischen”, 25 January 1930 
80 VolkischeBeohachter, “Nationalsozialistischen”, 25 January 1930
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“foreign parties”, but the NSDAP’s Weltanschaiamg81
Frick would later claim that he had been in “very close contact
with Hitler” since the latter had visited him “very often”.82 When asked 
why Hitler had given him the post of Reich Interior Minister in January 
1933 Frick suggested it was the result of his activity in Thuringia: 
“During that time he had observed me and thought 1 had done a good 
job” 83 Similarly, Goebbels’ diary entries on Frick were equally positive, 
describing Frick as “dignified”,84 a “German Minister indeed” and a 
“great guy! [knorkerKerl!]”.85
The public representation of Frick was in much the same light. 
“In the last few months hardly any man has stood at the centre of the 
domestic political struggle like the first minister of the NSDAP”.86 The
81 Volkische Beohachter, “Nationalsozialistischen”, 25 January 1930. See also Illustriete Beohachter, 
“Politik der Woche”, 1 February 1930, cited in C. Hartmann (ed.), Adolf Hitler. Reden, Schriften, 
Anordmmgcn. Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933. Band III. Zwischen dan Reichstagswahlen, Jidi 1928 - September 1930 
(Munich, 1995), doc. 10, pp.55-58
82 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4 Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 2 October 1945, fr.'5<^(^, 721
83 NA, RG 238, M1270, roll 4 Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 3 October 1945, fr.757
84 See E. Frohlich (ed.), DieTagebttcher von Joseph Goebbels. Samtliche Fragmente. Aujzeichnungen 1924 
bis 1941. Teil 1, Band I. 27.Juni 1924-30. Degember 1930 (Munich, 1987), entries of 28 January and 8 June 
1930, pp.489,558 respectively
85 Frohlich, Die Tagebticher von Joseph Goebbels, entries of 7 June and 11 October 1930, pp.557, 616
86 Volkischer Beohachter, “Kumpfer des kommenden Reiches. Dr. Wilhelm Frick”, 8 August. For 
more examples of hyperbole see Volkischer Beohachter, “Ein Jahr Staatsminister Dr. Frick”, 25-26 
January 1931, and, ibid., “Dr. Frick”, 27 January 1931
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article accused the Marxist and bourgeois parties of wanting Frick’s 
ministry to be no different from those of his predecessors, in the hope 
that disillusionment with Frick would retard the growth of the NSDAP. 
The article argued that, unlike the DVP and DNVP, Frick did not regard 
his ministerial post as a “cushy job” [Ruhe-polster], but a “workstool” 
[Atheitscbemel] - Frick had only been in office eight months and his name, 
the Volkischer Beohachter argued, was already “a beacon”. “Frick has 
shown what a single-minded and resolute Minister today has the power 
to do. Even though one or more of the measures are not entirely feasible, 
it finds its way to the heads and hearts of the remaining healthy part of
the nation”. 47
Similarly, the NSDAP’s pamphlet Der Kampf in Thuringen 
emphasised the party’s achievements in government, claiming that the 
NSDAP’s success in realising its goals was due to the fact that it 
represented “higher ideals”; and it had saved Thuringia from 
incorporation into Pi'ussia,® but the bourgeois parties wanted to dispute 
the effort made by Frick and the NSDAP Landtag faction towards the 
reorganisation of the administration. Der Kampf in Thuringen claimed that 
the bourgeois parties had not carried out this reorganisation before *
87 VolkischerB^achter, “Kampfer des kommenden Reiches. Dr. Wilhelm Frick”, 8 Augustl930
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because they lacked the “necessary strength, courage and backbone”.88 9 It 
was “particularly pretentious” when the bourgeois parties, especially the 
Landbund, claimed that Baum had balanced the budget. In the NSDAP’s 
view the LB and WP were not truly nationally minded. The two parties 
continued to libel NSDAP in election meetings. Hofer (LB) claimed that 
there wasn’t a “Frick government”, but rather a “Baum government”.90 *
“Self-interest”, in the NSDAP’s view, “shows there and everywhere” - the 
LB was “cunning, ruthless and brutal”, o” whilst the DVP was the “public 
antagonist” of the NSDAP.92 The behaviour of Bauer in the cabinet had 
shown the NSDAP that the DVP was “the greatest obstacle in the whole 
reform work”;.” In contrast to the DVP, Frick did not regard his post as a 
“cushy job”/4 Of all the coalition parties, only the DNVP had supported 
Frick “in the most respectable [manner] without exception”..
88 Der Kampf in Thuringen, pp.6>-1^1
S9 Der Kampf inThuringen, p.12, 16
8° Der Kampf in Thuringen, p. 16
81 Der Kampf in Thuringen, pp.22, 23
92 Der Kampf in Thuringen, p.22
88 W. Frick, “Thuringische Bilanz”, Nat.ionalsozialistische.sjahrbu.ch, 6. Jahrgang, 1932, p.214. See 
also Eabrlc:i^i^^RRcCdlirrle.nmiriSlerDr.Frick, p.38
8" “Dr. Wilhelm Frick”, Kationalsozialistische Monatshejic, 1. Jahrgang, 1930, p.229 
88 Der Kampf in Thuringen, p. 22
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NDSAP Membership in Thuringia, 
December 1929 - April 1931
(Sources: December 1929, F. SSUckel ( ed.). Kattmfund dic^ in Thhrmgce 1933-), p.26; January
1930 to April 1931, BABL, NS 22/1072 “Obersicht uber die Mitgliederstandsbewegung des Gaues 
Thuringen nach den von den Ortsgruppen tatsachlich abgerechneten Mitgliedern und an die 
Reichsleitung abgefuhrten Mitgliedsbeitragen”)
The membership figures for the Thuringian Gau during Frick’s 
period in office show a steady rise of between 400-500 per month from 
January to August 19.30, rising to over 600 for September, then returning 
to the previous monthly rises of between 400-500, until November and 
December when membership rose by roughly 1000 a month, then 
returning to the average of 400-500 a month for the remainder of Frick’s 
period in office. The SA in Thuringia had grown from 9 to 47 StUrme, 
with membership tripling from 1000 in January 1930 to 3000 by January
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1931.96
To what extent this rise in membership can be attributed solely 
to Frick’s presence in the Thuringian government is debatable. 
Undoubtedly many joined when Frick was in government, seeing his 
participation in government as a sign of the NSDAP’s respectability, but 
any attempt to separate such members from those who joined because 
the NSDAP had broken through in the Reichstag elections or those who 
turned from the bourgeois parties (as the DVP itself admitted) because 
of the downward spiral of the German economy at this time is almost 
nigh impossible to do. Yet, it would be safe to say that Frick must have, 
in some way, acted as a recruiting agent for the NSDAP.
The Third Motion of No-Confidence in Frick
The third motion of no confidence in Frick had been tabled by the 
SPD in mid-November.97 Ernst Hofer (LB) introduced a counter-motion 
proposing the Landtag ignore the SPD’s motion. Von Thummel, the 
Landtag’s President, accepted that Hofer’s proposal was valid since 
similar proposals were used in the Reichstag when motions of no 
confidence were introduced against Reich Ministers. However, von
96 ThHStAW, RStH/205 Bll.89,96RS
97 Vorlagen, Antr&gc, Grossc Anfragen, nr.167,13 November 1930. Marschler was again the subject
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Thummel suggested that a speaker for acceptance of Hofer’s motion, and 
a speaker against be heard by the Landtag before it voted on the
motion."
Hofer argued that since there had been a vote of no confidence on 
Frick and Marschler on 4 July there was no need for another. The SPD’s 
motions of no confidence, Hofer argued, were “solely disturbance 
attempts (Stdrungsvcrsuchm.) with the aim of thwarting the 
reconstruction work of the present government and making it 
impossible” to continue. The government parties would do everything to 
influence the Landtag so that the work of the present government could 
continue undisturbed"
Frolich argued that during the course of the government the SPD, 
and the opposition parties in general, had expressed their lack of 
confidence in Frick and Marschler, and this had been made repeatedly 
possible, according to Frolich, by the attitude of a government party.
Frick’s Final Conflict with the Reich Government
The conclusion of the police subsidies dispute did not restore
of a motion of no confidence. See ibid., nr.K^i^, 13 November 1930.
"8 Stenographische Berichtc, Band ii, 55th sitting, 20 November 1930, p.1397, col.i 
88 Stenographische Berichte, Band ii, p.l397, col.ii
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Reich-Thuringian relations to any degree of normalcy. Frick’s presence 
in the Thuringian government continued to inhibit its rehabilitation. In 
March 1931 his activities led directly to him not being invited to the 
Reich Ministry of the Interior’s conference on communist inspired 
‘godless propaganda’ (Gottlosenpropagandd) for the Lander interior 
ministers, scheduled for 16-18 March 1931.
Wirth believed it was inadvisable to invite Frick because of his 
speech in Braunschweig in which he had threatened to establish a 
parliament of the ‘National Opposition’ in Weimar’s National Theatre.100 
In addition, Wirth found Frick’s additional statements insulting, 
believing that Frick “had no cause to make threats”. MUnzel reported 
that Wirth was unsure as to whether he should have any contact with 
Frick. Wirth believed that an amicable conversation with Frick was out 
of the question since he had strongly spoken out against Frick’s 
statements in the Reichstag and had threatened the Thuringian 
government with action by the Reich (cine Rdchscxekution.). Wirth hoped, 
however, that a modus viviendi could be reached, but it had not come 
about after Frick’s “recent provocation”. Munzel pointed out that
™8 See K.D. Bracher, Die Aufl&sung der Weimarer Republic. Fine Studie zum Problem des Machtetvetfalls 
in der Demokratie, 5. Auflage (Villingen, 1971), p.343; K.D. Bratcher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, 
Structure and Consequences of National Socialism (London, 1971), p.237
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Frick’s speech was given in his capacity as a member of the NSDAP, not 
as Thuringia’s Interior Minister. Wirth argued that the two could not be 
considered as separate.1®
MUnzel’s written report outlined Wirth’s objection in more 
detail. Wirth had argued that Frick’s statement about a parliament of 
‘National Opposition’ was “a revolutionary statement in the most 
extreme [enttncntstcn] sense of the word”. This was why Wirth had 
threatened Reich action against Thuringia, and why he believed that it 
was not advisable to invite Frick The other Lander interior ministers, 
Wirth reasoned, had to understand “that it is certainly better that a 
minister who makes such threats remains away” from such a
conference.1®
Baum wrote to BrUning to complain that his government had 
been “passed over”.10® Baum said that the entire government could not 
consider Wirth’s justification as “sound” [stichhdtig].* 104 Baum argued that 
in his speech Frick had not threatened to call any parliament of the 
‘National Opposition’ into being, but had merely stated that the idea of 
one had been discussed. Baum further argued that Frick had only re-
roi ThHstAW, ThStMin/80 Bl.137 Note by Thiemer, 14 March 1931
™ ThHStAW, ThStMin/80 B11.138RS-139 Munzel to ThStMin, 14 March 1931
™ ThHStAW, ThStMin/80 Bl.141 Baum to BrUning, 27 March 1931
104 ThHStAW, ThStMin/80 BU42 Baum to BrUning, 27 March 1931
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Stated that which had already been mentioned in the left-wing press, 
and so claimed that Frick could not be interpreted as threatening Wirth 
with the creation of any such instttution.105 *Baum expected that Wirth 
would find out which statements Frick “had actually made” before he
had decided not to invite Frick to the conerrmc™1"
Baum believed that Wirth’s action was not only “an unfounded 
snub” of Frick, but also injured of the Thuringian government’s 
reputation, and showed a disregard for the Land’s standing amongst the 
other Lander. He also argued that it had also injured the reputation of 
the Reich government since a Reich minister had shown disregard 
towards a Land and its minister. Baum asked BrUning to ensure that 
Wirth would in the future “offers the measure of attention and respect 
which corresponds to Thuringia’s position and to which the Land is 
entitled” under article 56 of the Reich Constitution. ™
As with aspects of the police subsidies dispute, Baum had chosen 
to write direct to BrUning, deliberately ignoring Wirth, with Baum’s 
letter being reproduced in full in a Thuringian newspaper. State 
Secretary Wienstien (Reich Chancellery) and Ministerialdirektor 
Menzel (Reich Ministry of the Interior) both agreed that Wirth should
105 ThHStAW, ThStMin/80 B1.142RS Baum to BrUning, 27 March 1931
™8 ThHStAW, ThStMin/80 BU.112RSM43 Baum to BrUning, 27 March 1931
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receive a copy of the letter, and that nothing would be done except to 
issue an aclalowiddgement.107 08 *A bland acknowledgement was duly sent 
to Baum with no mention of any further action or resolution of the 
dispute?09
Frick's Exit from the Thuringian Government, 1 April 1931
The NSDAP had presented its successes in the Reichstag election
as a demonstration of the population’s confidence in the abilities of 
Frick and the NSDAP Landtag faction, claiming that, amongst other 
things, that the result showed that the attempts of “certain coalition 
parties”, i.e. the DVP, to damage the NSDAP’s credibility and influence 
had been “completely frustrated”. The NSDAP argued that the bourgeois 
parties had to choose between working with the NSDAP or the Marxist 
parties since the “abstention of the DVP is no longer tolerable. The 
Volkspartei is either in favour of a consciously national Thuringia or it is 
a compliant instrument of the Social Democrats”.110
107 ThHStAW, ThStMin/80 Bl.143 Baum to BrUning, 27 March 1931
108 BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl.131 Reich Chancellery note “Beschwerde des Vorstizenden des 
Thuringischen Staatsministeriums uber die Nichteinladung des Staatsministers Dr. Frick zur 
Innenminister-Konferenz im Reichsministerium des Innern”, 1 April 1931
7® BABL, R 431/2316 B11.131H31RS Punder to Baum, n.d.
110 Volkische Becha^er, “Die NSDAP an die Thuringischen Koalitionsparteien”, 18 September 
1930. See also ibid., “Der Sieg Ministers Frick”, 21-22 September 1930
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The DVP became increasingly fed-up with such abrasive attacks 
by the NSDAP. The Br^^ish Embassy in Berlin reported that the DVP’s 
patience was at breaking point, and that it would not oppose an SPD- 
KPD sponsored vote of no confidence in the “notorious Dr. Frick” on 1 
April 1931.U1 Fritz Sauckel’s article (“Hitler muL siegen”) in Der 
Nationalsozialist, attacking the Reich DVP, was cited as the final factor 
prompting the DVP’s defection from the government.1® The NSDAP 
argued that the DVP viewed this article as a “welcome pretext” to
remove Frick from the coalition.®
The DVP’s Landtag faction considered the ties between it and the 
NSDAP as severed, yet the DVP wished to remain with in coalition with 
the other parties, arguing that the NSDAP itself had severed the ties 
because of Nazi speeches and staeements.1® The DVP argued that the 
NSDAP’s “arrogant tone”, in which it had been attacked by the NSDAP, 
had become unbearable further stating that there was a point of “thus
U1 See the two reports of 27 March 1931, C2080/11/18 and 0179/11/1.8, FO 371/15214.
112 Vdlkischer Beohachter, “Die Volkspartei in Thuringen wieder einmal eingeschnappt”, 13
March 1931; Witzmann, Thttringeti von 19LS-L933, p.l75; L.D. Stokes (ed.), Kleinstadt und 
Nat^i^orn^^lsosj^^ism^u^s. Ausgewdhlte Dokumente ziir Geschichte von Eutin 1918-1945 (Neumunster, 1984), 
doc.l/24B/IV, pp.167-168
Frick, “Thuringische Bilanz”, p.214. See also Fabricius, RcichsinnenminisscrDr. Frick, p.51 
U4 Allgemeine Thttringische Landeszeitung Deutschlands, “Bruch der thuringischen Koalition
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far and no further” with its patience. The DVP objected to its leaders 
being continually slandered and vilified, accused as being fellow 
travellers of the SPD since it had always opposed the SPD in Thuringia. 
The DVP reiterated that its view that it was the NSDAP was solely 
responsible for the coalition’s collapse, arguing that the NSDAP was
naive to believe that the DVP would remove Bauer from the cabinet and 
replace him with a Staatsrat more amenable to the NSDAP. The DVP 
also argued that the NSDAP was also naive to believe it could leave the 
coalition whenever it suited it since this was not solely dependent upon 
the wishes of the NSDAP. The Nazis had to remember that all the other 
coalition parties had objected to this view and had told the NSDAP this
in the last inter-faction discussjrasn
The NSDAP replied that it was increasingly forced to the view 
that the DVP’s “far-fetched article” [an den Haaren herbeigezogener 
was solely “a pretext”, and that “behind these intrigues stands the 
[DVP’s] Reichstag faction, who, with the Centre, Democrats and Social 
Democrats, wants to destroy Thuringia’s independence”. The NSDAP 
refused to tolerate another attempt originating in Berlin “to torpedo”
vohzogen”, 14 March 1931
"8 AllgemcineThuringischc LandeszeitungDeutschlands, “Der thuringische Parteikonflikt”, 16 
March 1931
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Thuringian independence.?6 The article in Der Nationalsozialist, 
“DolchstoE gegen ThUringens Selbstandigkeit auf GeheiH Rot=Berlins”, 
which argued that the government crisis was “caused” by the DVP, had
to be viewed as the NSDAP’s official and “final statement” on the
matter,116 17
The Landtag’s Altenstenrat decided that the Landtag would meet 
on 1 April 1931 to discuss, amongst other matters, the SPD’s motions of 
no confidence in Frick and Marschler. It was reported that the DVP 
would vote for the motion. The Allgcmeine Thttringische Landeszeitung 
Deutschlands believed that any other development was unlikely since “the 
coalition parties themselves have the greatest interest in a quick 
solution to the crisis”, a crisis, which had by then lasted a fortnight had 
prevented any practical work by the government.118
The NSDAP launched one last attempt to ‘persuade’ the DVP into 
remaining within the government. “If the tone of some of our newspaper 
remarks have been sharp, it has been counter-acted by the insulting of 
Hitler by Witzmann, ... and through the grave affronts of our State
116 VolkischerBeobachter, “Vor Neuwahlen im Thuringen”, 15-16 March 1931
117 V&lbiscberBeobachter, “Der Volkspartei=Feldzug in Thuringen”, 19-20 March 1931
118 Allgcmeine Thiiringische Landeszeitung Deutschlands, “Entscheidende Aenderungen in der
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Minister Dr. Frick by Knittel”, a reference to the DVP’s Landtag 
rtpresentitive had allegedly accused Frick of cowardice in a meeting of 
the budget committee. According to the NSDAP, the DVP had 
“absolutely no cause”, therefore, to complain about the NSDAP’s tone, 
although the NSDAP believed that the DVP should “mind its own
business”*"
The NSDAP was interested in the LB, WP and DNVP’s opinion 
regarding the vote of no confidence. It accused any party that considered 
abstaining of turning its back upon the politics of the last year. The Gau 
leadership in Thuringia was fully aware that there were discussions 
being held on forming a minority government which would depend on 
the toleration of the SPD, “the greatest enemies of an independent, 
national Thuringia”. The NSDAP claimed the maintenance of a 
financially and politically independent Thuringia as “a stronghold 
[Hochhurg] of a national and Christian Germany” had been the purpose of 
the government since it was formed in 1930. “The parties moreover must 
be clear that this treason to every foundation preached since 1924 would 
cause a storm of wrath which we in Germany have never experienced *
Thuringischen Regierungspolitik”, 25 March 1931
119 VolkischerBeohachter, “Alarmsignale aus Thuringen”, 29-30 March 1931
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before”.12®
The Vote of No-Confidence in Frick
Frolich introduced the fourth and final no-confidence motion by 
saying that since the election of the coalition the SPD had regarded it as 
its first duty to remove the NSDAP from the coalition. According to 
Frolich, Frick and his Fachtr^^^ee^^m.ten. had persecuted non-Nazis and their 
organisations whilst favouring Nazis, citing the example of Georg 
Seifert, and the appointment of Nazis to the police force. This “political 
narrow-mindedness” had also led to Frick banning theatre performances 
and films, and the attempt to turn Thuringia’s cultural and educational 
establishments into party agencies. But, Frolich continued, Frick’s “style 
of governing” (Regierungskunst) had met its match in the court 
judgements passed against his measures, whilst the “huge majority” of 
the Thuringian population wanted an end to Frick’s policies, with the 
SPD attempting to bring this about with their votes of no confidence.1®
Witzmann confirmed that the cause of the crisis was Sauckel’s
article. The article contained “insults of the coarsest manner” against the 120
120 Vdlkischer Beohachter, “Alarmsignale aus Thuringen”, 29-30 March 1931. See also Der 
Nat^ionalsozialist, “Will man Thuringen der Partei der Kriegsdienstverweiger, Landessverrater und 
Religionsbeschimpfer ausliefern?”, 28 March 1931
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bourgeois parties in general, and the DVP in particular. Witzmann had 
been offended by Sauckel referring to the DVP as the “so-called 
Volkspartei”, its members as “imbecilic old men”, “deceivers and traitors, 
who in their unheard of incompetence and impudence play a wicked 
game with the fate of our population”. It was simply incorrect, protested 
Witzmann, that Sauckel claimed to be attacking the DVP at Reich level 
since the DVP in Thuringia was also affected by such remarks. The 
NSDAP had refused to withdraw the remarks and as a consequence the 
DVP had refused to participate in the inter-party discussions. 
Witzmann told the Landtag that the day before (31 March) the NSDAP 
had published a declaration, which was passed off as an offer of peace, 
yet Witzmann regarded the effort as “too late”. “You [the NSDAP] have 
had three weeks to take back the insults”. The attempt was also 
inadequate since it “in no way” conceded the severity of the insults.* 122 
Witzmann said that behind the crisis of the last few weeks lay “weighty 
causes” which had continually risen in their intensity. Witzmann 
argued that although the NSDAP claimed not to be a party, it was the 
most political party of all since its representatives considered it more 
important to carry out propaganda for the NSDAP than carry out the
m StenographtscheBerichtcy Band II, 79th sitting, 1 April 1931, p.1820, col.II-p.1822, col.I
122 StenographischeBerichte, p.l822, col.I-p.1822, col.II
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government’s work: “That has been a severe disappointment for us”. 
Witzmann confessed that it had not occurred to the DVP that it should 
not have had any expectations about Frick.123 Witzmann stressed that 
from the beginning of the coalition “we knew ... that we would have to 
make sacrifices”. The DVP did not deny that some good had been 
achieved by the coalition, yet it had been achieved by the coalition 
acting together. It was quite wrong, in Witzmann’s opinion, for the
NSDAP to claim that it had done all the work. Witzmann reminded the 
Landtag that since Christmas he had been publicly pronouncing that 
there was a point of ‘thus far and no further’, protesting that the DVP 
had always behaved in a loyal manner towards the government despite 
the antLNSDAP view of the Reich DVP. “So loyal and unbiased has our 
attitude always been, that we are therefore filled with pain and 
indignation because ... I had again and again held fast despite all the 
difficulties from day one, not to lose patience, and to make the effort 
with this young party”.124
Heilmann accused Witzmann of doing an injustice to the Nazis 
since in all important areas the NSDAP had helped high finance and the 
DVP carry out their policies, and that the DVP had consented to and
123 StenographischeBerichte, p.1823, col.ii
124 StenographischeBerichte, p.1825, col.Pp.1826, col.ii
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participated in Nazi policies, albeit with “bleeding hearts and tearful 
eyes”.I® Heilman pointed out that over the previous year the DVP had 
been attacked and insulted by the NSDAP many times, but only now the 
DVP sought a reason to leave the government. Heilmann accused the 
DVP of wanting to leave since membership contradicted DVP policy at 
Reich level over foreign policy.
In spite of the KPD’s remarks, the DVP voted alongside the KPD 
and the DDP in support of the SPD’s motion.® There were 29 votes for 
the dismissal of Frick and Marschler, 22 for their retention in the 
government, and two absences.®® Frick and Marschler immediately 
resigned.® Karl Kien, the DNVP’s Staatsrat, resigned for ‘personal’
reasons.125 * * * 9
The coalition formally dissolved despite Hitler and Sauckel’s
125 StenographischeBerichte, p.l831, col.II
44 Vorlagen, Antriige, Grosse Anfragen, nr.209, 21 March 1931. Marschler was subject to his third 
motion of no confidence. See ibid., nr.210,21 March 1930.
n7lLB and 1 KPD.
48 See ThHStAW, ThStMin/281 Frick to von ThUmmel,l April 1931; Allgemeine Thuringische 
Landeszeitung Deutschlands, “Die nationalsozialistischen Mitglieder scheiden aus der thuringischen 
Regierung aus”, 1 April 1931; Weimarische Zeitung, “Sturz des nationalsozialistischen Ministers Dr. 
Frick”, 1 April 1931; BABL, R 43 1/2316 Bl. 13-4 W.T.B. “Das MiHtrauensvotum gegen Staatsminister 
Frick angenommen”, 1 April 1931; The Times, “Setback to Nazi Fortunes: Defeat of Dr. Frick”, 2 April 
1931
4® Kien, like Frick, had not been elected to the Landtag.
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attempts to revive it.130 Frick’s fall from office was a particular blow for 
Hitler since the NSDAP was also facing the ‘Stennes Revolt’ within the 
SA at the same time. On hearing of Frick’s fall, Goebbels wrote: “In the 
meantime Frick is overthrown. Luck enough!” [Glwckesgenug.Q131
That evening Hitler launched a stinging attack upon the DVP. He 
claimed that the whole of German history had been a series of tragic 
acts, which revealed the enemy of the German Volk as an internal 
enemy.132 The DVP, which had deposed Frick, was not representative of 
the German Volk. “[A]fter today’s contemptible infamy”, said Hitler, “a 
day of revival shall come once again ... There is no reconciliation with 
our opponents. They must be annihilated. There is no German ascent 
without destroying these parties.” Turning to the subject of Frick's 
removal from the coalition, Hitler said that Frick could only use “a 
fraction of his might for Thuringia”. For, after today’s events, you can 
judge how much he has had to struggle against these parties ... that he 
has been overthrown has elevated him in my eyes ... one cannot govern
130 IT. Patze W. Schlesinger, Geschichte Thtiringens. Teil 5(ii) (Cologne/Vienna, 1978), pp. 512- 
513
131 See E. Frohlich (ed.), Die Tageblicher voti Joseph Goebbels. SctmtlicheFragmente. Aufzeichnungen 1924 
bis 1941. Teil 1, Band II. 1. Januar 1931-31. Dezember 1936 (Munich, 1987), p.42, entry of 2 April 1931
132 Dcr Nationalsozialist, “Die Tat von Heute bringt der Bewegung mindestens eine Million 
neuer Menschen”, 3 April 1931
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Germany with these elements ... Our opponents shall also come to the
realisation that 1 April has been the blackest day of the Deutsche
Volkspartei.”133
Conclusion
This chapter considered Frick's relationship with his coalition
partners, particularly with the DVP given that they had been strongly 
opposed to Frick’s candidature. The chapter revealed that the DVP’s 
attitude towards Frick began to harden as early as March as a result of 
the Thuringian NSDAP’s hostile towards the DVP, but that despite the 
DVP’s evident misgivings it decided to remain in the coalition, and 
focused on the intense misgivings of the DVP towards Frick and the 
NSDAP by June 1930, but how dislike of the SPD, prevented the DVP 
defecting from the coalition in July’s vote of no-confidence, despite the 
undeniable evidence that the NSDAP despised the DVP. The NSDAP- 
DVP relationship deteriorated even further after the NSDAP’s 
spectacular result in the Reichstag elections in September 1930, to the 
point that by late March 1931 the DVP had simply had enough of being 
the target of the NSDAP’s hostility and abandoned any reservations it
133 Dcr Nationalsozialist, “Die Tat von Heute bringt der Bewegung mindestens eine Million
neuer Menschen”, 3 April 1931
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had had in voting with the SPD, KPD and DDP in removing Frick from 
office.
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Chapter 7: Conchision
Frick, the first Nazi Minister
“Unimportant as the entire incident appears, it [Frick’s period in office] did achieve 
significance through the fact that it involved the first attempts by the National
Socialists to use the powers of a constituted government for their own ends.”1
As Thuringia’s Interior Minister Frick clearly attempted to 
remove pro-Republic, communist or anti-Nazi officials from his 
Ministries and the Thuringian government, and recruit Nazi or pro­
Nazi individuals, with particular regard to the Thuringian police 
force. The existence and use of article 3, paragraph 1 of the Enabling 
Act, it could well be argued, pointed to an intention to apply it on a 
much broader basis, but that the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s 
successful opposition, which led to the Reichsgericht’s judgement 
against article 3, paragraph 1, prevented its further application. Given 
that Frick then enacted a measure designed to root out communist 
officials and civil servants is possible proof that Frick did have the 
intention of applying article 3, paragraph 1 of the Enabling Act on a 
much broader scale within the government and administration of 
Thuringia.
1 E. Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic: Volume II: From the Locarno Conference to Hitler’s 
Seizure of Power (Cambridge, MA., 1963), p.262
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On the subject of the political complexion of the police
officers and orientation of the political police after the
Machtergreifung, Robert Gellately has written:
“The transformation of the old centralised political police forces across the individual 
German states did not require a widespread cleansing of the ranks or purge of the old 
political police. In a word, the police became Nazis or at least adjusted to the Nazi 
conceptions of the police; there was no wholesale expulsion of the old custodians in 
favour of the Nazi Party members, the Brownshirts (SA), or SS radicals. That said, there 
was to be some shuffling in some quarters; but, as we have seen, there is a considerable 
difference of opinion concerning the nature and extent of any ‘purge’. The only way to 
settle this issue would be to carry out a full-scale quantitative analysis of Germany’s 
various political police forces before 1933 (perhaps as far back as 1930), and then to
2
trace what happened in the following years.”
The course of the police subsidies conflict shows that Frick 
was keenly interested in altering Thuringian police force. But Frick’s 
appointment of Nazi Party members as police directors illustrates 
that he was more interested in ‘re-aligning’ the management of the 
Thuringian police force since this offered more potential to capture 
and control the whole police force from above than would an influx 
of Nazi Party members into the rank and file of the police. Perhaps it 
did not escape Frick that the appointment of professionally qualified 
civil servants who just happened to be NSDAP members would
2
R. Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933 1^^-45 (Oxford,
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provoke less of a furore, though the police subsidies dispute has 
illustrated that the Reich government would not tolerate any 
attempt by Frick to alter the Thuringian police in a manner other 
than that laid down by law. As 1930 progressed the Reich and 
Prussian governments’ concern about the growth of the NSDAP, and 
the threat it posed to the Republic, were revealed in the lengthy 
manuscripts about the Nazi Party. 3 For, despite the ambivalent 
attitude of the NSDAP towards civil servants,4 the Reich and 
Prussian governments feared that this group, as well as those that 
were relied upon to maintain public order and internal security (the 
police and the Reichswehr) could be used by the Nazis as a means of 
subverting the Republic from within.
What can be said of Frick’s time as Education Minister? Hitler
certainly believed that the post offered great potential and, if 
exploited correctly, would lead to Thuringia becoming the centre of
1990), pp.252-253
® See BABL R 43 1/2682 Reich Ministry of the Interior, “Das hochverraterische 
Unternehmen der NSDAP", November 1930, and R 43 1/2682-2683 Prussian Ministry of the 
Interior, "IDnkschrift des Preuftischen Innenministeriums", August 1930
4 See J. Capian, “Speaking the Right Language: The Nazi Party and the Civil Service 
Vote in the Weimar Republic”, in T. Childers (ed.), The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919-1933 
(London, 1986), pp.182-185
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another renewal of the German spirit,5 and place the NSDAP at the 
head of the right wing and conservative movement against the 
‘modernist’ trends associated with the Weimar Republic. Frick 
desperately wanted to awaken the instinct for volkisch ‘self­
preservation’ in the youth of Thuringia by developing the education 
syllabus to illustrate and reflect the “heroic stance.”6 The banning of 
All Quiet on the Western Front, the introduction of decrees designed to 
foster colonial sentiments, as well as irredentist feelings towards the 
Auslanddeutschtum, together with the introduction of anti-Semitic 
school prayers, was part and parcel of Frick’s mandate. In light of 
such measures, it would be hard to disagree with a contemporary 
opinion that “Frick did his best to obey [Hitler’s] instructions by 
using his position to turn every school and educational agency into 
an instrument of propaganda”7 Needless to say, Frick’s attempts to 
inculcate the minds of young people in the ways of National Socialist 
thinking were only part of the picture. The action against the
contents of the Weimar Schloss Museum can be viewed as a reaction
F. Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen als Modell der Machtergreifung: 
ein Bri^<ef Hitlers aus demjahre 1930”, Vierteljahrshefte filr Zcitgeschichte (iv-October), 14. Jahrgang, 
1966, p. 463
1 G. Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Der Legalist des Unrechtstaates. Eine Politische Biographic 
(Paderborn, 1992), p.58
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against what was perceived as the Republic’s “fraudulent spirit of
Weimar.”
Donald Tracey has argued that many of Frick’s measures were
more notable for their publicity value, rather than for any real 
administrative content.7 8 Frick publicly avowed his intention “to 
make Thuringia into the centre of an extremely fanatical National 
Self-defence, Opposition and Freedom”,9 * 11and Frick was indeed 
successful in drawing attention to himself and the NSDAP. The Times 
newspaper and Great Britain's embassy in Berlin compiled extensive 
reports concerning Frick’s ministerial period. The Times reported that 
Thuringia became known as “Frick’s Reich” due to the publicity he 
generated® Frick’s “biting commentary” against the Young Plan can 
be cited as an example, for although it quickly emerged that Frick 
had not been rntitkd to make such a speech, this was irrelevant 
since the speech had been made, with public and media attention
7 R. T. Clark, The Fall of the German Republic: A Political Study (London, 1935), p.323
g
D.R. Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia, 1924­
1930”, Central European History (i-March), Volume S, 1975, p.47
9 H. Patze and W. Schlesinger, Geschichte Thuringens. Teil 5(ii) (Cologne/Vienna, 197S), 
p.509,• Neliba, Wilhelm Frick, p.59. Frick allowed National Socialist papers to resume publication 
in Thuringia, see L.L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich (New York, 197^), p.lOl
® The Times, “Setback to Nazi Fortunes: The Defeat of Dr. Frick”, 2 April 1931
11E. Frohlich, E. (ed.), Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels. Samtliche Fragmente. Aujzeichnungen 
1924 bis 1941 Teil 1, Band 127.Juni 1924-30. Dezemberl930 (Munich, 1987), p.514
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again focusing upon Frick and his role in the Thuringian 
government. Even Frick suffering the misfortune of losing to the 
Reich government over the Enabling Bill, the Reich government’s 
withholding of police subsidies, and the defeat of his anti-Semitic 
school prayers undoubtedly had a beneficial effect in reminding the 
German electorate within Thuringia and Germany that Frick was 
very much alive and well.
One final factor that deserves consideration is Frick’s relations 
with his coalition partners. Those who consider Frick’s ministerial 
sojourn in Thuringia as a prelude to the Third Reich have neglected 
this. The development of the Thuringian NSDAP, first under Artur 
Dinter, and then Fritz Sauckel, provided a power base for the Nazi 
Party to challenge the other right-wing parties in Thuringia for a 
share in political power following the Landtag election of December 
1929. More importantly, the organisational cohesion and electoral 
success of the Thuringian Nazi Party was a major factor in the reason 
why Frick was not ejected from the government prior to April 1931, 
despite the evident dissatisfaction of the DVP from early March 1930 
onwards. The coalition parties - DVP, DNVP, WP, and the LB - 
needed the Thuringian NSDAP in the coalition government, for 
without Nazi support, the coalition would not have possessed a
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majority, and Thuringia would have possibly been governed by an 
SPD"KPD coalition instead. However, and arguably more 
importantly, the coalition parties were more minded to tolerate 
Frick than they perhaps would have done if their performance in the 
Landtag election of December 1929 had not been characterised by a 
weakening of the vote through defections to the Nazi Party. The 
coalition parties understood, especially the DVP (and Hitler more 
so), that they needed Frick much more than he needed them, and 
that should they remove him from office a new Landtag election 
would result in a further disintegration of their vote in the NSDAP’s
favour.
Towards an Interpretative Framework
Hitler’s letter of early February 1930 to Herr Eichhorn, his 
overseas supporter, which contained Hitler’s frank description of his 
“deliberate plans and tactics”12 over the formation of the coalition 
government in Thuringia, shows that Hitler clearly possessed 
definite ideas about how Frick was to spend his time in office. Most 
historians who have considered Frick’s period in office believe that it
P
F. Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen”, p.455
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constituted something more than a propaganda campaign. Donald 
Tracey acknowledges that
“the Frick ministry illustrates Hitler’s tactics so clearly as to constitute a general model 
for the assumption of power.”13
Fritz Dickmann believed that::
“the course of events from January 1930 in Thuringia appear almost as a dress rehearsal 
to the Machtergreifung three years later.”14
The ‘dress rehearsal’ interpretation is a simple and initially 
convincing theory - a good example of a post hoc analysis that 
historians can impose upon events. However, there are three 
objections to this theory.
First, little - if any - primary or secondary source research has 
been undertaken to substantiate the claim After all, how can it be 
possible to describe Frick’s exercise of ministerial power in 
Thuringia as a “dress rehearsal for the seizure of power” without any 
detailed examination of his period in office?
Second, there has not been any attempt to develop a theory of
13 Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia”, p. 48
14 Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen”, p.458
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a ‘dress rehearsal’ and what this would mean in practice: it has 
simply been enough to describe Frick’s activities in Thuringia as a 
precursor to events within Germany between 1933 and 1934, and 
then leave the matter at that. Such an uncritical association between
the NSDAP’s wielding of power in Thuringia, and then Germany, 
does not take the understanding of events in either situation far, if 
anywhere at all. The hypothesis is far too rigid and deterministic 
since it rests upon a superficial and selective view of the two events.
Lastly, and perhaps, most importantly, despite Hitler’s 
professed wish that Frick radically alter the areas of Thuringia’s 
government and administration that were within his grasp, what did 
Hitler understand by this? Was it to be a ‘dress rehearsal’, even 
though to anyone’s knowledge Hitler never mentioned the term in 
connection with the events in Thuringia? If it was, how far did Hitler 
conceive Frick’s ministry as a ‘dress rehearsal’, e.g., a highly defined 
exercise with highly defined aims, or a mission to reconnoitre the 
ground to see how far the NSDAP could advance. Even the nature 
and contents of Hitler’s briefing to Frick can only be speculation. Yet 
what did Goebbels mean when he wrote on 8 January 1930? “There
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[in Thuringia] we will put it to the first test.”15 If Goebbels' views can 
be taken as an accurate reflection of Hitler's, then the idea of a “dress
rehearsal” moves from the sphere of circumstantial evidence (and 
historical wishful thinking) towards the realm of premeditated 
action. However, the “dress rehearsal” theory is a view of the Nazi 
Party and its attitude towards governmental power, which, it could 
be argued, is one of the last ‘conspiratorial' interpretations of Nazism 
that still awaits demolition by historians, for the “dress rehearsal” 
hypothesis fails to take into account any degree of opportunism and 
reaction to events, either by Frick in 1930-1931, or by Hitler in 1933.
It is the missing dimension of opportunism, which is crucial in 
considering the wider significance of Frick’s ministries. Gunther 
Neliba, Frick’s biographer, has taken an idea of Hildegard Brenner,16 
and argues that Frick turned Thuringia into a “field of experiment” 
(Experimentierfeld)17. Neliba believes that many of Frick’s decrees and
15 “Da wir werden die erste Probe aufs Exempel liefern”, E. Frohlich (ed.), DieTageblicher 
von Joseph Goebbels. Sttmtliche Fragmente. Aufeeichnungen 1924 bis 1941. Teil 1, Band I. 21. Juni 1924-30. 
December 1930 (Munich, 1987), p.480
16 H. Brenner, DieB^wntpirliDidesNatioli^isojetiNatios (Roinbeck bei Flamburb, 19<^a), p.22
17 See G. Neliba, “Wilhelm Frick und Thuringen als Experimentierfeld fur die 
nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung”, in D. Heiden and G. Mai (eds.), Nationalsozialismus in 
Thuringen (W7eimar/Co]ogneWienna, 1995)
326
Chapter 7: Conclusion
measures possessed the character of a “political experiment”; any 
similarities with the events of 1933"1934 are dismissed by Neliba as 
superficial. The concept of the Experimentierfeld is possibly the best 
interpretation that can be derived from the extant historical 
evidence. It permits the fact that Hitler had ideas and policies, which 
he wished Frick to pursue through his offices, but it allows for 
flexibility and opportunism in pursuit of the goals. Frick was not a 
Nazi radical. If anything, he was in many ways still the sober,
conservative minded civil servant from the Kaiserreich he had been
before he met Hitler, conscious of what could be achieved in office; 
after all, this mindset of Frick’s was the reason why he was chosen as 
Hitler’s candidate. Hitler undoubtedly wanted Frick to push the 
boundaries of reform as far as he could, but Frick knew from 
practical experience how difficult this could be. In Mein Kampf Hitler 
rejected the idea of action dictated by blueprints because he 
recognised the need of the politician to remain flexible in pursuit of 
his aims: note the change from pursuing the overthrow of the 
Weimar Republic by violent means to one of using the ballot box 
and the constitution following the failure of the Munich Putsch. The 
evidence suggests that whilst Frick’s attitude toward his mission 
was enthusiastic, his actions were tempered by caution, e.g. Frick’s
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piecemeal appointment of professionally qualified civil servants who 
just happened to be NSDAP members and their sympathisers into the 
upper echelons of the administration of the Thuringian Police Force.
In view of Frick’s experiences, did the NSDAP, as a whole, 
learn anything from the episode? Jane Caplan argues:
“It is true that Hitler wanted Frick’s spell as Thuringian interior minister in 1931 to 
serve as an experiment for a future national government, but such evidence as we have
does not suggest that the party leadership undertook any systematic review of this 
18experience or sponsored any serious planning for the future.”
It could be argued that this lack of explicit planning for any 
future ‘seizure of power’ is evidence that Frick’s period in office 
cannot be viewed as a “dress rehearsal”. If anyone were to learn any 
lessons from Frick’s period of rule in Thuringia it would be Hitler 
and a select few in the top echelon of the NSDAP who would 
conduct the negotiations over entry to a Land or Reich government. 
The lower levels of the Party would have to suffice with being told
what to do when the time came.
Nevertheless, Frick’s experiences in Thuringia had 
demonstrated to Hitler that his idea of pursuing power at the Land
18 j. Caplan, Government without Administration: State and Bureaucracy in Weimar and Nazi 
Germany (Oxford, 1988), p.131
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level was correct, providing “a recipe for broader testing”19 in 
Braunschweig from September 1930 onwards, and Anhalt, Oldenberg 
and Mecklenberg in 1932. “In all of these coalitions the NSDAP was a 
minority party and as such interested only in controlling those 
agencies of direct use in furthering its seizure of power.”20 Although 
the events in Thuringia were by no means a complete success 
because of the strong opposition, which had been encountered, this, 
it could be argued, reflected more on the methods used to exploit the 
opportunity, rather than the aims and the ministries occupied.. The 
gaining of control over the Interior and Education Ministries in the 
state governments before 1933 show that the aims remained constant 
as these ministries would, or rather, could lead to the right rewards. 
Despite the excesses of Frick and the notoriety he brought to himself 
and the NSDAP, the Nazi Party remained a perfectly respectable 
coalition partner in the eyes of the conservative right,21 22which was a 
significant step toward the creation of the Third Reich^
19 Dickmann, “Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen”, p.458
20 Tracey, “The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia”, p.49
21 J.C. Fest, Hitler (London, 19Z4), p.265. See A. Dorpalen, Hindenbag and the Weimar 
Republic (Princeton, N.J., 1964), p.437, for von Papen’s comments of 1932 that Frick was “a 
moderate man who ... had led the Thuringian government with circumspection.”
22 M. Broszat, The Hitler State (Harlow, 1981), p.8
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The Thuringian School Prayers, April 1930
1. Dear God, you desire with a strong hand,
In these terrible times.
The Homeland, the Fatherland,
to cultivate deep in our hearts.
Lord, allow us to grow pure and great,
To one day carry out a great duty
The bright destiny of the liberated Volk,
To be held in. strong hands.
(From a prayer collection of the Thuringian Protestant Church's Landeskirchairat)
2. Father, in your all-mighty hand,
Stand our Volk and Fatherland.
You were our Forefathers’ strength and honour.
You are our constant weapon and defence.
Therefore liberate us from deception and treason.
Make us strong for the liberating act.
Grant us the heroic courage of the Saviour,
Honour and freedom are the highest good!
Our vow and watchword is always;
Germany awake! Lord liberate us!
God grant it!
(By a Protestant clergyman)
3. Father in Heaven,
1 believe in your all-mighty hand,
1 believe in the Volkstum and Fatherland,
1 believe in the Forefathers, might and honour,
1 believe you are our weapon and defence,
1 believe you punish the treason of our Land,
And bless the liberating act of the Heimat,
Gennany, awake to freedom!
(By a German poet)
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4. Father in Heaven.
I believe in your omnipotence, justness and love.
I believe in loving my German Volk and Fatherland.
I know that atheism and high treason tear apart and destroy our Volk.
I know that despite this, the yearning and the force for 'freedom live in the best,
I beheve that this freedom shall come about through the love of our Father in 
Heaven if we believe in our own strength.
(By a Protestant teacher)
5. Hear us, O Lord, the children implore you;
Allow our work to go forward!
Give rest to our dead warriors!
The widows, orphans you console!
And give us Germans renewed strength
Which shall create Freedom and Peace for us,
(By a catholic teacher)1
1 AmLsblattoC:sTli^i^'islgische/lMi.mstcriumef1(r\y)S^slJi0lmlgl 1930, nr.6,22 April 1930, p.40
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